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ASSTRACr 
This study is an investigation into the shifts in ways of knowing 
which have been subsumed under the label of postmodernism. More 
specifically, it is concerned to relate theories Of POstmOdernism 
to the construction of film as an object of knowledgeg and to 
feminism's place in a Modernist/postmodernist divide. 
Chapter One offers an examination of competing readings of the 
nature of aesthetic Modernism drawing primarily upon debates on 
Modernist epistemological legitimation advanced by JUrgen Habermas 
and Jean-Franijois Lyotard. 
Chapter Two utilizes Lyotard's notion of Modernism as knowledge 
legitimated by the grands r6cits of speculation and emancipation to 
propose a understanding of the conceptual parameters of avant-garde 
film Modernism. 
Chapter Three examines Lyotard's view that postmodernism is a 
condition of cultural 'incredulity towards metanarratives' by 
introducing feminist interventions into avant-garde Modernism: it 
is argued that feminist deconstructionist film plays a crucial role 
in delegitimating film practices brought under the metanarrative of 
speculation by challenging the non-gendered mode of spectatorial 
knowledge claimed for them. 
Chapter Four extends postmodernist critiques of 'totalizing' 
discourses to the grand r6icit of liberty, and advances the view 
that feminist deconstructiorism, and related psychoanalytical 
theories of female subjectivity/spectatorship, are in turn 
delegitimated for instrumentalizing and homogenizing the feminist 
'social bond'. 
Chapter Five considers Lyotard's propositions for a fragmentation 
of Modernist models of the 'social bond' in relation to his 
proposal for a theory of resistance defined in terms of 'dissensual 
paralogy'. Within the context of cultural and technological shifts 
in contemporary image-culture, the usefulness of a theory of 
postmodernism which remains embedded within Modernist 
epistemological differentiations is questioned. A proposal for a 
theory of film postmodernism which dispenses with the avant- 
garde/mass culture binary is suggested as a prerequisite for 
clearing a theoretical space for a politics of resistance which is 
not founded on instrumentalized and homogeneous spectators. 
Chapter Six extends this to consider how postmodernist notions of 
the dissolution of the 'self' and the fragmentation of 'social 
bond' relate to feminist emancipatory claims. A parallel to the 
theoretical 'loss' of Modernist foundationalisms; is offered by 
drawing on black and lesbian perspectives on film spectatorship to 
argue for theories of film meaning which reflect a multiplicity of 
modes of spectatorial positioning. 
The study concludes with an assessment of feminism's place in 
critiques of totalizing discourses and argues for localg contextual 
rather than metanarrative validations of film as critical 
discourse. 
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THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION 
lRrROINJCTION 
The work that follaws aims to provide a new understanding of 
shifts in 'ways of knowing' provoked by the emergence of the 
concept of 'Postmodernism'. More specifically, it is concerned to 
investigate what it might mean if debates on postmodernism were 
applied to film. Questions of whether the late twentieth century 
is indeed best understood in terms of a 'postmodern condition' have 
led to major re-examinations of key areas in intellectual enquiry - 
political and social sciences, global and cultural studies, art 
practice and aesthetics. During the early period of my research, 
however, few theoretical studies had approached film and its 
relationship to philosophical debates on postmodernism. Where film 
did find its way into discussions on postmodernist culture, as in 
Fredric Jameson's seminal essay 'Postmodernism, or The Cultural 
Logic of Late Capitalism' and Linda Hutcheon's A Poetics of 
Postmodernism, the contexts of these analyses suggested that visual 
features or filmic strategies exhibited by contemporary films were 
illustrative of broader theoretical propositions: 'pastiche' and 
$parody', 'depthiessness', the 'waning of affect' and 'le mode 
retro' in Jameson; self-reflexivity, signification through 
historical quotation and ironic parody in Hutcheonel Both critics 
were comerned to insist that these features were indicative of 
wider cultural and historical processes, but the ease with which 
theorists drew equally upon fiction, film, architecture and 
-1- 
philosophy to construct a notion of 'postmodernist cAdture' 
obscured the terms upon which film as a specific cultural 
I apparatus' might be construed in view of shifts from modernism to 
postmodernism. From this, it became evident that for thinking 
through the relationship between film and the concept of 
postmodernism, it was important theoretically to separate two 
components. Firstly, postmodernism as the signifier of 
epistemological change. The prefix 'post' brings with it a cluster 
of conceptual difficulties: notions of succession, periodization, 
historical sequence and causality, serial discontinuity, the 
relations of 'pre' and 'post'. Further, the issue is raised of 
whether postmodernism represents a new theoretical 'paradigm' or 
knowledge-block marked off from modernism before it. Secondly, 
postumdernism as it designates the effects of this change. Rather 
than the fact of change itself, the term has come to signify 
certain or sets of production techniques (of interior 
design, magazine graphics, buildings, films, music, videos, 
paintings, sculptures). When isolated in this way, two distinct 
routes towards an analysis of the meaning of postmodernism and film 
were offered: through the broader conceptual resources which 
constitute film as modernist or as postmodernist, and through 
analysis of contemporary stylistic changes in modes of filmic 
signification exhibited by specific texts. However, my research 
was framed by a wish to evolve some theoretical means which could 
account for, and interrelate, both 'levels' of analysis for film. 
My bias towards. theories of critical analysis led me to the belief 
that a more considered understanding of film's relationship to 
postmodernism could be reached from the epistemological level, fr(xn 
- 
which film is constructed as an objer-t of knowl. Regretfullyl 
this approach has precluded detailed visual analyses of film texts 
though I would suggest that the issues raised by this study have 
some bearing on the theoretical 'conditions' under which such Work 
might be conducted. My interest in the ways in which film has been 
subject to historically shifting modes of construction should 
signal that this thesis has been guided by the view that there is 
no 'natural' object of study called film but, rather, that debates 
on modernism and postmodernism indicate the irretrievably 
historical nature of conceptual resources for constituting 
epistenological 'objects'. 
Michel Foucault has contributed much to 'excavating' the 
discursive nature of intellectual/academic subjects of study2: for 
instance, the conceptual unities secured by such terms as book, 
genre, oeuvre, author; the forms of continuity offered by notions 
of influence, tradition or causal succession; the divisions of 
discourse (knowledge/truth) that mark off fields and boundaries 
along traditional institutional departmental lines 
- 
all are 
formalized at the level of the discipline. Foucault's 
archaeological method sets out to disturb discursive coherence and 
to displace these structuring concepts in order to expose and 
trouble the 'obviousness' of their effects. Instead of the 
immediate and 'natural' objects given for study, Foucault offers 
the means to understand the formation of an 'object' of study as 
alre implicated in a vast and intricate work of historical 
construction. And it is from a similar position that I have 
investigated the divergent 'constructions' of film as object of 
knowledge in both modernist and postmodernist discourses. Film, 
- 
and the modes of its analysis, then, forms a siteg or a space: 
the object does not wait in limbo the order that will Kee it and enable it to become embodied in a visible and 
prolix objectivity; it does not pre-exist itselfq held 
back by some obstacle at the first edges of light. It 
exists under the positive conditions of a complex group 
of relations. 3--- 
Foucault's 'discursive formation', it should be clear, does not 
reduce the formation of objects to an idealist or solipsistic 
situation in which objects are wholly created through thought. 
R. 
-ather, the politics of the archive demand that the thoroughly 
historical conditions of that system of formation be recognized. 
The epistemic space opened up in/by discourses on postmodernism 
demands full recognition that 'objects' as such 
- 
film, 
sculptures, buildings, advertisements, critical writings, clothes, 
furniture 
- 
do not nor cannot_themselves provide rules for their 
study, the modes of approach for analysis, nor dictate definitions 
of their 'proper' or 'essential' nature. As a consequence, film 
study is a loose approximation of a certain activity which is 
articulated through a set of conceptual operations rather than frm 
the confrontation of critic and preexistent set of objects. I am 
aware that these observations raise myriad theoretical problems 
which I intend to address over the course of this work. At 
present, I simply wish to signal an awareness that the 'complex 
group of relations' that permit film to become an object of study 
are subject to change. 
My thesis is shaped by the view that debates on which 
epistemological resources are available for the construction of 
film as an object of modernist or of postmc)dernist knowledge are 
profoundly historical ones. Foucault suggests that the 'unity of a 
- 
discourse is based not so much on the permanence or uniqueness of 
an object as on the space in which various objects emerge and are 
continuously transformed. 4 His archaeological method can be used 
to argue that debates on 'postmodernism' represent a recasting of 
the meaning of the 'specificity, of the 'space' that can be 
occupied by film. It is thus clearly untenable to hold that a 
theory of film postmodernism can be constructed without reference 
to a network of other epistemological 'realignments', and theories 
of socio-economics, history, politics, textuality, and subjectivity 
have contributed significantly to this process. A brief outline of 
key components of this complex or network of ideas that have been 
characterized as 'postmodernist' may be useful for positioning this 
study in a wider context: 
a) 
Debates over the emergence or existence of a 'post-Industrial' 
socio-economic condition of society; the shift away from 
production to consumption-led economies; critiques of Marxist 
class-based models of social structure; Baudrillard's society of 
the simulacrum; 
b) Politics 
Challenges to conceptions of mass political groups; e. g. 
Foucault's reformulation of previous monolithic ideas about 
power, society and the politics of the individual; emergence of 
historically new political imperatives which contest old models 
of historical development and political action; 
c) Aesthetics 
Contestation of older aesthetic forms of modernism and its 
claims for autonomy; the move to thinking of artistic practices 
as wholly embedded within economic and ideological systems and 
shrinking of the domain of art as privileged aesthetic critique 
of social reality; 
d) Post-structuralist Theory 
Derridean deconstructions of 'presence' and 'logocentrism'; 
post-Saussurean theories of language and semiotics; decentring 
of the Subject/production of subjectivity through mechanisms of 
textuality; critiques of formalist models of textual 
explication. 
- 
Again, this is not to suggest that the shift from modernism to 
postmodernism marks of f one coherent historical and/or intellectual 
movement across a range of practices. To pose the question of what 
postmodernism 'is' has itself been subject to critique: demanding a 
positive definition which can accommodate all aspects of academic 
enquiry points to a desire to force a multiplicity of features into 
a conceptual Ounity', often to facilitate a neat historical 
succession of coherent periods (as in Jameson's Marxist notion of 
postmodernism as 'cultural dominane). My view is that this kind of 
thinking is too dependent on Enlightenment or historicist 
epistemological sets that postmodernism works to unsettle. 
Instead, my analysis has been guided by the view that it is 
inappropriate to attempt a definition of postmodernism in general 
- 
I hope my understanding of it emerges from the theoretical material 
I am using. Thus, to avoid the potential pitfall of 'totalizing' 
contemporary discourses into a unitary postmodernist culture, my 
approach to this study was guided by some fundamental questions 
that relate specifically to film. Under what circumstances could 
film be construed as modernist? Was postmodernism a variant of 
modernism and thus a concern only for the minority 'avant-garde' as 
a form of a 'postmodemist aesthetic'? How did the 'postnodernist' 
features of contemporary mainstream Hollywood texts identified by 
Jameson and Hutcheon relate to a strong definition of film 
modernism? Or, did postmodernism denote the view that the cultural 
dominance of realist narrative cinema had marginalized modernist 
film practices so thoroughly that the claims of something called 
post-modernism need hardly be entertained? Further, did the 
absence of substantial debates over the meaning of postmodernism 
- 
for film suggest that film studies had already accounted for the 
effects attributed to a shift into cultural postmOdernism? It 
seemed appropriate to frame an enquiry by asking these questions 
since it brought into focus that what was missing from early 
notions of film postmodemism was a clear set of conceptual 
parameters for defining film modernism. As Peter Dews rightly 
states: 
One cannot... provide a coherent account of postmodernity 
without a determinate concept of modernity; and such a 
concept cannot be developed A priori, but is necessarily 
dependent on 5 the theorization of long-term historical processes... 
This has indeed been a primary intention of the work that follows 
though it is important to recognize that the 'coherence' of a 
theory of film modernism is necessarily one of theoretical 
reconstruction. By way of an analogous example of such a process: 
despite the constructional and visual diversity between the 
eclectic 'historicist' buildings of James Stirling, Michael Graves 
and Richard Bofill, the term 'postraDdernist' has been used to argue 
that these architects are united by being 'post' the modernist 
'International Style' of le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe and 
Berthold Lubetkin. 6 That the International Style's aesthetic of 
functionalist purity of space, mass and form was but one 
manifestation of the Modern movement (compare with the 'organic' 
forms of Frank Lloyd Wright or the 'expressionist' architecture of 
Erich Mendelsohn) suggests that quite disparate understandings of 
postmodernism can be construed according to how modernism is 
defined. In short, a definition of the term 'postmodernism' is 
rendered more complex by the fact that what it is held to succeed 
(or subsume) cannot itself be forced into a single conceptual 
- 
c 
. 
Onc unity. Or, to look at this another wayq epts of postmodernism 
can be purchased though perhaps inevitably at the expense of 
forcing modernism into a conceptual 'unity' which may belie 
historical and cultural diversity. This work has attempted to 
circumvent criticism of this mode of procedure by demonstrating 
that modernist film is not reducible to a historical past, to a 
single mode or visual language. Nonetheless, if it is accepted 
A-1- 
- 
that postmodernism is meaningful only in its relationship to 
modernism, I would hope that a certain reductiveness can be 
permitted as a necessary consequence of the nature of this 
endeavour. In other words, I do not claim that the trajectory 
outlined in this study has explanatory validity beyond the level of 
its locality and particularity. 
am aware that the terms of this Introduction have tended to 
suggest that film modernism and postmodernism can be neatly 
polarized. Rather, it is important to state that my understanding 
of postmodernism is both a negative and a positive one. By this I 
mean that postmodernist conceptual 'breaks' are necessarily 
indebted to former modernist modes of thinking: this is not to 
claim that postmodernism is 'really' only part of or an extension 
of modernism, without positive content of its own. I think it is 
useful to conceive of postmodernism as a double movement which 
grasps its reliance on modernism but only to make clear the terms 
and sustaining concepts that it 'inherits' and then works 
on/through. This becanes particularly acute when considering where 
feminism is positioned by debates on the meaning of a 
modernist/postmodernist divide. One of my guiding concerns has 
been to determine whether, and on what conditionsg feminism is 
- 
implicated in the theoretical divide opening up in debates on 
modernism and postmodernism. The title of this work, The POlitic-s 
of Representation, has been selected for the semantic value of the 
term 'representation' in two closely related senses: 
a) as the designation of a huge corpus of critical debates around 
the relation between reality and the forms of its reproduction; 
the nature and forms of meaning-bearing behaviour; 
b) the political processes of representation 
- 
the cultural/social 
construction of relations of dominance and exclusion; the 
boundaries of identity as systematized versions of 
hierarchy/authority. 
'Representation' in the first sense is perhaps the sole common 
ground for a continually shifting domain of critical theory. A 
familiar inventory forms a certain theoretical conjuncture: 
semiotics, linguistics, literary theory, psychoanalysis, political 
and social theory, Marxism, deconstruction, discourse analysis, and 
media studies. Each of these has contributed to debates over the 
nature, forms-and effects of systems of representation at the 
levels of theory and of particular practices. My use of the term, 
though, is underwritten by a concern for the importance of the 
second sense of the term. This should indicate that my reading of 
film and postmodernism is fundamentally informed by a concern for 
politics: the course of this works intends to demonstrate that it 
is feminism which offers the best understanding of these 
developments since it is feminism which has the largest investment 
in the political effects of the transformations offered as 
postmodernist. Feminism can be seen to imbricate levels of 
- 
analysis frorn the larger sphere of socio-economics, to the 
epistemological space of cultural/aesthetic practices such as filln 
and then to the specificities of filmic/textual operations. I do 
not, however, wholly agree with Patricia Waugh's diagnosis that 
postmodernism is only the acceptable 'male' appropriation of 
feminist analyses of cultural and social productions if only 
because postmodernism has also come to irr-lude neoconservative and 
anti-feminist positions too. 7 Nonetheless, I must admit to a deep 
sympathy with her work and hope to show how feminist critiques do 
make visible the very contradictions involved in rethinking a 
postmodernist politics of representation. Accordingly, a 
substantial portion of this work has been concerned with 
determining the conditions of feminism's relationship, firstly, to 
modernist film aesthetics and, secondly, to postmodernist 
dissolution of the epistemological foundations upon which 
feminism's emancipatory claims have been constructed. I will argue 
that feminism's relationship to both modernism and postmodernism, is 
in both cases a highly ambivalent one. In some ways, this is to 
run counter to the import of some theories of postmodernism, (such 
as Baudrillard's or, as I shall demonstrate, Lyotard's) which 
appear to deny the ground upon which a politics of film, especially 
of film spectatorship, might rest though it should be clear from 
the outset that my interest in postmodernism has been determined by 
a refusal to give up the task of defining postmodernist 
#conditions' for feminist knowledge-claims. However, I do take 
seriously postmodernist critiques of the epistemlogical 
'conditions' of aesthetic modernism, and have made it a central 
- 
10- 
feature of this thesis to consider feminisin's investment in the 
'loss' of the modernist tenet that art is oppositional, the site of 
resistance per se, that it offers an oasis of 'authentic' feeling 
in a desert of alienation and reification. As Dick Hebdige has 
pointed out, the 'radical' nature of modern art, and particularlY 
painting, is now thoroughly implicated in a wholly economic 
network: the gallery system, the auction and publicity machines for 
selling canonized canmodity 'masterpieces, university and 
polyter, bnic arts curricula. 8 Similarly, the adoption of Modernist 
shock effects, for example Surrealist juxtaposition, by the 
language of advertising. This suggested that a pertinent question 
to ask, also posed by Suzi Gablik, was whether modernism has 
'failed' in its historical role as either revolutionaryg avant- 
garde or politically meaningful, and I shall endeavour to answer Cp- - 
this in relation to film. 9 This is not simply a question of the 
dissemination or 'popularizing' of modern art or film (though it is 
about this as well), but has important repercussions for cultural 
practices which recognize the severely contracted place that art, 
as the critique of a given reality, has to occupy. Postmodernist 
practices in architecture, sculpture and photography are typified 
by attempts to think through this shrinkage of the realm of the 
'purely' aesthetic; there appears to be an acknowledgement of their 
existence as practices within a social/historical 'condition' which 
cannot sustain the notion of an autonomous 'critical' sphere called 
Art, as propagated by certain philosophies of Modernist film. 
The 'radical' nature of modernist art has also been subject to 
revision for its implication in a whole network of cultural 
exclusions that define it in: 
- 
11 
- 
e.., 
its 'Eurocentrism', its 1 masculinist' stress on 
transgression and transformation, its downgrading of 
eve7, thing that doesn't fall within its definition of 
what s important i. e. women's art, domestic culture and 
reproduction, black and Third World art, 'bourgeois' and 
socialist' realin, peasant and working-class white 
mass' culture... 
These critiques reveal that modernism does not provide a unique, 
timeless and authentic system for opposition but is wholly bound to 
the conditions that gave rise to it, to the cultural experience of 
modernity at the turn of the century. That this was expressed in 
patriarchal and colonial terms marks its distance from current 
politically informed practices and theories which seek to 
destabilize the monolith of a homogeneous position of opposition. 
Ao I 
,. 
Hebdige s article suggests, postmodernism thus defined appears 
in many guises which, from the orthodoxy of Left politics, seem to 
threaten the fundamental principles that permit belief in mass 
radical action. The fracturing of oppositional discourses into a 
conflict of socially and historically underrepresented and 
diversely oppressed groups has contested the models underlying the 
claims of modernist visions of emancipation. From a feminist 
position, I have a heavy investment in forcing an activity or 
politics of difference through since it is premissed. on 
understanding the discursive, constructed nature of the (power) 
relations at work in the term 'opposition'. A politics of 
difference has of necessity to reject the older forms of political 
activity/intervention since diverse groups offer quite distinct 
analyses of whose interests are served by the functionings of 
power, what that functioning consists of and what strategies are 
best employed against its effects. Foucault repeatedly emphasizes 
the fact that it is an effect of power deployed in a certain way to 
- 
12 
- 
believe that power is simply found 'sanewhere' like the State or 
with institutions. Power is not only coercion exercised by a 
corporate body (cf. Louis Althusser)", and for that reason it 
cannot be seized: power is multiple, fragmented and effective at 
the micro level through a lateral network of relations rather than 
an 'imposition' from above (though, admittedly, it may be true that 
it is often seen and experienced as such). There is a sense in 
which the very terms of political critique are being questioned by 
postmodernism's exploration of the power-effects of homogenization. 
Again, from a feminist perspective, I do not find this disabling - 
a political sensitivity to difference has to be based on a 
dethroning of 'taken-for-granted' ideas about power, society and 
the individual. In this way postmodernism provides a perfect 
chance for rethinking social meaning and the power effects of 
theories of representation. For feminists this is not a new 
activity and I shall be addressing feminist contributions to 
postmodernism's 'sense of the interrogative' throughout this work. 
postmodernist sensibility characterizes diverse fields, 
strategies and modes of analysis: it is difficult to be specific 
without reinscribing the boundaries that have been challenged. But 
for all its potential faults, debates on postmodernism have raised 
the need for recasting older antinomies set up by avant-garde 
modernism as oppositional political discourse. Suililarly, it poses 
the possibility that 'our' culture is defined by new modes of 
knowledge production commensurate with a distinctive form of social 
organisation variously called 'post-industrial', 'computer' and 
'informational' society or the 'society of the spectacle'. For 
film study, what is at stake is the dissolution of older modernist 
- 
13 
- 
criteria used to discuss the relations of representation to reality 
and to the place of the text 
, 
and the role of the reader/spectator 
in consuming those representations. With the retraction of the 
sphere of the aesthetic as an autonomous realm of aesthetic 
experience, postmodernist artists and theorists have had to evolve 
means of critique not from some global trans-historical perspective 
but from within the confines of representational practices 
themselves. Critical debates over the term 'postmodernism' have at 
least forced open the question of the necessarily historical nature 
of conceptual apparatuses and it is in this that the debates find 
their political charge. If it can be shown that the categories 
through which an object is known (constructed) and then interpreted 
are subject to change, to historical transformation, the next step 
should be to challenge that construction on political grounds. In 
this sense the critique of representation that I have characterized 
as postmodernist moves beyond the realms of theory to offer points 
of contact and open new connexions: with the sphere of the political 
in its broadest sense. I would argue that while at first glance 
postmodernism seems a negative, destructive term (which in some 
forms appears to make meaningful action a 'humanistic' fantasy) it 
can be pressed into the service of the political. My understanding 
of postmodernism is one from which, I would argue, it is possible 
to hold that f ilm becomes once again political: not as a 
specialized form of aesthetic experience, but as a 'space' of 
contestation fully implicated in the political, cultural and 
historical formation that grounds it. 
- 
14 
- 
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CHAFM ONE 
MODERNISM/PO. TMDERNISM: TERMS OF DEBATE 
Just as wdernism was not only an artistic phenomenon but 
can also be identified in philosophy and epistemology, 
postmodemism too pertains to specific practices as well as to the 
theories available to conceptualize thern. My first task is to 
provide a broad understanding of modernism and modernity before 
defining what is specifically Modernist in film practices 
(capitalized to denote this specialized and limited use of the 
word). To do this, I want to work through some of the issues that 
arise frorn what has become known as the Lyotard/Habermas debate as 
both theorists engage with the pressing question of what 
philosophical resources are available to the late twentieth century 
for understanding its historical and conceptual place in relation 
to other 'unities' entailed by the idea of modernity. 
, Modernity: A Franwork 
The need for defining one's epoch in its singularity against 
all others is not in itself new. Indeed, a historical perspective 
on the emergence of the term postmodernism. shows that most recent 
historical periods have been characterized by a certain anxiet 
about how the Age fits with the long term development of history, 
- 
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of Progress, and of whether the Age is truly at the forefront of 
historical development, that is, truly modern-' This historical 
consciousness though not new must, however, be understood as 
particular to the onset of modernity itself2: the task of placing 
one's epoch in relation to the unfolding of historical development 
is one of the most enduring conceptual legacies of that great 
cultural mutation in European history named the Enlightenment. The 
task of defining postmodernism is rendered all the more difficult 
since it requires that one conceptualize the difference and 
specificity of one's age from those preceding it but without this 
modernist epistemological and philosophical inheritance. As 
Foucault suggests, to ask 'what is Enlightenment? ' or 'what is 
modernity? ': 
... 
always comprises two objectives which are, in 
fact, indissociable and interdependent: on the one hand, 
the search to identify in its chronology, constituent 
elements and historical conditions the moment when the 
West first affirmed the autonomy and sovereignity of its 
own mode of rationality 
- 
Lutheran Reform, 'Copernican 
revolution', Cartesian philosophy, Galilean mathematis- 
ation of nature, Newtonian physics? And, on the other 
hand, an analysis of the 'present' moment which seeks to 
define, in terms both of the history of this Reason and 
of its current balance sheet, its relation to that 
founding act: a relation of rediscovery, renewal of a 
forgotten meaning, completion and fulfilment, or 
alternatively 3 one of rupture, return to a prior epoch, 
and so forth. 
That is, answering this question is a double movement; it involves, 
firstly, a definition of the nature of modern rationality and, 
secondly, a scrutiny of one's own epoch in relation to the 
emergence of that fonn of Reason. To answer the siMilar question 
'what is postmodernism? ', then, is not only to define the specific 
characterisitics of contemporary culture but to return to that 
'founding act' of modernity and the emergence of Enlightenment 
- 
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rationality to define one's difference from it. Hereq the debates 
conducted between Jean-Fran(iois Lyotard and jorgen Habermas ar_e 
central to any study concerned with these questions. While heeding 
Warren Montag's observation that postmodernism is in danger of 
being reduced to the opposition between Lyotard and Haberinasy 
4 
an 
exploration of these thinkers does provide an initial arena in 
which to pose some general relations between art and rationality, 
modernity and culture, political action and artistic practice. 
Both theorists are concerned with what happens in the shift from a 
modernist understanding of the social function of art to a 
postmodernist one. Their arguments, however, rest on much larger 
philosophical claims about the organizationg regulation and 
dissemination of knowledge which must be considered if their more 
programmatic statements are to be fully appreciated. 
The Pro ect of Enlint t i gL 
Current arguments over the nature (or existence) of a 
specifically postmodern 'condition of knowledge' necessarily entail 
ideas and definitions of that which is thought to precede it. 
Modernism for both Lyotard and Habermas is a much greater cultural 
event in Western history than the European art movement with which 
it is commonly identified. Habermas' theory of modernity can 
usefully be played off against Lyotard's claim that the term 
I postmodern' 'designates the state of culture following the 
transformations which, since the end of the nineteenth century, 
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have altered the game rules for science, literature and the artst05 
Lyotard's report on knowledge, The Postmodern Condition (1984)9 
concentrates on the area of science and the procedures which 
legitimated or validated scientific knowledge in the period of 
modernity; it is a statement on the end of this period and 
describes the new conditions for knowledge in 'computerized' or 
'information' societies. In contrast, for Habermas, modernity is 
an 'incomplete (unvollendetes) project' which was inaugurated by a 
differentiation of the spheres of religion/metaphysics with the 
'birth' of secular humanism before and during the seventeenth 
century. 6 By the eighteenth century, Western Enlightenment 
knowledge becomes organized around three new conceptual fields 
- 
science, morality and art 
- 
and is characterized by a division of 
the previous form of religious substantive rationality between the 
three autonomous disciplines in a process of secular 
rationalization. Habermas here takes on Weber's distinction 
between formal rationality and substantive rationality. 7 The first 
can be defined in relation to action which is rational to the 
extent that it is executed according to principles that have been 
rationally calculated to achieve given ends, for instance, 
administrative bureaucracies, formal law, scientific or economic 
production. Me second type refers to the possibility of applying 
these principles to the cultural or normative sphere and to the 
grounding of definite goals/values; this would seek to apply 
rational principles to ethics, morality, social aims and conduct. 
Habermas contends that the Renaissance witnessed the separation of 
religious knowledge from knowledge of human society and it is this 
major differentiation that permits the historical emergence of the 
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new disciplines. With the gradual lessening of the role of the 
I substantive' rationality of religion and metaphysicsq Habermas 
suggests that the older forms of enquiry come to be legitimated by 
new sorts of validity. The emergent disciplines of science, art 
and morality demand new forms of validation to legitimate them as 
bodies of knowledge, producing the following commutations: 
scientific discourse truth 
morality/ethics normative rightness 
jurisprudence authenticity 
production/criticism of art beauty 
As a result of this redistribution: 
Each domain of culture could be made to correspond to 
cultural professions in which problems could be 
dealt with as the concern of special experts. This 
professionalized treatment of cultural tradition 
brings to the fore the intrinsic structures of each 
of the three dimensions of culture. 
('Modernity', p. 9) 
This cultural differentiation, at the same time a process of 
professionalization and institutionalization, brings corresponding 
new forms of rationality for the new 'dimensions' or disciplines: 
science cognitive/instrumental 
morality moral/practical 
art aesthetic/expressive 
Habermas situates the historical project of the Enlightenment 
within this emergence of specialist modes of rationality; it is 
sustained by the belief that knowledges of 'objective scienre, 
universal morality and law, and autonomous art according to their 
inner logic' would: 
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... 
promote not only the control of natural forces but 
also understanding of the world and of the selfq 
moral progress, the justice of institutions and even 
the happiness of human beings. 
('Modernity', P. 
The disciplines had to develop as objective and autonomous in order 
for their specificities be understoodt controlled and hence used in 
the pursuit of human happiness. Modernity, then, in Habermas' 
scheme is characterized by this increasing tendency towards the 
specialization of knowledge but which, crucially, intensifies at 
the expense of the overall Enlightenment project. By the twentieth 
century the broader 'substantive' social goal has all but 
disappeared leaving only 'segments treated by specialists and their 
separation from the hermeneutics of everyday communication' 
('Modernity', p. 9); knowledge is produced in 'alienated' or 
rigidly autonomous modes. 8 In painting, the gulf between artistic 
production and its reception by the non-expert is celebrated in the 
aestheticist's slogan of 'art for art's sake', while the break fr(xn 
representational painting brings further estrangement of art from 
any social or ethical function it might once have had. This raises 
issues which are fundamental to any modernism/postmodernism 
analysis of the nature and politics of film as an artistic 
practice. They will explored in depth in due course but for the 
moment suf f ice it to say that f ran Habermas' position, one might 
expect that an end to the production of knowledges in this 
Modernist form would be welcaned since 'cormonsense' has come to 
equate Modern art with inaccessible and arcane abstract painting as 
the most visible form of the specisalization that he laments. 
However, far frorn accepting the end of the Enlightenment plan 
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implicit in the term postmodernism, Habermas argues that the 
project of modernity, as the historical movement towards 
substantive social rationality, has yet to be fulfilled. To 
counteract the effect of socially alienated knowledge, he proposes 
that the task ahead lies in 'the appropriation of the experts' 
culture from the standpoint of the lifeworld' ('Modernity', p. 13). 
This task, Habermas warns, must avoid the pitfalls of 'false 
programs of the negation of culture': 
A reified everyday praxis can be cured only by 
creating unconstrained interaction of the cognitive 
with the moral-practical and the aesthetic-expressive 
elements. Reification cannot be overcome by forcing 
. 
just one of those highly stylized cultural spheres to 
open up and become more accessible. 
('Modernity', p. 13) 
While contesting the form that knowledge production takes under 
late twentieth-century conditions, Habermas will not abandon the 
telos of modernity. What he terms 'societal modernization', by 
which economic and administrative rationality comes to organize 
more and more areas of human social experience, must be 
distinguished from this historically sublimated imperative. To 
counter the further retrenchment of the production of knowledges in 
autonomy from the demands or needs of the 'life-world' he argues 
instead for a new form of communicative rationality. It is not 
enough, with the Surrealists, to simply negate or refuse the mode 
of rationality embodied in one sphere alone (here, Art as aesthetic 
or expressive) while leaving the others intact. Rather, the 
proJect of modernity holds within it the seeds of a future social 
organization in which all knowledges are part of 'practical 
discourse' following a concerted attempt at a 'differentiated 
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relinking of modern culture with an everyday praxis' ('Modernity' 
p. 13). Habermas' type of rationality is concerned with 'the_task 
of passing on a cultural tradition, of social integration and 
socialization', of defining a future type of rational society in 
which, freed from economic administrative rationality: 
*9. the coamimication commimity of those affected, 
who as participants of a practical discourseq test 
the validity claims of norms and, to the extent that 
they accept them with reasons, arrive at the 
conviction that in the given ýircumstances the 
proposed 'norms' are 'right. 
The proJect of modernity is thus rescued from its present cultural 
reification by universal rational consensus. 
It is at this point that discussion can return to Lyotard's 
statement that postmodernity is, in part, the result of 
transformations in the social 'administration' of knowledge. It 
should be apparent that Habennas and Lyotard agree that the late 
nineteenth century witnessed a major mutation in the organization 
and social validation of knowledge in all spheres. For Habermas, 
this period (moderniSM) represents an aberration on the path to the 
fulfilment of modern#y since the intensification of its autonomous 
forms of rationality signal a shift away from the originary 
Enlightermient. raison d'etre. Lyotard also conc=s himself with 
fundamental questions of what and who knowledge is 'for', and of 
its furr-tion in the present condition of society. He seeks to 
understand the transformations at the end of the last century in 
the context not of intensification of autonomy but of a 'crisis of 
narra ivest. 
- 
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The Pragmtics of Knwledge 
Lyotard's thesis of postmdern knowledge rests on three 
propositions: 
a) all forms of knowledge require legitimation both in social 
terms and at the micro level of each discipline; 
b) legitimation can be understood by analogy with the idea of 
language games as procedures of validation; 
C) the development of 'computerized' or 'information' societies 
have been accompanied by radical changes in the way scientific 
knowledge is legitimated. 
Lyotard borrows Wittgenstein's theory of language games to explain 
the mechanisms and procedures by which any piece of knowledge comes 
to be a piece of knowledge. Every statement made implies a 'game' 
in the sense that each utterance 'can be defined in terms of the 
rules specifying their properties and the uses to which they can be 
put' (PC, p. 10). 10 Thus utterances can be classified according to 
the way the sender, addressee and the referent of the utterance are 
implicated in predetermined relations. Lyotard is interested in 
'the facts of language and in particular their pragmatic aspect' 
(PC, p. 9) because they furnish models of legitimation procedures 
which sanction the production of knowledge and information. Thus 
denotative, promisory, performative, prescriptiveg interrogative 
and narrative utterances differ in that they are pragmatic 
executions of the language games that permit thern. From this, 
Lyotard observes three consequences: 
a) their rules do not carry within themselves their own 
legitimation but are the object of a contract, explicit or not, 
between players (which is not to say that the players invent 
the rules); 
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b) if there are no rules, there is no game; even an infinitesimal 
modification of one rule alters the nature of the game; 
c) every utterance should be thought of as a 'move' in the game- 
(PC, P. 10) 
To clarify these propositions, I want to consider three types of 
utterance which bear heavily on Lyotard's 'crisis of narratives' 
thesis: 
Denotative utterance 
Example: The path of the planets is circular. 
This places the sender in a position of knowledge (since it is he 
who knows what the situation with the universe is); the addressee 
has either to give or refuse assent to the statement; the referent 
is thus given as something that 'demands to be correctly identified 
and expressed by the statement that refers to it' (PCq p. 9). 
"Performative utterance 
Example: I declare the University open. 
This distinguishes itself because the 'effect of 
the referent coincides with its enunciation' (PC, 
is thus in a position of authority (since she has 
make the statement); the statement is not open to 
verification by the addressee 1'Yho is immediately 
new context by the utterance$. 
Narrative utterance 
L. 1- 
- 
the utterance upon 
p. 9). The sender 
the authority to 
discussion or 
placed within the 
Example: Here is the story of 
... 
as it was told to me. 
The pragmatics of this utterance 'cannot of course be 
universalized' (PC, p. 21). A general property of this form is that 
the sender's only claim to competence is that he heard it himself; 
the addressee gains access to the same authority simply by 
listening' (PC: p. 20); the referent in this case is occupied by 
the protagonist of the story. 
This creates a situation in which: 
... 
the right to occupy the post of sender... is based 
upon the fact of having occupied the post of addressee, 
and of having been recounted oneself... by a previous 
narrative 
- 
in other words, having been positioned as 
the diegetic reference of other narrative events. 
(PC, p. 2 1) 
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While outwardly the most straightforward formt the narrative 
utterance is in fact a complex speech act which is: 
... 
in no way limited to the functions of enunciation; it 
determines in a single stroke what one must say in order 
to be heard, what one must listen to in order to speak, 
and what role one must play (on the scene of diegetic 
reality) to be the object of the narrative. 
(PC I p. 2 1) 
Chapter 7 of The Postmodern Condition is given over to explaining 
A-1- 
-I 
the pragmatics' of scientific knowledge in terms of the expansion 
of the first example, the denotative utterance: 'Scientific 
knowledge requires that one language game, denotation, be retained 
and all others excluded. A statement's truth-value is the 
criterion determining its acceptability' (PC, p. 25). At the same 
time, any scientific statement or lmovel must be 
validated/legitimated through: 
... 
a process by which a 'legislator' dealing with 
scientific discourse is authorized to prescribe the 
stated conditions (in general, conditions of internal 
consistency and experimental verification) determining 
whether a statement is to be included in that discourse 
for consideration by the scientific community. 
(PC, p. 8) 
Lyotard's point here is to show that scientific knowledge has never 
been, nor ever could be, self-validating, and that the 'legitimacy 
of science has been indissociably linked to that of the 
legitimation of the legislator' (PC, p. 8). The 'right to decide 
what is true is not independent of the right to decide what is 
just' for, contra Habermas, there is a 'strict interlinkage between 
the kind of language called science and the kind called ethics and 
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politics' (PC, p. 8). 
It is precisely because of its embeddedness in sociopolitics - 
institutions, pedagogy, professional practice, governmental Policy 
- 
that the 'crisis of legitimation' which Lyotard observes 
affecting science since the 1960's can be linked to the emergence 
of 'computer' societies or a 'postindustrial' (thoughq notablyg not 
necessarily a postcapitalist) age. The central feature of this 
crisis is the recognition of a dissonance between the old 
(modernist) ways of legitimating the production of knowledge, and 
the new (postmodernist) 'technologized' society which makes quite 
different demands: 
... 
for the last forty years the 'leading' sciences and 
technologies have had to do with language: phonology and 
theories of linguistics, problems of communication and 
cybernetics, modern theories of algebra and informatics, 
computers and their languages, problems of translation 
and the search for compatibility among computer 
languages, problems of information storage and data 
banks, telematics and the perfection of intelligent 
terminals, paradoxology. 
(PC 9 p. 3-4) 
The effect of these technological transformations has been 
radically to alter the way knowledge is produced and transmitted in 
society. Lyotard makes two important points: a) the miniturization 
and commercialization of machines is already changing the way in 
which learning is acquiredp classified, made available and 
exploited; b) the nature of knowledge cannot survive unchanged; it 
can fit into the new channels, and become operational, only if 
learning is translated into quantities of information (PC, p. 4). 
The new situation, Lyotard argues, results in a 'mercantilization' 
of knowledge which destroys the old relations of its production: 
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The relationship of the suppliers and users of 
knowledge to the knowledge they supply and use is now 
tending, and will increasingly tend, to assume the form 
already taken by the relationship of commodity producers 
and consumers to the commodities they produce and 
consume 
- 
that is, the form of value. Knowledge is and 
will be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be 
consumed in order to be valorized in a new production: 
in both cases, the goal is exchange. Knowledge ceases 
to be an end in itself, it loses its 'use-value'. (PC9 pp. 4-5) 
This is the basis of Lyotard's 'performativityl principle of 
legitimation, but, before considering this more fully, his 
controversial thesis on the crisis of the grands r6cits need to be 
examined. 
Lyotard begins by removing the qualitative distinction between 
narrative and scientific understanding; since 'knowledge [savoirl 
cannot be reduced to science, nor even to learning [connaissancel', 
it necessarily subsumes science which then becomes its subset: 
Knowledge, then, is a question of competence that 
goes beyond the simple determination and application of 
the criterion of truth, extending to the determination 
and application of the criteria of efficiency (technical 
qualification), of justice and/or happiness (ethical 
wisdom), of the beauty of a sound or colour (auditory 
and visual sensibility). 
(K, 18) 
Lyotard is here remarkably close to Haberrnas' three forms of 
rationality. The modern predilection for regarding physics-type 
hard sciences (based on verification/falsification procedures) as 
I real' knowledge leads to the downgrading of those forms of 
knowledge provided by narratives (myths, stories, maxims). 
Sustaining the production of scientific knowledge in the modern 
period is the ideological assumption that its validity does not 
depend on this inferior narrative mode of understanding. The 
scientist 'questions the validity of narrative statements and 
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concludes they are never subject to argumentation or proof': 
He classifies them as belonging to a different 
mentality: savage, primitive, underdevelOPedg backwardq 
alienated, composed of opinions, customsq authorityý 
prejudice, ignorance, ideology. Narratives are fablesq 
myths, legends, fit only for women and children* 
(PC, p. 27) 
Lyotard proceeds to demonstrate the specific ways in which 
scientific knowledge necess has recourse to narrative 
knowledge 'at least to the extent that the language game of science 
desires statements to be true but does not have the resources to 
legitimate their truth on its own' (PC, p. 28). The Platonic 
dialogue which inaugurates science: 
**. 
is not scientific, precisely to the extent that it 
attempts to legitimate science. Scientific knowledge 
cannot know and make known that it is true knowledge 
without resorting to the other, narrative, kind of 
knowledge, which from its point of view is no knowledge 
at all. Without such recourse it would be in the 
position of presupposing its own validity and would be 
stooping to what it condemns: begging the question, 
proceeding on prejudice. 
(PC, p. 29) 
To be brief, Lyotard contends that modern science can be classed 
according to which of two modes of narrative legitimation is 
utilized. 
The f irst is the narrative of I, or social emancipation. 
This legitimates the project of scientific knowledge by its appeal 
to the nascent bourgeois democracies of the nineteenth century. 
'Humanity' or 'the People' take on the role of protagonist in the 
narrative forms, for whom the State, like science and education, is 
legitimated by the consensual aim of freedom for the nation as a 
whole through the spread of knowledge to the population. The 
concept of historical Progress is thus intimately tied to the 
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legitimation of the new authorities; political power, knowledge and 
legitimation are tightly bomd in the sustaining narrative of 
-the 
Enlightement project. 
The second is the narrative of s lative This does 
not resort to the 'state-political' language game of legitimation 
but invokes philosophical speculation. Lyotard suggests that the 
founding of the University of Berlin (1807-10) embodies the 
narrative; the University contests the view that the project of 
learning should be left in the hands of the State/People and 
rejects the first narrative's claim to the organization and control 
of knowledge. It offers itself as the legitimating institution of 
a 'language game that links sciences together as moments in the 
becoming of Spirit' (PC, p. 34). For Lyotard, Hegel's Encycl a 
exemplifies this narrative in its attempt 'to realize the project 
of totalization' (PC, p. 34). The effect of this is to produce a 
lmetanarrative': 'German idealism has recourse to a metaprinciple 
that simultaneously grounds the development of learning, of 
society, and of the State in the realization of the "life" of a 
Subject' (K, p. 34). The most important outcome of this has been 
the legitimation of knowledge not from the point of view of the 
'immediate truth-value' but from the fact that it occupies a 
'certain place in the itinerary of Spirit or Life' (PC, p. 35). 
'True knowledge, in this perspective, is always indirect knowledge; 
it is composed of reported statements that are incorporated into 
the metanarrative of a subject that guarantees their legitimacy' 
(PC I p. 35). 
For Lyotard the modern period begins in the nineteenth century 
and falls into crisis through a process of 'delegitimation' 
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inherent in these narratives themselves. This is an important 
point, because Lyotard's now (in)famous characterization of 
postmodernism as an 'inc-redulity' towards legitimation by 
narratives must not be reduced to a simple social disenchantment 
with their explanatory power. For the narrative of speculative 
enquiry: 
The 'crisis' of scientific knowledge, signs of which 
have been accumulating since the end of the nineteenth 
century, is not born of a chance proliferation of 
sciences, itself an effect of progress in technology 
and the expansion of capitalism. It represents, rather, 
an internal erosion at work inside the speculative game, 
and by loosening of the weave of the encyclopedic net in 
which each science was to find its place, it eventually 
sets them free. 
(PC, p. 39) 
Disciplinary boundaries are thus dissolved, the borders between 
sciences cannot be maintained, the older hierarchy of learning 
'gives way to an inmanent "flat" network of areas of inquiry, the 
respective frontiers of which are in constant flux' (PC, p. 39); 
the speculative legitimation of the University is lost, reducing it 
to the 'replication of teachers rather than the production of 
researchers' (PC, p. 39). For the narrative of liberation, the 
process is more complex. If delegitimation is fuelled by the 
demand for legitimation itself, then posing self-reflexive 
questions of the scientific basis of knowledge would be enough to 
$erode' the pragmatics of narrative utterance. It will be recalled 
that narrative knowledge specifies its 'truth' (and 'social bond') 
by interrelating ethical, social and political claims ('a threefold 
competence 
- 
"know-how", "knowing how to speak! 1 
, 
and "knowing how 
to hear" 
- 
through which the community's relationship to itself and 
its environment is played out' (PC, p. 21). 'Incredulity' and 
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'delegitimation', theng derive from this inability of narrative 
knowledge (of prescriptive/practical statements) to 'supervise' the 
game of science (of denotative/cognitive statements). In sum, the 
recognition that the 'two statements belong to two autonomous sets 
of rules' effectively ends the claims of the political/ethical upon 
the scientif ic/technological knowledge-practice which can now be 
said to have escaped fran the rules of the 'game' of prescription. 
In the absence of the r6cits, Lyotard suggests that the 
contemporary social administration of knowledge can be understood 
in terms of an expansion of the second type of utterance outlined 
above, the performative. 'Performativity' belongs with the new 
'game' of tedmology in that it is legitimated by a different set 
of utterance relations than those specified by the metanarratives: 
it pertains not to the distinction between true, /false (denotation), 
nor to iust/uniust (prescription) but to the criteria of 
efficient/inefficient. Technical competence is defined by the 
principle of 'optimal performance: maximizing output (the 
information or modifications obtained) and minimizing input (the 
energy expended in the process)' (PC, p. 44). Lyotard traces a 
historically novel interdependence of wealth, effeiency and truth 
manifested in a technology which implicates all three in the 
production of a unique mode of knowledge legitimation. He stresses 
that not all knowledge is 'totally subordinated' to the 
technological investment which legitimates through the 'discourse 
of power' (PC, p. 45). Where it is, though, it is the category of 
efficiency which now serves the performance of the system. 
It would not be difficult to find supporting evidence for the 
features that Lyotard argues are the symptans of the reduction 
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of knowledge, and education, to the demands of a 'tecbnologized' 
view of society. The predominance of the performativity criterion 
has insinuated itself into almost every aspect of contemporary 
social life. Even those areas that were once regarded as 'non- 
productive' e. g. hospitals, schools, and social welfare agencies 
have had to become 'functional' for the system. The rhetoric of 
'efficiency' which serves, for example, to determine governmental 
funding and research policies for the new 'corporations' of Higher 
Education lends Lyotard's account some authority. From this it 
might be argued that in Britain, for example, the Thatcherite 
'social transformation' has consisted largely in moving economic 
efficiency from its restricted sense as a concept of industrial 
production/consumption to being a general explanatory social 
paradigm. Lyotard's schema raises the possibility that this shift r- - 
might perhaps be only the most visible manifestation or social 
consequence of the breakdown of narrative claims to supervise 
scientific knowledge production. In turn, this raises the crucial 
issue of whether the crisis of the Enlightenment narratives of 
speculative spirit and of liberty should be understood as 
temporally (or logically) prior to the specific socio- 
economic/political features he identifies; does The postmodern 
Condition simply describe current conditions of the organization 
and administration of global capitalism or does it them as 
the outcome of previous shifts caused by the process of 
delegitimation? It is important to be clear on this since quite 
differing political interpretations of Lyotard's thesis can be 
drawn, depending on whether or not one sees these features of 
performativity as the direct effect of delegitimation. This has an 
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important bearing on objections raised about the nature and status 
of social change in theories located within a postmodernist 
framework. It might be argued, for instance, that as ethical 
(humanistic) claims no longer legitmate science (as human 
Progress), the loosening of these bonds has led to the obverse: 
scientific and tecbnological criteria have come now to supervise 
the ethical/prescriptive realm. This would f it with a Habermasian 
analysis of a specifically post-1960's socio-economic/political 
situation as evidence of an increase and intensification of the way 
in which capitalism makes knowledge functional for itself. What 
Lyotard observes would then be in fact global capitalist relations 
rendered so transparent that knowledge can be produced without even 
the veneer of social or hunanitarian usefulness for its 
justification; his 'postmodern condition' would then actually be no 
more than the latest in a historical succession of states which 
have increasingly revealed the interdependence of relations of 
capital ownership, profit, technology and knowledge production. 
However, Lyotard's proposition that postmodernism is the condition 
consequent on the process of delegitimation inherent in the 
modernist narratives must be clearly distinguished from this 
position and, indeed, from any position that comfortably reconciles 
him with traditional Marxist interpretation of this kind since 
Marxism depends on the very narratives that Lyotard belLieves are 
bankrupt. 
The real point of divergence between Marxist and post- 
narrative analysis comes over the status of the 'social bond' which 
sustains the narrative of liberty. In Lyotard's schema, the 
teleological narrative of historical Progress for the People 
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necessarily entails a concept of a social body (natiOn/state/ 
humanity/class) in whose name liberation is sought- If the 
narrative of liberty no longer supervises knowledge productiong its 
Isocial bond' which interrelates ethical, social and political 
claims is also subject to new game rules as a consequence. A shift 
into a postmodern condition, then, would involve a 
reconceptualization of the social bond. Thatcherism, as one 
particular socio-political instance driven by 'efficiency', would 
in this sense have to be seen as the result of this much broader 
late twentieth-century shift in how the social bond is now 
legitimated. For instance, Thatcher's own words 
- 
'There is no 
such thing as Society: only individuals and their families' marks a 
public denouncement of the narrative of liberty as the general goal 
of social emancipation since the 'social bond' on which it depends 
is denied. Instead, executive political power, social ethics, and 
legitimation are all being bound to the principle of performativity 
for which neither the social group, nation, state and thus the 
narrative of liberty are functional. I would agree with this 
analysis for as long as the 'crisis of narratives' is held to be 
logically prior to the emergence of performativity (which should 
not be reduced to efficiency of production but include all the 
transformations in knowledge/information). There is in this, 
though, a danger of misreading Lyotard's theory as a very 
sophisticated apology for New Right/Libertarian social philosophies 
because a phenomeonon such as Ihatcherism, is thus 'iustified' as 
the inevitable outcome of these prior processes of delegitimation. 
Again, Dick Hebdige is to the point: 'It is easy to see why 
postmodernism has been characterised as an intellectual gloss for 
- 
35 
- 
Thatcherism 
- 
an invitation to people who should know better to 
give up, lie back and enjoy'. 12 Despite the fact that mOst strains 
of Marxist thinking also want to understand social transformation 
in terms of historical inevitability, there is a sense that any 
definition of postmodernism mLlst confront the idea that modernist 
models for orchestrating social and political change are no longer 
viable for comprehending and challenging the relations between self 
and society that the performative model would suggest. 
Returning to his thesis that the social bond is linguistic 
(consisting of all language statements 
- 
prescriptive, denotativeg 
cognitive, etc. ), Lyotard argues that the fracturing and 
proliferation of them into autonomous language games with none 
supervising the others requires us to rethink all the conceptual 
models inherited from the grands recits. If the metanarratives no 
longer supervise nor can be held to legitimate how knowledge is 
actually produced in Western capitalist economies, it is foolish to 
persist in the belief that the recits of the nineteenth 
century are adequate to address or analyse the nature of what must 
be recognized aý a postinDdern condition, qualitatively different 
from a modern one. Lyotard continues that 'the principle of 
unitotality or synthesis under the authority of a metadiscourse 
of knowledge is inapplicable' (PC, p. 40); the concept of 
homogenous 'Society/People' or the totality implied by the 
historical telos of 'Spirit' specified by the pragmatics of the two 
metanarratives cannot be retained after the crisis of legitimation. 
They too must be rethought as the major frameworks of social 
explanation. Lyotard's importance lies with the fact that he has 
attempted to think through the implications of delegitimation not 
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only in the realm of epistemology but also for social, ethical and 
political praxis. From an orthodox Left position within the 
- 
teleological narrative of liberation of the Peopleg Lyotard 
threatens to dissolve the very concepts used by Western philOSOPhY 
to formulate programs of political and social change, making him 
anathema to most varities of Marxist thinking 
- 
no cultural unitY 
called the People, no teleology guaranteeing the historical project 
towards Enlightenment, no means of articulating resistance to the 
effects of these tedmologies. However, his work can also be read 
as a positive engagenxmt which attempts to establish a pragmatic 
model for 'mapping' this splintering of knowledges (language games) 
which occurs after the breakdown of the models of social consensus 
entailed by the older metanarratives. His task is to take account 
of the material conditions of contemporary experience but without 
the epistemological certainties entailed by the gran r6cits. For 
such a model he turns once again to Wittgenstein, who proposed 
ý1- 
- that: 
Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze 
of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, 
and of houses with additions from various periods; and 
this surrounded by a multitude of new borou M with 
straight regular streets and uniform houses. -L-' 
Wittgenstein, Lyotard notes, subjects the 'town' of language to the 
'old sorites paradox' by asking - 'how many houses or streets does 
it take before a town begins to be a town V (PCq p. 40). Lyotard 
adds: 'new languages are added to the old ones, forming suburbs of 
the old town'. Hence the contemporary proliferation of language 
technologies 
- 
'machine languages, the matrices of game theory, 
new systems of musical notation, systems of notation for 
nondenotative foms of logic... the language of the genetic code, 
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graphs of phonological structures' (PC, p. 40-41) - attest to a 
world fractured into the multiplicity of expert languages which can 
never to be 'totalized' as knowledge for Humanity or historical 
Spirit. 
Lyotard's is one of the most important philosophical attempts 
to formulate postmodernism as a post-narrative social condition of 
multiplicity and fragmentation. It offers the possibility of two 
divergent interpretations which are decisive for determining 
whether this logically entails a 'rupture' or break in 
modernist/postmodernist terms. Lyotard anticpates his critics: 
We may form a pessimistic impression of this 
splintering: nobody speaks all of those languages, they 
have no universal metalanguage, the project of the 
system-subject is a failure, the goal of emancipation 
has nothing to do with science, we are all stuck in the 
positivism of this or that discipline of learning, the 
learned scholars have turned into scientists, the 
diminished tasks of research have become compartment- 
alized and no one can master them all. 
(PC, p. 41) 
So how can one articulate political resistance if both the social 
and epistemological bond have splintered beyond recuperation by the 
grands recits? The point to be stressed here is that those unable 
to relinquish the nineteenth-century modernist narrative models 
must find the concept of multiplicity impossible to reconcile with 
a politics based on an understanding of history as driven by 
struggle between monolithic blocks or groups (e. g. Proletariat/ 
Bourgeoisie). On the other hand, those that accept the 'crisis of 
narratives' accept that the task ahead lies with formulating new 
models of power and new modes of political analysis more consonant 
with this postnarrative and hence postmodern condition: 'Most 
people have lost the nostalgia for the lost narrative. It in no 
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way follows that they are reduced to barbarity' (PC, p. 41). On 
the contrary, Lyotard formulates the possibility of 
linguistic/political action 'against' the condition of pure 
performativity in terms of 'paralogy' 
- 
unexpected moves in the 
linguistic game 
- 
which offers moments of resistance but within a 
radically decentred, non-monolithic and heteromorphous social 
rrK)del. Lyotard's formulation is not without its problems though I 
shall not pursue this line of thinking about 'totality' until 
Chapter Four which will examine the consequences of delegitimation 
of the social bond more specifically. 
At present, I would like to situate some points arising from 
A. 1- 
- 
the preceding analysis relating to the status of postmodernism as 
the signifier of a major conceptual break from modernist 
epistmologies. 
Postmol . sm and De-differentiation 
To clarify the terms of debate, it is worth returning to 
Habermas to draw out the distinctions his analysis sets up. 
Firstly, the project of modernity begins with the differentiation 
of religious/metaphysical knowledge and the emergence of new types 
of rationality which by the end of the nineteenth century have 
split into autonomous spheres of 'objective science', 'universal 
morality' and 'autonomous art'. Modernism can thus be understood 
as a later stage of this previous differentiation. Scott Lash has 
taken up Habermas' use of the concept of differentiation to define 
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modernism specifically as the rejection of realist epistemologies 
or 'foundationalisms'. 14 In theoretical knowledge and morality, no 
less than in aesthetics, modernism manifests itself as a series of 
further specializations which are specific to late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century thought. Lash looks to the major fin. de 
sleclethinkers for evidence; Emile Durkheim's 'sociologistic 
epistemology', which separates the theoretical knowledge from the 
empirical 'real' world, and Max Weber's differentiation of the 
ethical from the theoretical spheres, Lash understands as wholly 
modernist responses to the previously dominant absolutes. It 
follows that postmodernism could be understood as a similar process 
of differentiation which results in a conceptual shift from these 
previous modernist categories. The concept of differentiation in 
the cultural sphere is, I think, an invaluable aid in assessing 
whether: a) there has been a major conceptual shift between 
modernism and postmodernism; b) postmodernism is actually 
continuous with its earlier forms; or c) there might be a way of 
understanding postmodernism, as constituted, however paradoxically, 
by both movements. Bearing this in mind, the following discussion 
of Nietzsche should be read as a test case. 
Nihilism, as formulated throughout Nietzsche's oeuvre, 
attacked the very possibility of having absolute cultural, moral or 
theological values. By Lash's criteria, this would qualify as a 
crucial modernist repudiation of the preceding 'foundationalisms' 
or certainties which were based on this premise. Ihis would then 
place Nietzsche's anti-realism together with the philosophical 
scepticism of G. E. Moore who also rejected the possibility of 
deriving rational principles of morality from the metaphysical/ 
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religious certainties of idealism, or from the utiltitarianism Of 
Jeremy Bentham or j. S. Mill. 15 When modernism is thus defined as a 
specific historical period with specific epistemological and 
aesthetic parameters, it ought to be relatively straightforward to 
contemplate our present condition as 'post' modernist. Howeverg 
&. I- 
- the main issue of debate emerges when modernist thinkers are 
assessed fr(xn the point of view which takes postmodernism to be no 
more than the logical development or extension of the original 
modernist 'problematic', that is, when it is held that there has 
been no major conceptual discontinuity. Scott Lash notes in his 
article that critics of postmodernism (Callinicos, Jameson and 
Eag-leton) tend to agree that whatever is held up as postmodernist Qp 
can be traced back to an original event within modernist anti- 
realist epistemology. In this sense, the case of Nietzsche's 
theory of 'perspectivism' is instructive in how retrospective 
reading can work in this way to secure a conceptual continuity or 
'tradition'. 
Hilary Lawson argues in her recent work16 that Nietzsche 
should not be equated with the 'pluralism' of anthropological 
cultural relativism more recently encapsulated in the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis. 17 Where cultural difference is construed in terms of 
norms, values and practices which are relative to each society, for 
Nietzsche, the status of the observer's knowledge of that society 
is thus radically compromised by the relativity of their own 
I perspective'. Nietzsche wrote in Thus Spake Zarathustra (1909): 
The perspective therefore decides the character 
of the 'appearance"* As if the world would remain over 
, 
rgtive! By doing that after one had deducted the persp 
Ione would deduct the relativity! 
- 
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This refuses the possibility of measuring variant interpretations 
of the world against a single, unified world of facts. Lawson's 
rereading suggests that Nietzsche's perspectivism thus extends the 
relativity of values to the field of 'facts', citing him: 
Against positivism, which halts at phenomena 
- 
'there 
are only facts' 
-I would say: No, facts is precisely 
what there is not, only inte 5 retations. We cannot 
r? establish any fact 'in ifgelf : perhaps it is folly to 
want to do such a thing. 
One might here detect the origins of a conventionalist critique of 
empiricist models of scientific knowledge now associated with 
Thomas Kubn and Paul Feyerabend. 20 Both philosophers of science 
base their challenges on a refusal to accept that reality can be 
known independently of the 'conventions', or theoretical paradigms, 
which actually determine what appears as 'reality' or 'fact'. in 
this instance, the later theories seem implicit in Nietzsche's 
historically earlier concepts; Kuhn and Feyerabend are thus the 
logical fulfilment of his critical potential. 
Another case in which the term postmodernist is rendered 
specious because of this kind of continuity with modernism is that 
of Ferdinand de Saussure. 21 One might cite his structural 
linguistics as another emphatic modernist rejection of realist 
philosophy in its differentiation of language into a formal system 
for which the empirical 'real' world is not functional. However, 
would reject any argument which claimed that poststructuralist 
theories of signification should be taken as continuing or 
developing Saussurean linguistics. 
In this respect, E. Wright's Postmodern Brecht (1989) is also 
a pertinent case. She re-presents a pivotal modernist figure in 
the wake of poststructuralist theories of subjectivity and 
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Derridean deconstructions of Brecht's distinctions between illusion 
and reality. Rereading in terms of Lyotard's theory of desire4 
Wright claims that Brecht's earlier theatrical practice was proto- 
postmodernist before it ossified in the more formal structures of 
epic theatre: 
The postmodernist Brecht is different from the modernist 
Brecht who produced the split subjects of the 'great' 
plays and who attributed this split to the divisive 
nature of bourgeois capitalism. In this other Brecht of 
the early plays the performative mode instead of the 
denotative mode of the later ones, with the result that 
accidental meaning subverts any didactic intention... 
Where in the 'great' plays the Fabel provided sense and 
meaning despite the disruptions of the epic mode, in the 
early plays theatricalization of experience undermines 
reference so that anything can happen in the communica- 
tion process, both between one character and another, 
and between stage and audience. To theatricalize is to 
engage in a fictive experimenting with the interaction 
of language and 
-"5 
lence, to explore the very ground 
of representation. 
Wright's intention, of showing that Brecht is ambivalently both 
modernist and postmodernist, actuallY ends up by redefining 
modernism - it is a newly radicalized modernism which incipiently 
contains postmodernism. This reading backwards produces a 
modernist precedent (even origin) for the postmodernist critiques 
to which Wright subjects Brecht and then claims were there all 
along. The term 'modernism' cornes to signify not a specific 
historical period and its related aesthetic practices but an 
atemporal description of a set of effects. 
To claim that what postmodernism theorizes is 'really' 
modernist ought to be closely questioned. Firstly, it entails 
effacing the very real differences in the conditions and use of 
knowledge between the two periods 
- 
early and late twentieth 
century. Those who would want to undercut claims that 
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postmodernism addresses a distinct critical/historical 
configuration deny the real possibility of difference by reducing 
it to the principle of the Same. The concept of postmodemism as 
differentiation ran make no sense if contemporary thought is in 
fact said to be governed by the same differentiation that 
historically and conceptually defined the modernist period. 
Secondly, there is a tendency in critics (such as Jameson and 
Eagleton) to want to find postmodernism already incorporated in a) 
modernism. Their attacbment to narrative models of 
historical/social explanation as outlined above should make it 
clear why the term postmodernism is troubling since the project of 
modernity depends upon them. From this, it might be said that one 
of the negative though important effects of debates about 
postmodernism will be felt in the redefinition of what Modernism 
itself consists 
-a revaluation which contributes to the 
maintenance of epistemological continuity for the project of 
Enlighterment. 
Thirdly, the denial of postmodernism's claims to difference 
signally (and perhaps wilfully) fails to acknowledge the positivity 
of the emergence of historically new 'objects of study' which 
modernism did not nor cannot be made to comprehend: the emergence 
of global popular culture, the politics of difference, of sexuality 
and desire, non-monolithic conceptions of power and history, the 
transformations of information technologies, the shift from 
production to consumption as the major dominant of cultural 
experience in Western societies. 
Taking all three objections together - the retrospective 
redefinition of modernismg the construction of continuity, and the 
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absence of issues of sexuality/difference 
- 
it should be clear why 
either/or thinking of this kind is destined to failure* Critical 
rereadings constantly negotiate the 'meaning' of their subjects; 
from the vantage point of the present, it becomes impossible (and 
largely undesirable) to determine the original intention or 
understanding of particular thinkers within their own intellectual 
envirorunent with a view to enlisting them on one side or other of 
the divide. As I stated in my Introduction, I do not believe that 
there is an event or emergence of postmodernism in general but only 
postmodernisms bound, in and by their difference, to whatever has 
previously occupied a particular sphere. Rather than engage with 
the question of whether thinkers are 'really' modernist or 'really' 
postmodernist, I would like to approach the problem with a 
different proposition: that postmodernism is at the same time both 
a break with and an extension of the modernist problematic. To 
explain how this can be so, I would like to return to Lash's 
contention that 'if modernism and modernity result from a process 
of differentiation, or what German social scientists call 
Ausdifferenzierung, then postmodernism results from a much more 
recent process of de-differentiation or Entdifferenzierung'. 23 
To argue for postmodernism as a major differentiation would be 
to lend support to any argument for a total break or rupture 
between two definable and discontiuous historical/epistemological 
blocks. However, Lash prefers to use the idea of de- 
differentiation which changes the emphasis from absolute break to a 
degree of relation. 24 The 'pastness' implied by the prefix 'post' 
can never be a statement of complete autonomy or self-sufficienr-y 
because dependency is already inscribed in the term; 'coming after' 
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thus need not necessarily be a temporal indication of pure 
succession but can entail that which came before it. This is not 
to reduce postmodernism(s) to what comes before but to underline 
that the process of breaking away has to be referred back to the 
previous formations. Baldly stated, modernism in this instance 
would be characterized by the separation (differentiation) or 
bracketing of reality as determining principle, and consequent 
reworking of the relations between knowledge and reality. 
Postmodernism would then be the de-differentiation of these 
relations 
- 
not a rejection of them but a dissolution of those 
modernist categories which created autonomous structures to counter 
the unproblematic realisms in philosophy, art and scientific 
knowledge. It follows that the 'de' prefix is essentially a 
negative gesture towards the idea that postmodernism is at present 
a state of flux or process; the positive content that a full scale 
differentiation would demand has yet to appear. This understanding 
of de-differentiation would explain why it is possible to find 
postmodernist positions irrplicit in certain rriodernist ones: not 
because the recent theoretical shifts are the same as the older 
forms, but because they engage them, work through them, and 
transform them. Here, what I term postmodernist (the de- 
differentiation of the older modernist categories) cannot be 
understood as separate since it is logically dependent on them as 
their prior conditions of possibility. This is not, I stress, to 
make them continuous. 
This study is an investigation into one f ield in which this 
process of de-differentiation can be observed. It is a complex 
process, as Warren Montag observes: 
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The irreversibility of any theoretical break is 
necessarily linked to its unevenness and incompletenessý 
to the obstacles that it inevitably throws up to its own 
development. Philosophy, in turn, is never simply the 
guardian of a theoretical truth; it is the space in 
which the meaning of the developments in knowledge is 
constantly determined and fought over. It is a conflict 
between tendencies that seek to annul a given break or 
mutation (or, failing that, to exploit this levent' to 
their ends) and tendencl2g that seek to clear the way to 
its further development. 
With this in view, I want to appropriate Lyotard's formulation of 
postmodernism as the conditions for knowledge consequent on the 
10, crisis of the modernist recits to frame a theory of the 
meaning of Modernism and postmodernism for the politics of film. 
The 'crisis of the metanarratives' thesis is indeed a highly 
provocative one which has generated a useful working model for 
understanding the 'game rules' governing the Modernist production 
of art and more specifically, of film construed as Modernist 
knowledge. This is not to imply that I would want to rest my 
definition of postmodernism entirely upon Lyotard; my understanding 
of the bankruptcy of the metanarratives throws up a series of 
tensions (especially with regard to feminism and its claims to 
offer emancipatory knowledge) which have produced two contradictory 
and politically irreconcilable readings of Lyotard's propositions 
for postmodernist paralogical aesthetics. The 'unevenness and 
incompleteness' of Lyotard's theoretical break - the modernism of 
its postmodernism - will become apparent later. 
As a necessary precondition of exploring the consequences of 
posing postmodernism as a corxiition of post-metanarrativity, in the 
following Chapter I intend to examine certain historical forms of 
film practice in order to arrive at a position from which it is 
possible to define why they are Modernist. 
- 
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CHAFM IM 
FILM AND METANARRATIVE MODERNISM 
Extrapolating from The Postmodern Conditiong the fundamental 
components of modern knowledge legitimation are: 
a) the narrative of liberty 
- 
requires some degree of social 
control over the production/consumption of knowledge in order for it to be referred back to and made effective for the goal 
of human emancipation and Enlightenment 
= knowledge for social emancipation 
b) the narrative of speculation 
- 
permits the investigation of the 
principles and foundations of specific types of knowledge in 
autonomy from the immediate concerns of utility of the People 
or its abstract embodiment in the form of the State 
= sanctions autonomous knowledge 
Proposed in this way, Lyotard's modern/postmodern split in science 
suggests some particularly interesting avenues for a siMlar ii 
exploration of the transformations of the 'game rulesi in the 
aesthetic sphere. The metanarratives can also be understood as the 
chief forms of legitimation for the production of modern art. 
Nonetheless, in the Introduction to her edition of Postmodernism 
and Its Discontents (1988)9 E. Ann Kaplan warns against positing 
postmodernism as something affer-ting cultural practices in the same 
way. She argues for a broad framework of enquiry which should 
'take into account the particular 'apparatus' being used, as well 
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as how modes of production/exhibition govern aesthetic 
strategies'. 1 This is a timely reminder against searching for the 
unity of a monolithic Postmodernist condition to pit against an 
equally monolithic Modernist one. Taken alone, the Lyotardian 2- 
concepts of legitimation and delegitimation are too broadly drawn 
to illustrate the correlations between science and the aesthetic 
sphere. For this reason, I feel it is imperative to couple them 
with a concept of de-differentiation since this can be made to show 
more particularly the effects of post-narrativity in one area of 
the aesthetic sphere: film. By bringing together the larger 
processes of delegitimation and the more specific impact of de- 
differentiation for film, it is possible to delineate the key 
features of Modernism, and then to venture some reasons why 
postmodernism must necessarily be regarded as a break with (and not 
a continuation of) its 'proiect'. The main task, then, is to 
address the particularity of postmodernism in relation to the 
politics of film practice by identifying some historical and 
theoretical features of Modernism in this area. My first Chapter 
concluded that modernist epistemlogy should be understood as based 
upon several key rejections of realist 'foundationalisms; one can 
venture to state that modernism in art witnesses a similar 
differentiation process in countering forms of realism 
(representation as mimesis2) by creating autonomous art practices. 
But the Modernist 'break' with realism in film is not identical 
with that in painting3, for instance, nor with the emergence of 
modernism in architecture4. To this end, I have identified four 
'ideal-types' of Modernist film: Abstract Formalism, Structural & 
Structural/Materialism, Anti-Illusionism, and Surrealism. As a 
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critical theorist, my interest lies prima ily with the 
philosophical positions which inform certain types of film makingy 
and I accept that this is in some ways a reductive approach, 
preferring to isolate the various social/theoretical propositions 
rather than provide a 'history' or purely temporal understanding of 
their production and exhibition. This is not to relegate the 
importance of the specificities of historical and cultural 
production/consumption; on the contrary, I wish to isolate the 
theoretical bases of these four ideal-types in order to demonstrate 
that postmodernism's 'break' is indeed a historical and not purely 
an aesthetic phenomenon. The categories are by no means 
watertight, given that exceptions can be made to all of them. 
Also, features from one type can often be observed in others; 
Sim' larities and overlaps can be found in the work of a single film 
maker while single films exhibit several tendencies which are here 
rather arbitrarily separated. However, this does not affect my 
basic contention that film practices which can be termed Modernist 
are those which: 
a) must be referred back to the metanarratives for their 
philosphical legitimation; 
and 
b) specify their status as autonomous art (and as know' 
according to a theoretical differentiation between 
representation and reality. 
- 
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Alitanomy arml Mxlernist Differentiation 
I would contend that the defining feature of each of the 
Modernist film practices I have identified is that they are in some 
way, even if negatively, bound to the concept of artistic autonomyp 
an understanding which entails two fundamental propostions about 
modern art and aesthetic differentiation. The first proposition is 
that, in general terms, it is the nature of art within modernity 
(later intensified by modernism) to offer a particular mode of 
experience or type of 'knowledge' which is qualitatively distinct 
from all other forms of human creativity; the specificity of 
aesthetic experience, however defined, is thus derived from the 
fact that art is held to be a highly specialised sort of knowledge, 
culturally differentiated from what may be termed reality or 
everyday life. It is this concept of autonomy, and consequent 
theories on the nature and degree of the relations between art and 
what functions as 'social reality', which has dominated theories 
and practices of art in the modernist period. This broad 
characterization must be narrowed at once with a second proposition 
to the effect that the constitution of modernist art as autonomous 
has historically been subject to several major inflections which 
have specified the effect of that autonomy quite differently. 
Modernist art can thus be very crudely classified according to 
whether the cognitive and/or epistemological distinction grounding 
aesthetic autonomy is embraced or rejected. Accepting the fact 
that the wider cultural processes of modernity haveg since the 
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eighteenth century, tended towards the social specialization of art 
Practicest it is possible to draw two broad categories of Modernist 
response to constitution of art as autonomous domain: 
a) Due to the specificity of its differentiation, it is 
felt that the greatest intensity of aesthetic experience 
is to be gained from the contemplation of what is essential 
to each medium, of that which distinguishes it from all other 
social practices, and from every other art medium; 
b) Due to the specificity of its differentiation from all other 
spheres of human activity, art is charged with a pedagogical or 
emancipatory function which allows artistic practices to be 
politically oppositional to the power structures of the culture 
that sustains them. 
The analogy with Lyotard's metanarratives should be patent: the 
first group, in pursuit of the specificity of material of each 
medium, appeals for legitimation to the narrative of speculative 
spirit while the second validates the critical or radical function 
of autonomous art by appealing to the narrative of liberty for the 
People. Aesthetic 'knowledge' in modernism cannot then be reduced 
to either one of these basic modes or principles since the very 
constitution of modernity embodies within it both competing, 
contradictory but equally coherent and valid definitions of the 
nature, purpose and function of art. 
Returning to the epistemological coricerns of modernism, it is 
not surprizing to find that manY theories of artistic practice do 
manifest a critical tension which may be understood as the failure 
to bring together the discourses of what I maintain are 
fundamentally irreconcilable metanarratives. For a preparatory 
example of my claim that the narrative of speculative spirit and 
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the narrative of liberty are also the dominant PhilOSOPhic-al 
Lrr-iderpinnings of Modernist film (indeed, define it as such), one 
ran turn to Adorno's Aesthetic Theory (1970) which may be read in 
terms of its attempt to articulate both positions simultaneouslyg 
to define modern art as autonomous and to make this the source of 
its capacity for radical social critique: 
Did not art lose its foundation when it gained complete 
freedom from external purposes? 
Art is and is not being-for-itself. Without heterogenous 
moment, art cannot achieve autonomy. 
... 
first, works of art must be able to integrate 
materials and details into their immanent law of form; 
and, second, they must not try to erase the fractures 
left by the process of integration, preserving insteadin 
the aesthetic whole the traces of those elements which 
resisted integration. 
A, ll works of art, including affirmative ones, are ipso 
facto polemical. The very notion of a conservative work 
of art is somehow absurd. By emphatically severing all 
ties with the empirical world, art in an u8 conscious way 
expresses its desire to change that world. 
Adorno secures a margin of critique f or modernist art by arguing 
that formal autonomy, although essentially a negative phenomenon 
peculiar to the modernization process begun in the eighteenth 
century, is central to any modern radical aesthetic experience 
since it is precisely this irreducible difference or specificity 
which escapes appropriation by predetermined 'content' or 
'ideology', and which resists direct social control (conservative 
2r progressive). For Adorno, 'what makes art works socially 
significant is content which articulates itself in formal 
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structures'. Drawn in this way, Adorno's concept of the 'dual 
essenr-el of art points to a very significant feature of the 
modernist differentiation of the artistic sphere which has been 
picked up by several theorists, including Thornas Dumm: 
ooo it is crucial that one remember that a radical 
aesthetic is only available to modern subiects because 
it originates in the same phenomena that have led to the 
increaseg differentiation of spheres of value in modern 
culture. 
Thus art can be either 'for itself' (autonomous) or oppositional 
(emancipatory) only under modernist 
- 
bourgeois 
- 
social relations 
since they are in fact two sides of the same coin, being two 
responses to the fact of modern differentiation which splits 
artistic practice from its Enlightenment traiectory. Any case made 
for a postmodernist condition will have to demonstrate that this 
primary constitution of the aesthetic sphere has been superseded, 
that there has been a maior post-narrative de-differentiation which 
legitimates art quite differently. 
A second example of thinking generated by the question of 
aesthetic autonomy and/or social usefulness takes discussion back 
to Habermas. Given his intimate relation to the critical theorists 
of the Frankfurt Schoo, 7, it is perhaps not surprising to find a 
similar tension structuring his work. He identified the broader 
process of differentiation and specialization as part of the 
trajectory of modernity which has severed art, as alienated 
knowledge, from social praxis and from the needs of the 'life- 
world'. However, Habermas' proposals for returning to the overall 
goal of the Enlightenment is a 'comminicative rationality' for a 
society in which all knowledges are part of 'practical discourse'. 
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It follows that any 'differentiated relinking of modern culture 
with an everyday praxis' ('Modernity'q p. 13) must baLmce this 
claim for art as everyday communication with Habermas' wish to 
preserve the specificity of the aesthetic as a mode of knowing. It 
remains untheorized in Habermas' work what the function or role of 
art can be once this 'reappropriation' has been completed and the 
older categories supporting the aesthetic/expressive sphere in 
radical autonomy from the rest of society (the 'inner logic' of 
bourgeois art produced and received under consumer knowledge 
relations) are broken down. I shall return to a discussion of 
postmodernist critiques of the larger political implications of 
Habermas' 'use' of aesthetics in the name of justice and freedom in 
Chapter Four. 
By way of a preface to the four ideal-types of fihn practice I 
have identifiedg I have so far touched upon the mutually 
determining relationship of Modernism and aesthetic autonomy. 
There remains a third term, that of the avant-garde, which conjoins 
with 'modernism' and 'autonomy' to form something like a dominant 
paradigm for locating the category 'Art', and for gauging the terms 9- 
of postmodernist de-differentiation. It is very useful to think of 
aesthetic modernism in terms of Lyotard's narratives since it 
permits a much-needed flexibility for addressing the complex issue 
of the avant-garde which has often been wrongly regarded as 
synonymous with modernism per se. Andreas Huyssen, in his 
excellent essay 'The Search for Tradition: Avant-garde and 
Postmodernism in the 1970's', warns against the easy assuuption 
that modernism, artistic auton(xny and the avant-garde are 
synonymous: 
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Both avant-garde and modernism may legitimately be 
understood as representing artistic emanations from the 
sensibility of modernity, but from a European 
perspective it makes little sense to Jump Thomas Mann 
together with Dada, Proust with Andre Breton, or Rilke 
with Russian constructivism. While there are areas of 
overlap between the tradition of the avant-garde and 
that of modernism (e. g. vorticism and Ezra Pound, radical 
Ianguage experimentation and James Joyce, expressionism 
and Gottfried Berm) the overall aesthetic and 8 political differences are too pervasive to be ignored. 
What need to be separated, and are often obscured, are the 
aesthetic, political and institutional determinants which specify 
the proiects and terms of 'intervention' for various historical 
avant-gardes. To this end, several theorists have recently adopted 
Peter Burger's important distinction between two very different 
tendencies within modernism which, importantly, once again centres 
on the issue of artistic autonomy. 9 The first tendency, which I 
understand as a centripetal one, tends further to entrench art in 
its automny from social life, pushing towards art as the pure 
analysis and exploration of the internal conditions of each medium. 
The second response, a centrifugal one, is not content with 
revolutionizing the internal (traditional) conditions of art 
- 
form, meaning, procedures 
- 
but more radically with challenging and 
dissolving the very constitution of the category 'art' which, 
Burger contends, is throughly implicated or 'institutionalized' in 
bourgeois society. Avant-garde refers only to the latter group 
(within the European Dada/Surrealism line) which attacks the 
ideology of autonomy while the former group are best understood as 
Modernist in their attempts to revolutionize but retain the 
cultural differentiation which constitutes the category of the 
aesthetic. However, I have been unable to find a suitable 
replacement that will capture the general use of the term 'avant- 
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garde' (simply, movements or groups effecting formal and/or 
politically motivated artistic innovation and transgression) and 
will have to continue to use it in this way: it should be clear 
when the phrase ref ers to Bdrger's more specialized sense. 
One of the most interesting features of trying to define 
Modernism in film practice is that the instituitiOn of cinema and 
its products, film, are subject to ambivalent cultural 
construction. There can be traced a conflict, inherent within the 
historical emergence of cinema, between undertanding it as an 
'aesthetic' form or, otherwise, as 'entertairunent'. I am concerned 
here with isolating exactly what it is that permits a film to 
belong to the 'aesthetic' and more especially to be regarded as 
Modernist. This entails examining how the category of the 
aesthetic is primarily the result of the work of cultural 
differentiation that is specific to modernism. 
The 'independent', experimental or avant-garde cinema is not 
hanogeneous but denotes a plethora of nationally and historically 
diverse techiques and strategies for a 'counter' cinema. What 
unites film makers such as Maya Deren, Paul Sharits, Andy Warhol or 
Michael Snow is a concern to exploit their own difference from 
ý1_ 
- __ 
another ideal-type of film practice. P. Adams Sitney prefaced his 
edition of The Avant Garde Film (1978) with the question: 'Can 
there be a history of the independent cinema? ': 
Insofar as it calls itself independent or avant garde, 
admirably introducing a negative element into its 
epithet, it reflects back upon another cinema, itself 
unnamed and undefined, against the darkness of which it 
shines. We certainly have histories of this other 
cinema, narratives of technological change, industrial 
growth, and national enclosures embroidered with the 
stories of an almost monomorphic hero called 
alternatively Griffith2 Chaplin, Melies, Eisenstein, von 
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Stroheim, Dreyer, Bresson. 10 
Ten years later the 'unnamed' cinema can now be named - that of the 
classic realist text"- and the past decade much critical work has 
been comerned to define its operations. I shall be reviewing the 
caýponents of this form of textual production w passan so suffice 
for it here to stand as a convenient shorthand for films which 
offer the following: structurally coherent and often linear 
fictional narrative; synchronous sound; psychologically 
identifiable characters; editing, framing, lighting, mise en scene 
and the construction of perspectival film space subordinated to the 
demands of the narrative; suppression of the production of the 
fiction in favour of a transparency of the medium to the events 
represented. As the dominant form of cinematic consumption, 
'cornmercial' or 'Hollywood' film is installed as the norm against 
which each practice defines itself. It is important for my 
argument at this point to stress that 'avant-garde' or 
'independent' are, above all else, relative terms predicated on the 
concept of difference but, crucially, a norm-defined difference, 
which I would suggest is the primary distinction required by any 
film practice to be considered Modernist. It is fundamental in 
that it is this initial 'difference' which carves out the 
epistemological space that is required in order for film to be 
brought under Modernist legitimation by the metanarratives. In 
other words, the existence of the norm 'commercial cinema' defines 
a space in which film is able to be legitimated as either 
autonomus knowledge or else as emancipatory knowledge (since by 
circular definition commercial cinema is neither). 
By this line of thinking, it is possible to make the precise 
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distinction that realist or 'escapist' fiction film does not belong 
with the Modernist paradigm. This would accord with the fact ýhat 
the historical emergence of cinema at the end of the 19th centurYq 
as has been well documented12, was not an 'aesthetic' event but 
essentially a mass cultural phenomenon, shown in cheap venues by 
initially itinerant exhibitors, dependent for its audience upon a 
largely uneducated working-class population and experienced as a 
machine for 'entertainment'. It would be possible to argue, by 
ignoring the national heterogeneity of early silent cinema 
production, that from an 'art' point of view, cinema reached no 
higher than an artless vulgarity of mere naturalism (the 
'documentary' of the Lumiere School), the low cultural adaption of 
theatrical dramatization (the 'illusionism' of the Me-lies Schoo, 13) 
and the comic shorts of music hall comedians. Since it was already 
inscribed in the discourses of 'popular culture, and consigned to 
the culturally undervalued sphere of 'entertainment', early cinema 
was differentiated from the aesthetic by a series of key binaries - 
art/entertainment, High Art/Low Culture, elite/popular, avant- 
garde/mainstream - of central concern to postmodernism's de- 
differentiations. As the norm negatively defining the legitimation 
concerns of the aesthetic sphere from which it is excluded, 
'realist' or Hollywood film thus sets the agenda for film practices 
that seek the status of the aesthetic, that is, partake of the 
grands recits that determine what constitutes modern art. With 
this distinction in place, and in keeping with my aim of 
investigating Lyotard's theory of aesthetic legitimation, avant- 
garde and modernist practices will now be examined using the 
metanarratives to assess their political, moral and epistemological 
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Abstract Formlism 
'Because he was the first to criticise the means itself of 
criticism, I conceive of Kant as the first real Modernist'. So 
wrote Clement Greenberg and in one sentence formulated one of the 
mst influential definitions of modernist art. His essay 
'Modernist Painting' continues: 
The essence of Modernism lies... in the use of the 
characteristic methods of a discipline to criticise the 
discipline itself 
- 
not in order to subvert it, but to 
entrench it more firiFI-y -in its area of competence. 14 
For Greenberg, this tendency towards Kantian immanent criticism was 
historically determined by what he felt to be a cultural void left 
by the decline of religious feeling during the course of the 
nineteenth century; he argues that this loss might have been 
averted had it undergone the type of self-criticism now advocated 
for the arts: 
The arts could save thernselves f rom this leveling (sic) 
down only by demonstrating that the kind of experience 
they provided was valuable in its own right jgd not to 
be obtained from any other kind of activity. 
In pursuit of a 'more rational justification' for the arts, each 
would have to 'narrow its area of competence, but at the same time 
it would make its possession of this area all the more secure'. 
Hence the famous dictum: 
What had to be exhibited and made explicit was that 
which was unique and irreducible not only in art in 
general, but also in each particular art. Each art had 
to determine, through the operations peculiar iko itself, the effects. peculiar and exclusive to itself. 
This was an essentially reducing and rationalizing operation 
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whereby 'each art would be rendered 'pure' and in its 'purity' find 
the guarantee of its standards of quality as well as of its 
independence'. The abarKkmmnt of recognizable objects in favour 
of the non-figurative or Abstract art is therefore due to the 
historical pressures upon painting to define itself through its own 
operations, and by criteria taken frcxn any other art. The 
Greenberglan paradigm can best be summarized by the term 
'specificity'; 'it quickly emerged that the unique and proper area 
of each art coincided with all that was unique to the nature of the 
medium'. Thus, Greenberg declares that the one true guarantee of 
painting's independence as an art is 'flatness' or two-dimensional 
picture space. He argues that three-dimensional space, to which 
the presence of 'recognisable entities' (human figures, teacup) 
attests, is the authentic province not of painting but of 
sculpture. Cubism, for instance, is abstract in the sense that in 
the early (1910-12) Analytic period Picasso, Braque (and later, 
Gris) were preoccupied with pictorial space and the 'flatness' of 
perception of spatial planes. 17 Greenberg's definition of 
Modernism is thus circular and self -defining - painting is and 
should be only what painting is. 
The same impulsion towards specificity can also be found in 
the writings of early film makers, this being one of the chief ways 
that film could be taken out of lentertainmentl and brought under 
the Modernist metanarratives. Germaine Dulac, in 'The Avant-Garde 
Cinema' (1932) wrote: 
We can use the term 'avant-garde' for any film whose 
technique, employed with a view to a renewed 
expressiveness of image and sound, breaks with 
established traditionsq to search out, in the stjýctly 
visual and auditory realmg new emotional chords. 
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The 'established traditions', perhaps needless to say, were those 
of the industrial/commercial cinema which Dulac holds responsible 
for denying the fact that cinema is specifically visual. To 
demonstrate this, Dulac separates what commercial cinema bas 
'borrowed' from other non-filmic art forms to show why 'from its 
scientific basis... cinema must address itself uniquely to sight as 
music addresses itself uniquely to hearing. Dulac's article 
'Visual and Anti-Visual Films' (1928)19 can be read in conjunction 
with Jean Epstein's earlier attempt to define the 'essence of 
cinema' in 1923; for the specificity Dulac sought, Epstein had 
coined the term 'photogenie': 
The film should 
historical, edui 
geographical or 
become, step by 
that mean2othat 
elements. 
positively avoid any connection with the 
zational, romantic, moral or immoral, 
documentary subjects. The film should 
step, finally exclusively cinematography 
it should use exclusively photogenic 
'What are the aspects of things, of beings and of souls which are 
photogenic, aspects of which cinematic art has the duty of limiting 
itself? ' Epstein's answer is the most minimal definition of the 
abstract (non-referential) potential of film to function as an 
autonomous system: the 'photogenic aspect is a construct of spatio- 
temporal variables' or, 'an aspect is photogenic if it changes 
positions and varies simultaneously in space and time'. 21 Hans 
Richter posed the distinction in these terms: 
The main aesthetic problem in the movies, which were 
invented for reproduction (of movement) is, 
paradoxicallyg the overcoming of reproduction. In other 
words, the question is: to what degree is the camera (film, colour, sound, etc) developed and used to 
reproduce (any objects which appear before the lens) or ýýe (sensations not possible in any other art to proc 
0 medium? 
No consensus emerged either then or since as to what exactly is the 
- 
65 
- 
essence of cinema though the principle of abstraction remains the 
same whether movement, light or optical perception is taken to. be 
A-1- 
- 
the specificity of the medium. Richter's division between film as 
reproduction 
- 
as the image of something profilmic 
- 
and film as 
production 
- 
as effects specific to itself 
- 
is a crucially 
important one. Firstly, because it permits a clearer understanding 
of the concerns of abstract film as autonomous art as formulated by 
Greenberg. Secondly, it provides a common ground for the some of 
-I- 
- the disparate film makers of the European avant-gardes working 
between the 1920's and '30's who were part of a 'conscious attempt 
to overcome reproduction and to arrive at the f ree use of the means 
of cinematic expression'. 
The European avant-gardes concerned with abstract film in this 
period (not avant-garde at all but Modernists, by my reading of 
Burger) were chiefly artists working in France and Germany; to take 
but the most well documented figures, Ferdinand I. 
-&-ger, Man Ray, 
Marcel Duchamp and Rene Clair in the former, with Hans Richter, 
Otto Fischingerg Walter Ruttman and the Sewdish Victor Eggeling in 
the latter. Following Richter23, the broad interests of these film 
makers can be summarized as follows: 
a) the orchestration of motion in visual rhythms; 
b) the plastic expression of an object in motion under 
varying light conditions; 
c) the distortion and dissection of a movement, an object 
or a form and its reconstitution in cinematic terms; 
d) the denaturalization of the object in any form to recreate 
it cinematographically with light. 
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A brief examination of the major films produced by these figures 
substantiate Richter's general principles. 
Both Malcolm le Grice and Standish D. Lawder. 24 have traced the 
concern with film as the analysis of flux, rhythm and movement to 
the painters of both Cubist and Futurist groups. Le Grice makes 
the distinction that in Cubism 'following directly from the late 
Cezanne', the 'dynamic principle is that of the flux in experience 
deriving from the changing stance and perception of the painter' 
whereas in Futurism, instead of focussing on this effect, formal 
devices are utilised to 'represent movement while basically 
maintaining the status of the observer'. 25 Personallyt I do not 
find this distinction a particularly useful one though it is better 
when posed as the idea that Cubist film is concerned with an 
'architectural' abstraction (Mondrian) while the Futurist develops 
film's kinetic potential (Kandinsky). Eggeling and Richter are 
thus more Cubist in their search for a 'logic' for the forms of 
abstract art but I would argue as equally kinetic in the rhythms of 
spatio-temporal illusion of movement created by the composition of 
I pure' plastic forms. During 1918-20, Eggeling and Richter had 
collaborated on a series of animated Scrolls which were painted 
studies of what le Grice defines as forms with 'simple, definable 
linear characteristics combining in additive and subtractive 
structures with basic mirror and rotational transformations. 
26 
Their failure to adapt successfully the animated scrolls to the 
technical demands of film making at UFA led to two conclusions; 
one, that fihn is governed by a different set of laws from two 
dimensional painting, that film is a time-based medium (making the 
static arrangement of form secondary to temporal considerations and 
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consequently, that much more simplified forms would be required to 
allow for the demands of frame cauposition, film speed and ratio of 
parts to the whole. 27 
Richter's first film film is Rhythm/Rhythmus 21 (1921) can be 
seen as the result of both conclusions, a study of 'rhythm in 
painting' 
- 
simplified rectangular black, white and grey shapes in 
constant flux and transformation which Lawder describes as 'Perfect 
examples of Neo-Plasticism in action' 
-a work in which 'the 
content was essentially rhythm, the formal vocabulary was elemental 
geometry, the structural principle was the counterpoint of 
contrasting opposites, and in which space and time became 
independent'. 28 Eggeling, on the other hand, continued to exploit 
the sequential fact of film (frame after frame) to adapt his 
Scrolls animation. The resulting Diagonal Symphony (1924) is a 
study of 'graphic transformational logic' in which the 'emphasis is 
on objectively analysed movement rather than expressiveness, on the 
surface patterning of lines into clearly defined movements, 
controlled by a mechanical, almost metronomic tempo'. 
29 The two 
film makers, although unknowingly, were working on the same 
features of Abstract Formalism that were occupying Orphists, the 
Suprematist Kas: LflM*r Malevitch and later, Piet Mondrian of the De 
Stijl School, in painting: the elemental forms of pure spatial 
relationships. This Mondrian-Analytical Cubist tendency, according 
to le Grice, can be contrasted with one dominated by the painter 
Wassily Kandinsky. 30 Both Lawder and le Grice have read the 
abstract work of Ruttman and Fischinger in terms of a Kandinskian 
move from figuration to abstraction. For le Grice, Ruttman's 
series Lichtspeil - Opus I-IV (1921-24) can be considered 'a 
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microcosm paralleling development of abstraction in general': the 
extant is dominanted by 'anthropomorphic' and 'organiq' 
forms and 'their action represents an allegorical conflict between 
sharp wedge-like forms which probe aggressively and rounder forms 
which are the subject of the rhythmic probing'; Opus II_ 
concentrates on mathematical and geometric composition of 
rectilineals and diagonals which suggest an 'attempt to relate more 
directly to the geometry of the screen and the mechanical analogies 
of the film medium'. Le Grice reads the fourth Opus as a 
culmination of the abstraction process in that parts of the film 
'divide the screen so boldly or transform it so rapidly that it is 
the optical effect which predominates. However, I would suggest 
that it is not the use of abstraction which is paramount here but 
rather the emotional or spiritual expressionism which underlies the 
experiments with film as a non-representational form that brings it 
within Kandinsky's danain. Ruttman and Kandinsky were both 
influenced by the theory of 'synaesthetic correspondences', a 
theory that had its origins in the nineteenth century 
Aeastheticist' s concern that all art should to aspire to the 
condition of music. Lawder cites the Gennan critic Berhard Diebold 
who called for a new art formed from the coalition of modern art, 
the movement of film and the structure of music. 'Film-as-painted- 
music', the author suggests, sprang from a wish to 'give visible 
form to the emotional moods created by music... which presumed the 
existence of specific auditory and visual stimuli to elicit imer 
emotional states'. 
31 The first screening of Ruttman's stencil 
coloured (1921), with musical accompaniment, was reviewed in 
the following terms: 
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Some of the forms of these colours assumed were familiar 
to us in the restless paintings of the Cubists and 
expressionists 
- 
triangles, trapezoids, cubes, circlesq 
spirals, squares, disks, crescents, ellipses 
- 
all the 
usual fragmentary and activist geometry. But here the 
writhing, shifting, interlacing, interlocking, inter- 
acting elements were fluent and alive, moving to the 
laws of a definite rhythm and harmony, obedient to a 
will and impulse... flickering and wavering in and out, 
over and under this revel of Klangfarbe, or sounding 
colour, the Leitmotif appeared in playful, undulant lines. the colour equivalents of the strong, clear finale: S2 
Fischinger's later Experiments in Hand Drawn Sound (1931) which he 
described as 'patterns drawn on paper with pen and ink, 
photographed on to the margin of the film reserved for the sound- 
track' was also part of the 'optical music' tradition within film 
abstraction which followed Fischinger into the 'commercial' sector 
when he moved to Hollywood under MGM (Optical Poem of 1937/8) and 
was commissioned by Disney to design a section for what was to 
become Fantasia (1940). 33 Marcel Duchamp's. Rotary Demi-Sphere 
(Precision Optics) (1925), later incorporated into Anaemic. Cinema 
(1927), might also be considered as part of this tradition of 
optical abstraction, being an attempt to produce stereoscopic film 
and a three-dimensional effect by orchestrating the visual effects 
of discs of concentric and eccentric circles with homonyms inscibed 
upon them. Within his predominantly Surrealist films, Man Ray too 
experimented with the abstract properties of filming objects 
rotating to reflect patterns of light, particularly in sections of 
Emak Bakia (1926)* 
The features discussed so far adhere to the notion that film 
specificity can be located in production as against reproduction. 
One must be careful to say that it is the impression of movement 
that occupies the foreground of experiment (the hand-drawn, 
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animated abstract work producing the effect of dynamic and rhythmic 
forms). This is not in itself specifically cinematic but to do 
with the projection of images at certain speeds. In other words, 
it might be argued that abstraction actually turns away from what 
makes film essentially a photographic medium 
- 
its capacity to 
record and reproduce images 
- 
and makes it an extension of 
'painterly' concerns. Ferdinand 1.6ger's Ballet Mkanique (1924) was 
intended to exploit both of these contrasting potentials by 
creating a 'rhythn of common objects in space and time, to present 
them in their plastic beauty'. 34 David Curtis has suggested that 
the film is historically significant for being the first abstract 
film to be photographed as opposed to drawn. Taking on abstract 
geometric forms, images of commonplace objects and close-ups of 
facial details, L6ger's film is tightly constructed into sections 
of varying tempo and scale, featuring prismatic fracturing of semi- 
representational images (bottles, human legs, mechanical legs, 
kitchen implements, eyes, mouths) to contrast in meaning, tone and 
rhythm with their abstract 'equivalents'. 
35 Commentators have 
pointed, however,. to the section (Stills number: 188-92) in which a 
washer woman is seen to begin an ascent up a flight of stairs only 
to begin the same sequence before reaching the top. This is 
repeated seven times here and again a little later using loop 
repetition. The importance of this section has been attributed to 
it being the first time that film has become the subject of film; 
where Richterý Ruttman and Eggeling were concerned with what is 
specific to the film medium (movement, rhythm, optical effect), 
1, ý_ger's sequence poses self-reflexive questions about the formal 
construction of 'units' of film meaning and about the materia 
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of the means of filmic signif ication. This teridency will be 
explored in some depth in the next section on structural/ 
Materialist film. 
Film abstraction, in the form I have outlined, is the primary 
example of aesthetics legitimated by the narrative of speculative 
spirit. The concept of a self-regulating, autonomous sphere of 
art, occupied by questions pertinent only to the specificities of 
each medium, though, requires validation as knowledge since its 
role in cultural life is far from self-evident. Greenberg, rather 
tellingly, appealed to the procedures of science for this: 
That visual art should confine itself exclusively to 
what is given in visual experience, and make no 
reference to anything given in other orders of 
experience, is a notion whose only justification lies, 
notionally, in scientific consistency. Scientific method 
alone asks that a situation be resolved in exactly the 
same kind of terms as that in which it is presented. 
Fran the 'point of view of art itself its convergence with science 
happens to be a mere accident' but, significantly for my discussion 
of delegitimation in Chapter One, he follows : 'What their 
convergence dogs show, however, is the degree to which Modernist 
art belongs to the same historical and cultural tendency as modern 
science'. 36 This should make it subiect to the same dissolution 
of the recits as Lyotard theorized for science: if art must 
appeal to science for its validation, it follows therefore that it 
cannot 'supervise' its own 'game'. In turn, I would argue, this 
necessarily calls into crisis the very status of the autonomous 
aesthetic ob. ject it seeks to legitimate: art is truly art in so far 
as it is based on 'scientific' procedures and its claim to autonomy 
is seriously threatened. 
At a more readily political level, engaging in the pursuit of 
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&. I- 
- the specificity of the medium depends on a rigorous differentiation 
between art and social life. The 'graphic' film's rejection of 
realist fiction does not necessarily entail a politically motivated 
opposition to it but, rather, accepts (and thus supports the idea) 
that avant-garde art practices are only avant-garde for art. 
Consider a quotation from Sitney, this time from Visionary Film 
(1974): 'The precise relationship of the avant-garde cinema to 
American commercial film is one of radical otherness. They operate 
in different realms with next to no significant influence on each 
other' (P. viii). In 'Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural 
Theory' (1980)2 Raymond Williams (with regard to Gramsci) 
formulates a theory of cultural hegemony in terms of the processes 
and relations between three possible political cultures 
- 
dominant, 
emergent and residual 
- 
and makes this point: 
There is a simple theoretical distinction between 
alternative and oppositional, that is to say between 
someone who simply finds a different way to live and 
wishes to be left alone with it, and someone who finds a 
diffe; qnt way to live and wants to change society in its 
light-j/ 4, 
SitneyIS 'radical otherness' is alternative but not oppositional in 
that it does not seek to transgress or transform the codes of what 
Noel Burch38 has termed the 'institutional mode of representation' 
but, rather, abandons them. The status of Abstract Formalism as 
art is secured by its absolute separation of art from the concerns 
of social life, differentiating the means of representation or 
medium (film) from reality (social life). Fr(xn a feminist 
perspective, abstraction is dependent on a primary exclusion of the 
social 
- 
within the Modernist aesthetic of Abstract Formalism, 
issues such as the social construction of gender in film simply 
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cannot appear. L. 6ger's Ballet Mecarilique is again instructive. One 
commentator has suggested that the incorporation of elements of 
female fares, legs, mouths and especially eyes, makes L6ger's film 
&. I- 
- 
une first real engagement with 'institutional' film's investment in 
sexual imagery. The film: 
... 
was stylistically heterogeneous in its construction 
and instead of seeking to suppress such 'troublesome' 
items as the 'look', language and sexuality, it places 
them in a central position. Kiki's eyes, shown in 
extreme close-up, look back at the spectator from the 
screen, challenging his7TWr- security as unseen 
voyeur... 39 
While I do not believe that this was Lýger's intention, nor that it 
would have been read at this time in such a way, the film does 
illustrate my point that, for me, feminism can only appear as an 
issue for film within representational or image-based practices. 
This makes feminism's relationship to Modernism and the concept of 
an avant-garde, both political and aesthetic, a complex one. 
shall refrain from discussing feminist critiques of the historical 
avant-gardes and of the Modernist problematic which determine them 
until Chapter Three. Here, it is surely not insignificant that the 
major Arts Council 'Film as Film' forum of 1979 concluded with a 
withdrawal of work by the female/feminist film makers, historians, 
researchers and exhibitors for the way in which a 'hidden' history 
of women film makers of this period (Alice Guy, Germaine Dulac, 
Maya Deren) could only be made apparent (suppressed) within the 
abstract/formal film field which denied the diversity and non- 
homogeneity of their film practices. As my own research has 
shown4O, these film makers are judged and consistently downgraded 
for not 'fitting in' to the categories (historical and formal) 
already constituted by an overwhelmingly masculine apparatus of 
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critics, theoreticians and selection comittee members. 
To conclude, I summarily characterize my first film practice 
tIllus: 
Modernist : 
nant Metanarrative : The Narrative of Speculative Spirit 
Internal Life of the Autonomous Object 
Differentiations Automxmous art v Social life 
Abstract V tation 
Hi zb Art V Low Culture 
Aesthetic Value V Entertainment 
Strur-tural and Structurr d/Materialist Film 
The next film practice within the Modernist narrative of 
speculation can be seen to continue research into the 'specificity' 
of the film medium but extending this as far as its logical 
endpoint: film as its own 'material'. The concerns of 
Istructural/materialist' film can only be gauged by outlining the 
terms of its components, both the concept of 'structural' film and 
of 'materialism', and its relations to radical film practices. 
The label 'structural' film was first used by P. A. Sitney in 
1969 in an article published in Film Culture to identify a set of 
features that distinguished a group of films/film makers from other 
I underground' non-commercial tendencies. 
41 The time and place of 
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this are significant, marking a shift away from pre-World War II 
Europe to late '60's America as the focus for new developments-in 
experimental film practices. Within the American context, the 
advent of structural film can be used to posit a break from the 
post-war associative and emotive films of what Sheldon Renan has 
termed the Second Avant Garde (West Coast USA from approximately 
1943 to 1956). 42 This had been dominated by the Surrealist- 
inspired 'mythopoeic' or 'trance' films of Maya Deren 
- 
Meshes of 
the Afternoon (1943), the poetic narrative films of Gregory 
Markopoulos 
- 
_Pysche/Lysis/Charmides 
(1947-48), the expressive 
qualities sought by 'psychodramas' such as Kenneth Anger's Eaux 
d'Artifice (1953) or the works of James Broughton and Sidney 
Peterson. 43 Renan's Third American Avant Garde includes the major 
film makers cited by Sitney as exemplary of the structural tendency 
: Tony Conrad, George Landow, Michael Snow, Hollis Fr&npton, Joyce 
Wieland, Ernie Gehr, Paul Sharits plus Andy Warhol. They differ 
from these earlier metaphorical works in that they are concerned 
not with the 'specificity' of the formal aspects of film but with 
structure 'wherein the shape of the whole film is predetermined and 
simplified'. This is not in itself sufficient to distinguish the 
two; a 'precise statement of the difference between form and 
structure must involve a sense of the working process; for the 
formal film is a tight nexus of content, a shape designed to 
explore the facets of the material'. 
44 In brief, a photographed 
content of images is then subjected to formal narrative devices: 
slow and fast motion, repetition, superimposition, montage editing, 
transitions, focussing, double exposures, reversals, expansion and 
contraction of the image, or, for instance, the editing technique 
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of 'thought images' peculiar to M. arkopoulos who 'used short bursts 
(groups) of images 
- 
single frames taken from different scenes-or 
parts of a scene, both repeating and anticipating events'045 
Richter's production/reproduction distinction is again pertinent. 
For Sitney, 'recurrences, antithesis, and overall rhythm are the 
elements of the formal' so that 'reproduction', or the content of 
images, is retained for 'poetic', associative or semantic effect. 
The structural film, in contrast, devalues the representational 
capacity of images in favour of analysis of the 'specificity' of 
the visual processes of film, in order to examine film as its own 
subject or 'content': 'the structural film insists on its shape, 
and what content it has is minimal and subsidiary to the outline'. 
Sitney's much cited and debated definition follows: 
Four characteristics of the structural film are a 
fixed camera position (fixed frame from the viewer's 
perspective), the flicker effeEt, loop printing (the immediate rertition of shots, exactly and 
n 
46 
without variation and rephotography off of a screen. 
Birgit Hein has taken issue with Sitney's terms of definition and 
proposed some more specific indicators of structural film's concern 
with the processes 
- 
optical, chemical and perceptual 
- 
that form 
the material 'substrate' of the realist film image. I have found 
it useful for ordering the explosion of film making activity in 
America during the 1960 1 s/70 Is to follow Hein's division of the 
field into three areas: 1) the film strip; 2) projection, using 
intervening light; 3) the projected image. 42 For the sake of 
brevity, I here present the author's categories supplemented with a 
few examples from film practice. 
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The Film Strip 
Hein notes that film as physical material can be 'treated' for_ 
aesthetic purposes in different ways: 
a) in the optical Process9 which includes the actual 
photographic shot taken with the camera and the optical 
printing; 
b) in the chemical-development process of negative and 
positive material; 
c) in direct work on the surface of the film stri 
- 
The earliest form of 'structural' work on the material of celluloid 
has been attributed to Man Ray's rayograms in Retour a la Raison 
(1923) which, by exposing objects placed onto the film surface, 
could directly imprint their physical characteristics without 
filming through a camera. The dadaist origin of direct work on the 
film strip has been explored more recently by Tony Conrad who has 
cooked film, soaked it in curry and left it to partially corrode. 
In 7360 Sukiyaki, Conrad has 'washed unexposed Kalvar stock, cut it 
up, and cooked it; he next 'dipped the pieces of film in egg and 
threw them against the screen, which was illuminated by the 
projector, and they slowly dripped down'. 48 Conrad's activity does 
not interrogate photographic (reproductive) processes as such but 
nonetheless remains part of structural film's larger task of 
exploring the physical or material constituents of them. The 
I structural' label covers many approaches to a perceived need to 
draw attention to the various aspects (light, film, movement, 
projection, time) founding the 'illusionism' of realist i 
practices in cwmercial cinema 
- 
Whereas Conrad abandons the filmic 
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altogether, some film makers take the reproductive imasze 
potential of film as the starting point for their critiques. 
- 
Stan Brakhage renewed interest in the direct technique in one 
of his 'transitional' film; Mothlight (1963) is often presented as 
the film in which Brakhage mediated between the Second (poetic) and 
the Third (structural) American avant gardes. In this, Brakhage 
I treated' the film strip by pasting moth wings and leaves between 
strips Of mYlar tape then running it through an optical printer. 
Renan quotes Brakhage as saying that the negative effect of this 
light collage is 'what a moth might see from birth to death if 
black were white, 49 
-a poetic metaphor generated by work on the 
film strip itself. Bringing the film strip to the spectator's 
consciousness does not, however, have to be structural but may 
belong to the formal. For instance, Dog Star Man/The Art Of Vision 
defines Brakhage's aesthetic as one in which he: 
deliberately makes the splices visible, draws on his 
s, scratches and punctures them, repeats shots and 
turns them upside down; the image sometimes appears 
negative or can be over- or under-exposed or spoiled by 
camera shake, there can be blurred super-impostions or 
it can be almost invisible because there are so few 
frames. 
-"j 
The purpose of this is symbolic to convey inner emotional states 
through distortion of the film strip as metaphor for 'seeing' with 
what he termed in 'closed-eye vision' (cf. Vertov's 'kino-eye). 
Structural film, in contrast, takes the film strip as its own 
subject, taking apart the processes of the film strip to illustrate 
the material basis of film images. George Landow's A film in which 
there appear Sprocket Holes, Edge Lettering, pirt Particles, etc. 
(1965-66) is the most famous example of a film in which the 
'content' (a 'found' image of a girl's head) is reduced to a 
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minimum in order to present an experience of movement solely 
through the visible flux of dust particles gathering in the 
sprocket holes. The material qualities of film stock are also 
explored as fundamental to the process of image formation in Ken 
Jacobs' Torn Tom the Piper's Son (1969) described by Hein as a 
primary example of a movement from 'reality of representation to 
the reality of the f ilm-strip and its material constitution': 
He starts with a 10 min. burlesque film of 1904 which, 
after one complete run-through, is analysed sequence by 
sequence after being refilmed from the screen. Parts are 
repeated at differing speeds, including slow-motion; 
isolated fragments are run forwards and backwards, and 
details grow larger and larger until the image dissolves 
into bright and dark spots and the film-grain becomes 
visible.! " 
Both le Grice and Hein cite Paul Sharits' Axiomatic Granularity 
(1973) and Apparent Motion (1975) as important for doing away with 
' 
L. 1- 
- 
the photographic image entirely and working solely with the 
textural qualities of exposed film strip. 
Projection 
This category relates to the fact that it is only in projection 
that the impression of motion is conveyed. Hein suggests that 
there are forms of purely filmic motion and that motion in film is 
a 'possibility, but not a necessity, for single images on the film 
strip can be identical': 'for this reason duration is an integral 
part of f ilm' K- 
Under the heading of projer-tiOnt it is possible to place those 
films concerned with the condition of film in its temporal 
dimension which is often taken to be the non-reducible 
'specificity' of the medium. Against the artifically condensed and 
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manipulated narrative time of commercial cinema, Sitney states that 
the fixed camera is crucial to structural film because it permits 
analyses of the concept of fiLm duration. Loopprinting, as 
practiced by Joyce Wieland in Sailboat (1967)52, similarly frees 
the spectator from the constraints of motivated, linear narrative 
time by drawing attention instead to the experience of projection 
time itself 
- 
'without the kinetic element of repeated loops, 
repetition of identifiable elements is an essential prerequisite 
for the establisbment of systemic structure'. 53 Andy Warhol's 
early silent fixed frame film find their structure in the 
specificity of film duration, a concrete duration in which the 
material time of filming and the projection time of viewing 
coincide: 
[Warhol] made famous the fixed frame in Sleep, in which 
half a dozen shots are seen for over six hours. In order 
to achieve that elongation he used both loopprinting of 
whole one hundred feet takes (21 minutes) and, in the 
end, ýýe freezing of a still image of the sleeper's 
head. 
Eat, Kiss and refuse film movement, sound or dramatic 
event in favour of an exploration of film duration: 'duration 
confronts the spectator with film itself as material and as a 
process of representation'. 
55 It must be noted that Warhol's 
minimalist 'one shot' f ilms , while analytical of film duration, 
depend for their effect on the spectator's acceptance of the 
'presence' of the film' represented content in direct contrast to 
the structural work on the image base of film so far discussed. 
Michael Snow's Wavelength (1967) - 45 minutes of continuous zoom - 
also explores the 'time/movement continuum' using the 'limitation' 
of continuous static camra with pans and zooms (with rotation in 
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La. Rfigion. Centrale (1971)) to examine the spatial/temporal 
construction of film duration. 56 In Wavelengthq the 'camera and 
its lens maintain their status as physical tools while allowing for 
an interpretation as a ctxnplex model for perception': 
The film begins with an act of pure recording as if the 
camera were a completely passive tabula rasa instrument 
capable of preserving without distortion the impress of 
the exterior world. The image shows an empty loft and 
sound records the street noise outside of it. When 
people enter the loft carrying a bookcase we hear them 
in synchronization. But soon after, the natural sound is 
suspended and replaced by an artficially generated sine 
wave. On the visual track flashes of pure color (sic), 
transitions to negative, slight superimpositions occur. 
Thus both the sound and picture recording iSýtruments 
begin to generate their own subject matter. 
The Perceived Image 
From the motion implied by projection through after-image and 
stroboscopic effect, in feature films there is no creative 
difference except movement between each frame and the film strip 
whereas in structural f ilm the perception of a single-frame f ilm is 
not the same as appears on the film strip. 
Robert Breer's experiments with a 'frame by frame collision of 
totally disparate images' in Recreation (1956) and later in Blazes 
(1961) in which 'a hundred basic images switching position for four 
thousand times, 58 illustrate the 'conditions of illusion' of filmic 
movement. These are clearly indebted to the kinetic work of 
Richter but make more extensive analysis of the single-frame as 
unit of film signification: 'one of Breer's discoveries was the 
simple fact that two different images on consecutive frames give 
the effect of a single super-imposition; the chain of different 
images means the eye has to chose what it wants to see'. 
59 The 
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I perceptual' film has been characterized by le Grice as film which 
works upon the spectator at a 'pre-conscious' rather than 'psyclp- 
interpretive level'. 60 Guided by the concept of retinal retention, 
'flicker' films utilize rapid sequential contrasts to elicit an 
'autonomic nervous response'. Tony Conrad's eponymous The Flicker 
(1966) offers a 'simple progression from twenty four flashes a 
second (camera speed) to four flashes and back to twenty-four in 
the space of thirty minutes'. 61 Peter Kubelka has thus been 
regarded as one the progenitors of the structural film's concern 
with film perception; his Arnulf Rainer (1957, Austria) is by his 
own description a study in 'harmonic measurement in time and light' 
composed of four strips 
- 
'one composed of completely transparent 
film leader, then a strip of completely black film, and then two 
strips of magnetic sound, one completely empty, no signal, and the 
other, continuous sound'. 62 Without using a camera or editing, 
Kubelka then cut the strips to a rigorously predefined 'score' to 
form a tonal perceptual structure of light in metric patternings. 
Paul Sharits concentrated on the colour 'flicker' film - (Ray Gun 
Virus 1966) 
- 
'wherein clusters of differentiated single frames of 
solid colour can appear to ahmst blend or, each frame insisting on 
its discreteness, can appear aggressively to vibrate. 63 
From Hein's categories, it is evident that the project of 
dismantling the complex of procesess which constitute realist or 
representational film requires the spectator's consciousness and 
cognitive perception. The spectator has to this point been given 
as an unproblematic subject capable of attaining full self- 
knowledge through viewing structural film de-constructions. This 
has provided a sharp focus for Peter Gidal's writings and film 
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making64 which are highly charged polemical attacks on 'dominant 
cinema', and his overtly antagonistic stance marks a shift from 
strucatural film's concern with what Peter Wollen has argued is the 
pursuit of a film 'ontologyt65 (material as irreducible 
specificity, an aesthetic concern for purity) towards a politically 
materialist mode of cultural production under capitalism. The 
'bringing to consciousness' of the processes that realist fibn 
denies or represses is the central core of Peter Gidal's 
formulation of film as both structural and 'materialist'; the more 
abstract concerns of structural film are brought within a 
conceptual framework that foregrounds the issue of spectatorial 
positioning in order to 'negate' the dominant experience of 
viewing. 66 Thus Gidal's 'materialism' is not solely the reduction 
of film as material to its physical photo-chemical 'substrate' but 
also 'materialism' as synonym for Marxist cultural politics: 
Gidal's aesthetic conflates the two senses: 'true' materialist 
critique of bourgeoise social relations can be made only through 
the experience of the processes of film as material since all other 
(representational) forms are in some way complicit with bourgeois 
oppression. He is concerned to 'produce' a viewing subject 
process rather than the passive spectator of the 'cinema of 
consumption'. Gidal isolates three primary mechanisms by which 
dominant cinema secures passive spectators: illusionist 
representation, narrative and identification. While each aspect 
has some degree of functional autonomy - identification is 
'inseparable from the procedures of narrative, though not covered 
by it, 67- they form a complex network of 'repressive' processes 
which re-present a finished content transparent for an untroubled 
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consuming viewer. He thus equates dominant cinema with 
representation (the capacity of film to register an image of 
something profilmic, to proffer itself as a record of 'reality') 
and rejects both as deeply complicit with the exploitative 
relations and ideological formation of the capitalist mode of 
production. Narrative is an 'illusionist procedure, manipulatoryg 
mystificatory' and the conditions of its functioning are for Gidal 
wholly repressive: of space 
- 
the 'distance between the viewer and 
the object, a repression of real space in favour of the illusionist 
space'; of time 
- 
the 'implied lengths of time suffer compressions 
formed by certain technical devices which operate in a codified 
manner, under specific laws, to repress (material time), and of the 
discontinuity of film frames 
- 
the repression of in-film spaces, 
'those perfectly constructed continuities'. 68 Hence his strident 
rejection of any 'so-called' Lef tist f Urn practice that attempts a 
politically radical critique by subverting narrative though still 
retaining a representational image base: an 'avant-garde film 
defined by its development towards increased materialism and 
materialist function does not represent, or. document, anything'. 
69 
For Gidal, the representation of #content' or of 'people' are 
primary conditions for the reproductive and non-productive 
processes of identification. The 'mechanism of identification 
demands a passive audience, a passive mental posture in the face of 
a life unlived, a series of representations, a phantasy identified 
with for the sake of 90 minutes' illusion'. 
70 In brief, radical 
film practice must by definition provide the means for viewing 
without the ideological and psychoanalytical implications of 
identification as: 
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eee that force which impels a movement from one's 
position in a social space of social meanings or a 
political space - to and into a different human 
residence another ! Zdy or another figure 
- 
where the 
pbantasms and fantasies, ýýe realities of one's 
projections, are enacted. 
Against narrative, illusionism and identification, he posits 
, Uo- 
structural/materialist film, 'at once object and process', in which 
'the real content is the form, form become content. Form is meant 
as formal operation, not as composition'. 72 Gidal is not content 
with the type of reflexivity that permits film procedures to be 
represented instead of presented in process since it confirms the 
spectator as consuming and not producing: 
The assertion of film as material is, in fact, 
predicated upon representation, in as much as 'pure' 
empty acetate running through the projector gate without 
image (for example) merely sets off another level of 
abstract (or non-abstract associations). Those 
associations, when instigated by such a device are no 
more materialýjt or non-illusionist than any other 
associations. 
]Rather, the viewing of a structural/materialist film is 'at once 
viewing a film and viewing the 'coming into presence' of the film 
i. e. the system. of consciousness that produces the work, that is 
produced by and in it,. 74 Gidal seeks a film practice in which a 
'materialist reading at one with the inscription of the work (which 
is the work) is enabled or forced' 
- 
the construction of the work 
is coterminous with its deconstruction and the relation of film to 
I reality' is not of consequence. The text: 
... 
itself is elaborated and constituted in such a way 
that the whole work process of reading the marks 
necessitates a reading of differences and a 
dialecticisation of the material procedures which 
produce the marking one is confronted with. The subject 
of the work is not the invisible artist symbolically 
inferred through the work's presence, but rather the 
whole foregroundfabric of the complex system of 
markings itself. " 
- 
86 
- 
'Ihus Deke Dusinberre writes of Gidal's Room Film (1973): 
The erratic and often unfocused use of the camera 
effectively yields a camera uninterested (or, at leastq 
disinterested) in the objects it scans. The camera 
movement is not mechanical, as is the editing procedure, 
but appears almost random or arbitrary. So that the film 
privileges the very process of configuration of the 
image on the part of the recording apparatus and on the 
part of the viewer; by making the perception 5-Fan i 
on the screen difficult and by rendering those images 
banal and almost 'meaningless', the film rigorously 
reduces the semantic element and forces the spectator 76 back on to her/his own capacities for meaning-making. 
For Gidal, the 'structuring aspects and the attempts to decipher 
the structure/recorrect it, to clarify and analyse the production- 
process of the specific image at any specific mornent' define film 
as structural/materialist. Again: 
Through usage of specific filmic devices such as 
repetition within duration one is forced to attempt to 
decipher both the film's material and the film's 
construct, and to decipher the precise transformations 
that each75o/incide/nce of cinematic techniques 
produces. 
The activity or 'work' of the viewer in this guarantees that the 
experience does not degenerate into the meaningless-tautology of 
'mechanically formalistic' rýpresentations of film solely as film, 
but a dialectical process that results in spectatorial knowledge. 
Here, in the epistemological space of the perceiving sub_ject, the 
two metanarratives converge to produce a Modernist politics of 
anti-representation. The structural film evidently extends (or 
displaces) the paradigmatic autonomy sanctioning Abstract Formalism 
and, as such, belongs with the narrative of speculation as the 
aesthetic legitimation of knowledge of the internal conditions of 
the medium. However, matters become more complex with Gidal's 
attempt to inflect structural film within a 'materialist' context, 
given that materialist philosophy (Marxism) necessarily appeals to 
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the narrative of liberty. Gidal is thus a hybrid Modernist in 
amealing to both 
- 
knowledge of the internal furr-tioning of film cr, - 
is 'produced' as a kind of antidote to the seduction ofq and 
consequent social oppression by, a popular mass cultural experience 
of a largely representational cinema. In the name of anti- 
identification, Gidal articulates quite neatly what from a 
postmodernist perspective is by now a commonplace: that Left- 
radical politics have been affiliated with a form of Modernism 
which makes its art/political avant-gardes responsible for the 
production of 'knowledge' so as to resist the ideological work done 
by capitalism in the course of a 'reproduction of the relations of 
production'. I shall explore this configuration more specifically 
under the rubric of the narrative of liberty. 
To sum up, structural film is centripetal in both its content 
(film as film) and in the constitution of its marginal aesthetic 
domain. From a desire to produce more politically conscious social 
sub-jectsq thoughg structural/materialist film draws upon the 
narrative of emancipation. The didactic enterprise of 'producing' 
anti-capitalist knowledge is thus underwritten by the narrative of 
speculation which differentiates the Modernist sphere of the 
aesthetic through a rigorous separation of specialized art practice 
fran 'everyday' life experience 
- 
the radical political aesthetic, 
as discussed above, is afforded only at the cost of this 
differentiation. Schematically represented: 
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Pan rl wnist: 
Dcadnmt Metanarrative: 
Supp] emwtary : 
Differentiations 
IbAe Narrative of Speculative Spirit 
The Narrative of LUx! rty 
Radical Autoomy as Social Critique 
Knml edge 
Production 
Work 
v logy 
v IL 
v Pleasure 
It has been argued so far that for film to be Modernist it 
must be brought under the legitimation of the metanarratives which 
define it as knowledge and, in support of my thesis, I have cited 
examples of film practice which draw largely upon the narrative of 
speculation. However, Lyotard's thesis on the epistemlogical 
resources which validate modernist knowledge is a useful one to 
apply to film; for Lyotardq Modernism is construed according to 
the legitimation claims of two metanarratives which allows a 
greater flexibility for determining the conditions under which film 
has been construed as Modernist. 
I wish now to pursue how the other grand rLit, the narrative 
of liberty, has equally determined the history and nature of 
Modernist film making. 
- 
89 
- 
Anti-illus' i 
It has been suggested that the primary Modernist 
differentiation, the space of art as knowledge, can be secured only 
by exclusion from the mass popular consumption of entertainment/ 
illusionist/representational cinema which furictions as the norm and 
sets the agendas for various laesthetict programmes. The logic of 
this would be to argue that the definition of Modernism thus 
necessarily excludes the majority of film production/consumption. 
But there is something dissonant with this conclusion. which arises 
fr(xn attempting to balance a historical awareness with a 'purely' 
theoretical description. From an 'art' point of view, camercial 
cinema cannot be Modernist being neither autonomous nor 
emancipatory. However, this conclusion amounts to a very partial 
grasp of the concept of Modernism; modernism was not solely (nor 
primarily) an aesthetic phenomenon but the dominant cultural 
experience of a historical period (c. 1870-1939) of social, 
economic and tecbnological transformations within industrial 
capitalist societies. It is the period that Marshall Berman, after 
Karl Marx, has famously documented as one in which 'all that is 
solid melts into air'. 78 The 'maelstrom of modern life' is the 
result of a complex network of interrelating social, economic and 
demographic factors: the central contradiction of modern life in the 
late nineteenth/early twentieth-century is embodied by the figure 
of Faust 
-a simultaneous affirmation of the power and human 
potential of science and tecbnology and a concomitant experience of 
the destruction of 'traditional' (rural, agricultural) social 
organization and values. Berman outlines a few of the most 
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important factors: 
ooe the great discoveries in the physical sciences -_ 
changing our images of the universe and our place in it; 
the industrialization of production, which transforms 
scientific knowledge into technology, creates new human 
environments and destroys old ones, speeds up the whole 
tempo of life, generates new forms of corporate power 
and class struggle; immense demographic upheavals, 
severing millions of people from their ancestral 
habitats, hurtling them half-way across the world into 
new lives; rapid and often cataclysmic urban growth; 
systems of mass communication, dynamic in their 
development, enveloping and binding together the most 
diverse people and societies... bearing and driving all 
-, 
Nd' these people and institutions along, an ever-exIN ing, 
drastically fluctuating capitalist world market. 
Modernism, then, should be regarded as a particular set of cultural 
rather dm, as has become customary to understand, narrowly 
artistic responses to the social (industrial, economic) processes 
of modernization. The historico-economic 'base' of Modernism can 
become obscured when concentrating solely on an atenWral sphere of 
the aesthetic and it is clear that the very social existence of 
cinema testifies to the dominance of an industrialised. and urban 
experience for large numbers of the population. Indeed, early 
cinema has become the privileged signifier of Modernist culture of 
the Machine Age8o, fusing science and innovation in a technology 
for exhibition and consumption on a historically unprecedented mass 
scale. This raises a seeming paradox: the emergence of the 
institution of mass cinema may belong with the histroical Modernist 
period but its dominant 'products' (narrative/ illusionist film) 
cannot be theorized as Modernist according to the terms of 
definition so far presented. To resolve this, one must shift 
perspective frcxn the concern with film as autonomous knowledge (as 
specified by the narrative of speculation) to grasp that from its 
inception cinema was also subject to legitimation by the narrative 
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of liberty and that this specifies avant-garde prqiects under its 
aegis quite differently. 
The key historical text here is, of course, Walter Benjamin's 
highly influential 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction' (1936), which theorizes a break frorn the viewer's 
absorbed contemplation of art to the 'distracted' but politiCiZed 
spectator of the new mass media. 81 The most salient points he 
makes concern the capacity of photography to transform the 
traditional concept of a work of art by negating its sustaining 
Romantic concepts: creativity, genius, eternal value, beauty and 
mystery. Instead, the industrial capacity for the mechanical 
reproduction of visual imagery works against such 'pre-Modern' 
notions of artistic production, and devalues the ritual-based 
'aural or ('self-presence') of the artist's 'authentic' art work. 
Hence, the technique of reproducing exact copies of an art work 
'detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition' and, 
for Benjamin, opens up a whole new conception of the function of 
art: for 'the first time in world history, mechanical reproduction 
emancipates the. work of art from its parasitical dependence on 
ritual': from a photographic negative, for example, one can make 
any number of prints; 'to ask for the 'authentic' print makes no 
sensel. Benjamin argues that the 'instant the criterion of 
authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the 
total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on 
ritual, it begins to be based on another practice 
- 
politics,. 82 
It is not only the repetition of serial reproduction that he sees 
as the historical uniqueness of the modern epoch. Benjamin also 
argues that film is a progressive proletarian art medium per se, 
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providing a 'simultaneous collective experience' of representations 
of the world not tied to previously realist or naturalist foým 
(utilizing close-ups, distortions, selections of detai, 83) and 
expanding the spectator's sense of the observable 'real' worlde 
Benjamin's essay has been subject to much attention in within 
recent debates on the shift from modernism to 'post-aesthetic' or 
'post-auratic' postmodernism; while I would agree that it certainly 
marks a fault line between quite different ways of conceiving the 
'work' of art, according to my reading of the metanarrativesq his 
thesis is a quintessentially Modernist one in that it defines the 
emancipatory project of film 'at the service' of liberty for the 
People (as specified in Marxist dialectical materialism). His 
concept of the film spectator is of paramount importance to many 
formulations of the means by which film can be employed for 
liberational purposes. Consider the following: 'Distraction and 
concentration form polar opposites which may be stated as follows: 
A man who concentrates before a work of art is absorbed by it', in 
contrast, 't4e distracted mass absorbs the work of art': 
The distracted person... can form habits. More, the 
ability to master certain tasks in a state of 
distraction proves that their solution has become a 
matter of habit. Distraction as provided by art presents 
a covert control of the extent to which new tasks have 
become solvable by apperception. Since, moreover, 
individuals are tempted to avoid such tasks, art will 
tackle the most difficult and most important ones where 
it is able to mobilize the masses. Today it does so in 
the film. Reception in a state of distraction, which 
is increasing noticeably in all fields of art and is 
symptomatic of profound changes in apperception, finds 
in the film its true means of exercise. The film with 
its shock effect meets this mode of reception half way. 
The film makes the cult value recede into the background 
not only by putting the public in the position of the 
critic, but also by the fact that at the movies this 
position requires no attention. lh%ýublic is an 
examiner, but an absent-minded one. 
- 
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As a mass proletarian art form, the political function Of film 
derives from the possibility of exploiting this gap between 
apperception in a state of distraction and the generation of shock 
effects by anti-naturalistic techniques. This is nowhere more 
clearly defined than in the work of the 'other' Modernism of which 
Peter Wollen speakS85 
- 
originating in the intellectual upheaval 
and optimism of post-Revolutionary Russia (1917-30) and later 
developed in a second (potentially) revolutionary 'moment' - May 
1968 in France. 
Dziga Vertov and other experimental film workers in the 
twenties shared the belief that the film medium is inheren 
revolutionary. It is 'born' Modernist in the sense that its 
techniques and procedures could be utilized to challenge the 
dominant bourgeois traditions of Aristotelian theatrical 
representation, understood as mystificatory and alienating 'opium 
for the masses'. For nascent socialism, cinema could be invaluable 
to give knowledge of social reality in unique and formally 
innovative ways. As Sylvia Harvey points out, Vertov shared with 
Lenin the view that art should provide 'an account of reality from 
the point of view of a particular world outlook (Marxism) deployed 
in the service of a particular social class (the proletariat): 
there is 'no cinema above classes, no cinema above class struggle: 
also we know that the cinema is a secondary task and our Programme 
is very simple: to see and show the world in the name of the world 
proletarian revolution'. 86 This quotation frorn Vertov, as Harvey 
suggests in a footnote, is subject to several readings; a statement 
of an 'instrumental' approach to film meaning, in which the content 
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or 'representation' is primary and film form is secondary, or else 
as a statement on the need to produce new film form in order to 
'show' the world anew. Vertov's Kinoks87 were concerned to 
emphasize, with the Constructivists and Futurists88, the 
technological machinery of the new art medium in order to oppose 
the illusionism of contemporary cinema in the West which ordinarily 
concealed the 'artifice' of its making. This led to two 
developments. 
Firstly, the idea of film as production; the concept of film 
as 'work' or 'practice' (as against 'artistic creation' and 
I genius') in the post-revolutionary period was shared by other 
'workers' in 'cultural productions89 and should not be taken as a 
merely ritualistic concession to Marxist dogma. It is possible to 
propose, with Robert Stam and Annette Michelson, that Vertov's The 
Man With A Movie Camera (1929) 'systematically juxtaposes virtually 
every aspect of cinematographic activity with work as it is 
conventionally conceived'. Thus he makes a series of analogies: 
editing-=sewing, cleaning film--cleaning streetst film 
industry=textile industry, turning reel of projector--turning spools 
of thread. He includes many shots of the camera, screen and 
projection apparatus to present the socialist message that 
cinematographers are engaged in collective production equivalent to 
industrial production while simultaneously foregrounding the film 
I 
-. 
1 90 as artifice 
. 
Secondly, the concern with the machinery of filming led Vertov 
to his theories of Kino-Eye and to the formulation of a radical 
break with former modes of perception. Within Marxist thinking, 
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true or 'socialist reality' cannot be found on the surface level Of 
everyday appearances (because alienated, reified and 
'ideological'). So too with film: it is 'necessary to get out of 
the circle of ordinary human vision; reality must be recorded not 
by IMiitating it, but by broadening the circle ordinarily 
encompassed by the human eye'91: 
I, am machine, am showing you a world, the likes of 
which only I can see... I free myself from today and 
forever from human immobility, I am in constant 
movement, I approach and draw away from objects, I crawl 
under them... This is I, apparatus, maneuvreing (sic) in 
the chaos of movements, recording one movement after the 
another in the most complex of combinations.. OPIUS9 I decipher in a new way a world unknown to you. 
Condensation of time (through cutting and slow, fast and reverse 
motion), proximity of spatially disparate phenomena (through 
montage, superimposition and multiple exposure) and the camera's 
capacity to select details unconscious to the human eye might be 
used to break 'with the laws and customs of the construction of the 
cine-thing I. 93 
Vertov's formal experiments have been compared to those being 
undertaken by the Russian group OPOYAZ who were engaged in a 
radical critique of bourgeois 'realist' literature. 94 The 
engagement of Marxist literary aesthetics with the work of the 
Russian group has been widely acknowledged and with the publication 
of Herbert Eagle's study of Russian Formalist film theory, it has 
been possible to assess more effectively the revolutionary 
theoretical context shared with thern by Vertov and other film 
maker/theoreticians such as Eisensteing Kuleshov and pudovkin. 95 
In 1926, Boris E. ixenbaum edited and published a volume of articles 
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on film theory, Poetics of Cinema, by Tynjanov, Piotrovskij and 
Kazanskij. Also amongst these was Viktor Sklovskij who had earlier 
presented his thesis of 'defamilarization' in the 1919 article 'Art 
as Device'. The core elements of Russian film Formalism can be 
suamarized as follows: 
a) cinema can only be approached scientifically by bracketing out 
anything not specific to the medium in order to identify the 
workings of its 'immanent' signifying procedures; 
b) cinema's representation of people, places and objects must be 
understood not as the reproduction of reality but as 'material', 
'material which was already constructed, through various 
devices, into a signifying system"; 
C) the function of all art is to renew perceptions of social life 
that have become habitual and automatic. 
The 'conventional' structures and 'devices' of art thus become the 
central focus of film meaning rather than the 'content' of a 
transparent representation of 'reality'. 96 I am here confined to 
acknowledging the Formalist's critique of realistic and 
naturalistic film practice in which, it is argued, through 
imperceptible editing teclmiques and theatrical representation, the 
viewer is rarely made aware of the 'devices' or 'construction' of 
film meaning; this is 'bourgeois' and hence politically regressive 
because the viewer is denied the emotional/aesthetic experience of 
ostranenie ('making strange) and/or zatrudnenie (making 
difficult') achieved through 'laying bare the device'. The 
I transformational process' applied to 'life' by 'art'97 typifies 
the anti-illusionist project(s) of Modernist film brought under the 
narrative of liberty in the equation of aesthetic formal innovation 
with political avant-gardism. But having said this, wishing to 
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'lay bare the device' poses some prickly problems for defining the 
degree of abstractness that the calculation of the estrangemen-t 
effect might require. For instance, revolutionary work on film 
form led Ejxenbaum to the theory that film defamiliarizes 
perception because of its capacity for 'trans-sense' or sensual 
lexpressivity'98 (which parallels Delluc, Epstein and Dulac's 
concept of 'photogenie'), while Tynjanov's study of the 'laws of 
production' of film led him to declare that 'cinema is an abstract 
art' which he developed in his article 'On the Foundations of 
Cinema'. As Eagle notes, Tynjanov is concerned with the ways in 
which film is, unlike reality, being two dimensional and planar, 
with its 'restriction to black and white, the absence of natural 
sound, the boundedness of the film frame, and the restriction to a 
single point of view in a given shot. 99 One must be careful not 
to allow what is particular to the emancipatory project to fall 
back under the narrative of speculative spirit as discussed above. 
How far, then, can the abstract 'devices' or conventional 
structures of the film as medium subsume representational 'content' 
before we are returned to the reahn of autonomous art and to those 
differentiations which are anathema to innovation in film form for 
the purpose of liberating the People? 
a 
The question is,, useful one to precede an assessment of Sergei 
Eisenstein since his theoretical corpus can be understood as 
evolving a 'materialist' film practice from knowledge of the 
specificities of the 'devices' of the film medixxn. Jacques Aumont 
has recently approached Eisenstein's work in similar terms, 
offering two major 'categories' of his theory: firstly, those 
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concepts concerned specifically with the medium qua medium and, 
secondly, those engaging with the broader social/ideological role 
of cinema and its political effect on the spectator. '()o Within the 
former, it is the idea of the vertical fragment that, strictly 
speaking, comes before the more widely known (and frequently 
condemned) concept of 'intellectual' montage in that it refers to 
the constitution of film meaning below the level of the single 
. 
The 'physical' characteristics of film instead become the 
basic units of montage processes. Eisenstein dismantles the image 
to utilise various aspects of its semantic potential against the 
'horizontal' force of succession and offers a series of filmic 
fragments which can enter into meaningful relationships or 
'contrasts' with other fragments or 'stimuli'. 101 In his essay, 'A 
Dialectic Approach to Film Form' (1929), Eisenstein. outlines the 
possible sources of meaningful 'spatial-pictorial contrasts' or, 
more dialectically, 'conflicts' which may be generated within and 
between frames 
- 
contrasts of linear direction, of planes, of 
volumes, spatial arrangements, of light, of tone, of camera angle 
(suggesting conflict between matter and viewpoint), of lens 
distortion (suggesting conflict between matter and space), of film 
speed (suggesting conflict between matter and temporality) and 
between the 'optical complex' and 'acoustical experience' of film 
viewing. Hence Eisenstein's dictum: 'The shot (frame) is by no 
means an element of montage. The shot is a montage cell (or 
molecule)t. 102 Accordingly, 'The Filmic Fourth Dimension' (1929) 
argues against 'orthodox' montage (that in which 'two shots side by 
side produces one or another conflicting interrelation') in favour 
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of an 'overtonal' mcmtage system of 'visual counterpoint' analogous 
with the orchestration of a musical score: 'in place of an 
'aristocracy' of individualistic dominants... a method of 
'democratic' rights for all provocations, or stimuli, regarding 
them as a summary, a complex'. 103 Eisenstein's schema offers a 
potentially infinite number of conflicts and contrasts; this is not 
to suggest that these fragments of meaning ran be understood 
outside of the context of any particular film but that each unit 
should be determined by the calculated organic unity of the whole 
fi]. m. 104 Eisenstein also theorized in 'Methods of Montage' 
(1929)105 the larger units or sequences above the level of the 
individual shot that could be exploited for the purpose of 
conflict: 
Temporal montage 
- 
a) metric; mechanical beat of cutting length 
of shots 
b) rhythmic; pattern of movement established 
when metric pattern is broken at key 
points; 
Tonal montage 
-*patterns of 'emotional tone' e. g. light/ 
dark, sharp/soft or hazy/luminous; 
Overtonal montage 
- 
the sum total of impressions of the 
'collective calculation of all the piece's 
appeals'; 
Intellectual montage 
- 
used to make direct intellectual points 
through metaphorical association of 
semantically disparate but filmically juxtaposed images e. g. killing of 
workers/slaughter of bull in Strike (1924); 
Kerensky/vanity of peacock in October (1927-8)o 
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What must not be forgotten in this account is that Eisenstein was 
corcerned not simply with the abstract properties of filmic 
signification but was concerned to orchestrate representational 
images to maximize meaning-effect at an immediately political 
level. Whereas Peter Gidal's 'materialism' was shown to be 
predicated upon a total refusal of representation, as negative 
'work' on the consumption of identificatory film, Eisenstein is 
concueerned to exploit the spectating subject in order to provoke a 
positive response to the articulation of a representational image 
base through montage procedures. This takes discussion to the 
second 'category' of Eisenstein's theoretical corpus which 
addresses the 'psycho-physiological' effect upon the viewer. 
As with the concept of montage, several stages of Eisenstein's 
thinking about the calculation of 'effect' can be traced at 
different points in his theoretical writings. Firstly, the concept 
of 'attraction' formally defined by Eisenstein in a manifesto in 
Lef (1923): 
Attraction (from the point of view of the theatre) is 
every aggressive moment of the theatre performance, that 
is, every element subjecting the spectator to a sensory 
or psychic action verified by means of experiment and 
mathematically calculated to produce in the spectator 
certain emotional shocks which, in turn, once they 
have been united, alone determine the possibility of 
perceiving the ideological aspect of ! heBgrformance 
given, its final ideological conclusion. 
Given that Eisenstein's concept of attraction in cinema develops 
from earlier theatrical work/performances, it is right that several 
camentators should have pointed out that this quotation also 
defines 'epic' theatre and the concept. of 'distantiation' or 
verfremdungs fekt as formulated by Bertholt Brecht. Martin Walsh, 
in his volume, The Brechtian Aspect of Radical Cinema (1981), makes 
-101- 
explicit that the anti-illusionist practices of Eisenstein and 
Brecht owe a large debt to Meyerhold's theory of 'agit attractions' 
in which the spectator is refused the comfort of identification 
through the interposition of elements drawn from non-naturalistic 
performances such as the circus or music hall. 107 The 'principle 
of attraction' in cinema is exemplified for Aumont in Battleship 
Potemkin (1925) by: 
a) the close-up of vermin which precedes the medical officer's dive 
into the sea; 
b) the allegorical monument which serves as an introduction to the 
Odessa of the tyrants; 
c) the awakening of the lion-people. 
Aumont shows that while 'attraction' does not always work so 
metaphorically 
, 
these shots produce the required spectatorial shock 
(or 'estrangement') initially because of their autonomy with regard 
to the theme of the section in which they are embedded, and then by 
the 'associations' to which they give rise 
- 
'by the concatenation 
with other attractions 
, 
the whole chain being what makes it 
possible to transmit this 'theme' to the spectator'. 108 It is 
clear that Eisenstein's use of the concept of 'attraction' is very 
auch part of the Pavlovian scientificity of 'reflexology', based on 
an action 
- 
reaction model of human responses to external stimuli 
which, in his system, are held to be calculable for the purposes of 
political (socialist) effect. 
Again, Aumont is most instructive in pointing to a major C)- 
tension in the use of 'attraction' for forcing the spectator into 
political consciousness, a contradiction 'between its 
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aggressiveness, its surprise aspect (its Proletkult aspect), and 
its efficacy, its utilitarianism (its Leninist aspect, so to 
speak)1.109 In other words, shock attraction alone ('the rap on 
the skull', 'the kino-fist') cannot guarantee that the specatator 
will be 'moulded' in a politically/ ideologically 'correct' way. 
The ensuing shift in Eisenstein's theory of film efficacy can be 
understood through the double-sided nature of its goal (both 
ideological and subjective) and the: 
... 
progressive effacing of the first determination, org 
rather, its reabsorption into a more and more 
stereotyped and invalid 'political discourse', in favour 
of a development, even a hypertrophy of the action 
exerted upon the spectator as a source of 'energy'. 110 
The more refined concept of 'pathos' replaces the crudity of 
political effect upon the spectator in shock attraction or 
'dialectical' conflict; in turn, pathos (a new 'offensive 
psychologism' aimed at 'pumping up', 'recharging' and heightening 
the spectator's consciousness) is replaced by a politicized form of 
'ecstasy' (taken from the Greek. ek-stasis, to move one out of 
oneself) in which the subjective experience rather than political 
consciousness of the spectator is exploited for ideological ends. 
However, for all of Eisenstein's attempt to refine the original 
Proletkult theory of attraction, it nonetheless remains apparent 
that I attraction', 'pathos' and 'ecstasy' share the aim of 
directing the spectator along pregiven paths of meaning, based on 
the assumption of correspondence between formal techniques, 
psychological reception and concomitant political effect. Since 
this is the primary principle of any film to be formulated under 
the narrative of liberty as anti-illusionist, it is not surprizing 
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to find that later work on political/revolutionary film form by 
Jean-Luc Godard (and contemporaries in the aptly-named Dziga Vertov 
Group) is formulated within this reference frame. 
Robert Stam, Sylvia Harvey, Colin MacCabe, Peter Wollen and 
Kirsten Thanpson have each in varying ways proposed that Godard's 
radical film practice rests upon what I term a dis-articulation of 
naturalism/illusionism, or, an adaptation and development of 
Brechtian distantiation for film. "' In Wollen's words: 
For Godard, conflict becomes not simply collision 
through juxtaposition, as in Eisenstein's model, but an 
act of negativity, a splitting apart of an apparently 
natural unity, a disjunction. Godard's view of bourgeois 
communication is one of a discourse gaining power from 
its apparent naturalness, the impression of necessity 
that seems to bind a signifer to a signified, a sound to 
an image, in order to providT12 convincing 
representation of the world. 
The means by which Godard accomplishes the 'deconstruction' of the 
illusionist narrative film are numerous and spread widely across 
his film production. For illustrative purposes only, I offer a few 
primary examples of Godardian techniques. Thompson, in her Chapter 
'Sawing Through the Bough: Tout va Bien as a Brechtian Fihn', 113 
identifies three ways in which Godard applies Brecht's idea of 
defamiliarization through the 'separation of elements' 
- 
isolating 
and working upon the various components of the medium to draw 
attention to the constructed nature of illusionist film and to 
involve the spectator in a productive rather than consumptive 
relation to the experience of viewing. 
Firstly, interruption, which is the 'insertion of material 
that breaks up a smooth, logical chain of narrative causes and 
effects' that 'serve in some way as a critique or illustration of 
-104- 
the position put forth in the scene' - e. g. the interview between 
Susan and Georgette (a factory worker) starts with the camera-on 
the back of a woman worker and is intercut by shots of her now 
facing the camera and reciting a radical song as commentary on the 
working corxiitions that necessitate the interview. Similarly, 
graphic titles or printed material may be interposed to summarize 
in advance the concerns of the narrative, or the dominant action 
may be counterpointed with contradictory images or activities-114 
Secondly, contradiction, the 'joining of stylistic techniques in a 
115 discontinuous manner, which breaks down classical norms'. 
Robert Stam concords with the view that Godard engages in a 'series 
of guerilla raids on orthodox continuity'. For him, Pierrot le Fou 
(1965) and Tout va Bien (1972), for instance, 'foreground the 
primordial discontinuity of film itself'116: the continuities of 
clothing and characterization are tampered with, actor positioning2 
sequence of actions and movements (duplicated and/or out of 
conventional order) contravene Hollywood realist codes, eye line 
matches are ignored, scene changes are abrupt and unmotivated by 
theme or narrative, and scenes are fragmented by the famous 'jump 
cuts$. Stam argues that, through these, Godard continually draws 
attention to the fact that realist film is constructed through the 
splicing and sequencing of static images in such a way as to appear 
a natural representation of reality. It is for this reason that 
Godard also makes the discontinwLty between sound-track and and 
image-track functional for his political aesthetic: opposing lip- 
synch and 'naturalized' (but not natural) studio sound which is 
usually subordinated to the demands of narrative and dramatic 
codes, Godard exploits the unsettling effects of sound through 
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mismatches between sound and image. For instance, in 
Masculine/feira'nine (1966), obtrusive ambiant noise drowning out the 
lovers' conversation draws attention to the way in which Hollywood 
film usually restricts audial information to dialogue, 
authenticating background sound and incidental music. Godard uses 
voice-over at odds with the character on-screen or will have 
characters comment off-screen to produce a spectator aware of the 
discontinuity between the sound and image 'elements' of film 
signification. 
Thirdly, refraction, which is the 'mediation between the events 
depicted and the spectator's perception of those events'. Thompson 
suggests that Godard's foregrounding of film making itself in Tout 
va Bien procures the necessary distance between spectator and 
events 'represented' 
- 
the opening and closing discussions: 
possible film scenarios, box office takes, making of the film and 
expenditure upon it, need for stars, etc. In Stam's terms, the 
filin highlights a series of issues around production and 
consumption: the 'working class as producers and consumers of 
goods; artists and intellectuals as producers and consumers of 
information; filmmakers and audiences as the producers and 
consumers of film'. In short, the film 'unmasks the alienated 
nature of cultural work in class society' by 'reminding us of 
cinema's economic base and institutional superstructure'. 117 ()r, 
the play with Susan's monologue (excess of verbal/written 
information and false English/French/English translations) further 
emphasizes the need for the spectator's distance from the fiction 
in order to recognize the 'critical decoupage of social existence'. 
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Stam similarly argues, in terms so close to those of Eisenstein, 
that Itechnique in Tout va Bien is not something that exists in the 
service of the political message 
- 
it is the political message'. 118 
In short, the political purpose of such techniques is to 'estrange' 
in such a way as to bring the active spectator into a relation of 
knowledge. MacCabe, in his article 'The Politics of Separation', 
defines the purpose of anti-illusionism thus: 
What is inq)ortant, therefore, is that in the separation 
of the elements the spectator gets separated out of this 
unity and homogeniety 
- 
this passivity 
- 
in order to 
enter into an active appropriation of the scenes 
presented to him. This active appropriation is the a ffq 
of epic theatre 
- 
it is the production of knowledge. 
Later in this work, I shall reconsider more fully the assumption 
that the 'separation of elements' is in itself estranging and hence 
politic-ally progressive. 
To draw this section to a provisional close, the chief 
proposals of Anti-illusionist film as specified by the narrative of 
liberty (frorn the Left/radical problematic metonymically 
represented here by Vertov, Eisenstein, Brecht, Godard) can be 
summarized as follows: 
- 
a) a primary distinction must be established between films that 
'interrogate' the illusionist codes of narrative realism and 
those that are anti-representational, which refuse the 
analogical capacity of cinematography altogether 
- 
Eisenstein, 
Vertov and Godard each retain a recognizable representational 
image base either to exploit the semantic potential of 
conflicting hna I 
, oges 
of'ý or to subvert from within the seeming 
'naturalness f illusionism; 
b) film as a representational system is posed as discrete from 
social reality, not as a wholly autonomous system, but one that 
is capable of giving dialectical knowledge of that reality; 
C) the political effect of the gap between film as representation 
and real relations of social reality is experienced by the 
spectator as 'distantiation' which produces knowledge of the 
ideological constitution of representational systems; 
d) that knowledge of reality through demystification is in itself 
emancipatory. 
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The differentiations outlined for the emancipatory component of 
Structural/Materialist film also pertain here though represent4tion 
and reality are posed quite differently, becoming interactive and 
mutually determining. To some degree the centripetal force of 
autonomous knowledge (of the specificities of the film medium) 
entailed by the narrative of speculative spirit is present but this 
is of secondary concern to the major task of producing emancipatory 
knowledge: 
Dominant Me The Marrative of Liberty 
Supplemmtary: The Narrative of I spirit 
Ronrasentation as Soc"l Critique lr--- 
Differentiations: Emal-gement v Iden 
Ideology 
Reality v Representation 
Production v Consumption 
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It was concluded above that Anti-illusionist projects under the 
narrative of liberty specified the terms 'representation' and 
'reality' on the capacity of film (as cultural representation) to 
distance the viewer, and hence produce knowledge of the real 
(class) conditions of social existence; in other words, that there 
exists a 'real' outside of representation of which knowledge may be 
gained. 
A second related set of arguments were put forward about the 
degree of investment made by the different Modernist practices in 
the realist/representational qualities of the film image. It was 
suggested that Anti-illusionism did not necessarily entail anti- 
representationalism since anti-representationalism was found to be 
the defining characteristic of Abstract Formalist, Structural and 
Structural/Materialist filmmaking. Any Anti-illusionist project 
must then, I would maintain, necessarily retain a representational 
image base and those conventions which ordinarily constitute the 
'illusion of reality' either to use verisimilitude in order to 
calculate politically motivated readings, or to subvert and 
transgress that system of representation ('intervention' and work 
'within' rather than abandonment and work 'elsewhere). On the 
basis of these findings, it is possible to hazard the following: 
where f ilm making is legitimated by the narrative of speudative 
spirit, it will forsake representation so as to examine the 
internal conditions of the medium; where it is legitimated by the 
narrative of liberty, it will the spectator's recognition 
of 'reality' either for the political effects of montage or for the 
-109- 
didactic 'deconstruction' of cinematic form, the realism of film 
being used for knowledge of 'social reality. Turning to 
Surrealist film theory and practice, however, it emerges that 
I representation' and 'reality' can enter wholly different relations 
(which recast the terms of the above hypothesis by refusing to 
grant the distinctions that permit knowledge of reality at all) but 
still remain within the narrative of liberty. There are two main 
canponents of Surrealist film thought; the profound influence of 
Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytical model for the Surrealist 
production of art in general and of film as 'dream' in particular, 
and a consequent challenge to the epistemological schema entailed 
by the notion of film as representation of reality. 
Stemming from Dada's earlier political rejection of bourgeois 
culture (especially art) for its collusion with the same 'morality' 
that produced the futile carnage and slaughter of the First World 
War, Breton's 'Manifesto of Surrealism' (1924) contains a utopian 
plea for the imagination: 
The imagination is perhaps on the point of reasserting 
itself, of reclaiming its rights. If the depths of our 
mind contain within it strange forces capable of 
augmenting those on the surface, or of waging a 
victorious battle against them, then there is every 
reason to seize them 
- 
first to seize them, then, if 120 
need be, to submit them to the control of our reason. 
It would be difficult to overemphasize the degree of influence 
exerted upon the theoretical origins of Surrealism by Freud's 
formulation of the structure and functioning of the human mind. 
His two-tier model of psychic apparatus comprised of primary 
processes 
- 
the dreams, fantasies and drives of the unconscious, 
governed by forces of desire (sexual/death drives), and secondary 
processes 
- 
the waking thought and memories of the conscious, 
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governed by the reality principle (social/normative). Freud's work 
on the 'disturbances' of the 'psychopathology of everyday life' led 
him to theorize the relations between unconscious demands for 
satisfaction of desires and conscious prohibition of its fulfilment 
in terms of an incessant dynamic of conflict, resistance, 
reconciliation and repression. The practice of psychoanalysis, the 
'talking cure', aims to gain access to the unconscious but can do 
so only through its representation thus the dream could be 
interpreted as primary representation of the workings of the 
tmconscious. Freud's analyses of dream-work became crucially 
Important to Surrealist artists as model for the manner in which 
psychic desires and wish-fulfilments are refused free reign by the 
interdictory forces of the rational conscious mind. The 1924 
Manifesto makes explicit Sur ealist debt to Freud's 'discovery' of 
the unconscious, and how this unconscious is equated with the 
'pure' freedom of imagination, in the putative dictionary 
definition offered by Breton: 
SURREALISM, n. Psychic automatism in its pure state, by which one 
proposes to express 
- 
verbally, by means of the written word, or 
in any other manner 
- 
the actual functioning of thought. Dictated 
by thought, in the absence of any control exercised by reason, 
exempt from any aesthetic or moral concern. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA. Philosophy. Surrealism is based on the belief in the 
superior reality of certain forms of previously neglected 
associations, in the omnipotence of dream, in the disinterested 
play of thought. It tends to ruin once and for all other psychic 
mechanisms and to substit t 'tself for them in solving all the u 121 
principal problems of life. 
In the 'absence of control exercised by reason, Surrealist action 
centred upon ways of allowing the free transmission of preconscious 
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mental processes: 'periode des sommeils' (self -induced hypnotic 
sleep), the 'free association' of automatic writing and drawings, 
the random construction of collages from undirected selection of 
everyday materialsq the exhibition of 'found' objects, frottage and 
grattage techniques in painting. 122 On both political and artistic 
grounds, the Surrealist 'state of mind' opposed the rationality 
inherent in contemporary moral and artistic intention, seeking 
instead the accidental and contingent as the most effective means 
for the dual purpose of loosening control by conscious thought and 
of gaining access to unconscious processes. Early Surrealist 
attention to cinema was marked by attempts to thwart the 
rationality enforced upon the spectator by breaking with usual 
conventions of viewing. J. H. Matthews' study Surrealism and Film 
(1971) begins with the oft--cited account of how, during the First 
World War, Andre Breton and Jacques Vachg would rush to view part 
of a commercial film until boredom would force them on to another 
cinema and to another film segment and so on. Hence Breton's view 
of cinema: 'I think what we valued most in it, to the point of 
taking no interest in anything else, was its power to disorient 
(son pouvoir de depaysement)'. 123 Arbitrarily 'selecting' images 
no longer bound by narrative conventions or thematic organisation 
of fered the possibility of mentally juxtaposing those images in 
extra-ordinary because logically unmotivated combinations. For 
Breton, 'depaysement' or disorientation is defined as 'a 
discordance, deliberately as wide as possible, between the "lesson" 
the film teaches and the manner in which the person receiving it 
disposes of it' which leads Matthews to suggest that, for the 
Surrealist: 
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Interpretation becomes a more creative act than an 
evaluative one; or rather, evaluation is identified with 
creation in a manner proving beyond doubt that 
su=ealism is less a style or method than a state of 
mind which thelýjlm provides the occasion for 
externalising. 
Me cxmcept of a reality superior to that presented to rational 
thought by surface appearance challenges the anteriority of an 
ontologically distinct realm of an empirical 'real' and instates 
prelogical human desire as a constructive agent in a newly 
subjectivised sense of the real. The experience of Surrealism 
demands a participant-spectator for whom 'poetic effect' derives 
from the pleasure/stimulation of the loosening of reality's grip on 
perception. Surreality, as Weightman and Matthews agree, should 
thus be understood with the semantic value of. §uper-reality, that 
is, reality intensified to a new level of meaning by the 
acknowledgement of the repressed psychic dimension of human 
existence. 125 It is for this reason that one development of later 
Surrealists was to give precedence to the spectator's capacity to 
achieve the heightened effect of 'depaysement' through viewing the 
most banal of film. Salvador Dall' had fonmlated this 'critical 
paranoia' as a 'spontaneous method of irrational knowledge based 
upon the critical and systematic objectification of delirious 
126 
associations and interpretations'. Through a process of 
'enlargement', Joseph von Sternberg's Shanghai Express (1936) could 
be read not at surface level but interpreted 'irrationally' to 
reach a latent level of content not available to the viewer who 
simply responds to the rationality/reality of the 
representation. 127 The analogy with Freud's latent/manifest model 
of interpretation is clear but the abstract facility of any 
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spectator to experience 'visualg mental and emotional dislocation' 
has little to say on how specific film techniques, rather than- 
cinema in general, may engender the desired disorientation. 
Dawn Ades128 notes that Breton's earlier 'dictionary' 
definition was not primarily concerned with painting or even the 
visual in general but rather with attacking 'instrumental' language 
in favour of writing as 'poetic effect' and, with Linda Williams, 
it can be argued that an appropriately filmic formulation of 
Surrealism also derives not from painting but from language and the 
workings of the verbal sign. Breton describes how he and Phillipe 
Soupault came to a theoretical understanding of Sur ealism and to 
the automatic production of poetry as 'pure expression' through 
statements made by the poet Pierre Reverdy: 
The image is a pure creation of the mind. 
It cannot be born from a cmiparison but from a juxtaposition of 
two more or less distant realities. 
The more the relationship between the two juxtaposed realities 
is distant and true, the stronger the image wil lAe 
- 
the 
greater its emtional power and poetic reality. 
In Part One of her excellent work Figures of Desire (1980), 
Williams supplements the Manifesto with further statements by 
Reverdy taken from his 1918 article 'LImage': 
The emtion thus provoked is poetically pure because it is born 
outside of all imitation, all evocation, all comparison. 
One can create... a powerful image, new to the mind, by 
bringing together two distanýorealities whose relationship 
the mind alone has grasped. 
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Reverdy's concept of poetic language as the juxtaposition of 'two 
distant realities' calls forth Lautremont's frequently cited image 
I as beautiful as the chance encounter on a dissecting-table of a 
sewing machine and an umbrella'. Applying the same concept to 
film, however, draws attention to the very different conditions of 
language and cinematography. Reverdy can be claimed as a leading 
precursor of a specifically Surrealist understanding of the film 
medium though his awareness of the potential for disorientation 
caused to the spectator by the splicing together of disparate 
images but that awareness, it must be added, is limited. Williams 
makes the important point that the act of combining distant 
realities may well produce poetic emotion in verbal language (given 
that this contravenes the rules governing normal language use) but 
the effect is severely reduced in film because juxtaposition (or 
montage) is the actual 
- 
normal 
- 
mode of procedure or condition of 
filmic expression. Narrative conventions already in place by 1918 
would thus deny the viewer any real sense of surprize when 
confronted, in Reverdy's example, with a shot of a woman looking 
out of a window followed by one of a cloudy sky. Similarly, 
Soupaultis attempt to generate surprize effect by exploiting film's 
capacity to 'upset the natural laws of spare and time' through 
special effects and cutting (a woman sits down and stands up as a 
man who sits down as a child etc. ) is not fully Surrealist in that 
the surprize 'exists only in relation to the laws of the real 
world', that is, the spectator is confirmed in the reality of those 
laws and surprized only at the unreality of the film images in 
relation to them-131 
Drawing from the conclusion that the surprize of 'depaysement' 
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can rarely be derived from the montage juxtaposition of 'distant' 
realist images (though Eisenstein's theory of shock attractions 
ight dispute this), Surrealist thinking began to consider how 
film's unique ability to offer the spectator what seems to be a 
direct representation of reality might be exploited in ways which 
could radically redefine the ef fect of that illusion. In short, 
Surrealism maximizes the strength of film's reality effect for non- 
realistic 
- 
surrealistic/superrealistic 
- 
purposes by setting the 
realism of the image against the unreality of what is represented 
thus loosening the bond between film reality and a reality given as 
preexistent. Whereas Anti-illusionism renounces film realism in 
favour of an external reality, in Surrealism the principle of an 
external 'real reality' has little force since the film is 'born 
outside of all imitation, all evocation, all comparison': 
... 
the Surrealist artistic image only pretends to 
create the illusion of real space, no matter how 
meticulously drawn (Magritte) or even photographed (man 
Ray) the objects in it might be... the image is simply 
the space of an encounter 51 never the illusion of a 
previously existing place. 
Jacques Brunius makes explicit how the Surrealist comprehends the 
relationship between film and reality through its 'incomparable 
facility for passing over the bridge in both directions'; the 
I extraordinary and sumptuous solidity it contributes to the 
creations of the mind, objectifying them in the most convincing 
fashion' while making 'exterior reality submit in the opposite 
direction to subjectizisation'. 133 The terms of Surrealist 
dislocation of the conceptual relations of representation/reality 
can be fully gauged from Brunius' statement that 'what is admirable 
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in realism is that there is no more real, there is only the 
fantastic', and from Breton Is 1924 rejoinder that 'wbat is 
admi le in the fantastic is that there is no more fantastic; 
there is only the real'. 134 Surrealism does away with the order 
and logic that divides reality from fantasy and in its place 
appeals to the dream as a system of representation that utilizes a 
'disinterested play of thought... exempt from any aesthetic or 
nioral concern' to express the urr-onscious desires. 
The dream as model has been closely examined by Linda Williams 
who argues that the specificity of Surrealist film practice can 
only be approached through a distinction between dream form and 
dream content, between the structure of latent drives and manifest 
content. For Freud, the drearn is a special case in that it allows 
unconscious pruwry processes a form of expression or 
representation; the process of transforming the latent thoughts 
into the manifest content of a dream 
- 
the dream-work 
- 
necessarily 
entails forms of distortion that present an apparent chaos of 
visual symbols: 
... 
each separate impulse seeks satisfaction 
independently of the rest; they proceed uninfluenced by 
one another; contradictions are completely inoperative... 
associations of ideas proceed along lines without any 
regard to logic; similarities are treated as identities, 
negatives are equated with positives... these objects to 
which conative trends are attached in the unconscious 
are extraordinarily changeable 
- 
one may be replaced 
along a whole c]Nýn of associations that have no 
rational basis. 
Manifest content is not therefore meaningful in itself. 136 Still, 
despite the chaotic illogicality of dream events, one of the chief 
features of the dreaming experience is the strong sense of its own 
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reality, its internal conditions of normality, even though waking 
thought proves inadequate to the task of recounting extraordinary 
dream events. Bunuel's L'Age d'or (1930) and (with Dali) Un Chien 
andalou (1929) are Surrealist not simply because of the absurdity 
of what is represented to the spectator but because, Williams 
argues, they approximate the form of a dream with a visual style 
that corresponds to the way the workings of the unconscious is 
experienced 'rather than the way it appears to the logical mind. 
Surrealist film imitates the dream experience firstly by 
attempting to 'approximate as closely as possible to the dreamer's 
belief in the reality of the signifier, a signifier that the 
dreamer thinks is perceived but is really only imagined'. 137 Hence 
the use of realism, which draws attention away from the level of 
the signifier and towards the perception of the signified content, 
the avoidance of cinematic distortions which would disrupt the 
spectator's identification with the screen image and disturb 
profilmic vraisemblance, and of any symbolic filmic representation 
of dream content which must remain at the surface level of the 
strangeness of the manifest. Williams proceeds to scrutinize L'Age 
d'or, Un Chien andalou and Bunuel's later That Obscure Object of 
Desire138 in terms of how they 'elaborate a structure of opposition 
which expresses not so much the desire for an object as the psychic 
139 process of desire itself', which leads to the second means 
available to film for the i'mitation of dream states (derived from 
Freud's theory that dream distortion 'works' but, importantly, 
'does not think'): the processes of condensation and displacement. 
In his The Inte etation of Dreams (1900), Freud outlined 
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a) the metaphoric mechanism of condensation which explains the 
principle of omission/selection by which 'only a few elements from 
the dream-thoughts find their way into the [manifest] dream- 
content'; and b) the metonymic mechanism of displacement by which 
'the dream content is differently centred from the dream thoughts - 
its content has different elements from its central point'. 140 For 
instance, in Un Chien andalou, the manifest thematic groups of 
mutilation/cutting, fascination of body parts and the context of 
male/female relations are shown to be (as in Freud's interpretative 
schema). overdetermined, here, by a castration anxiety and 
counterwish for plenitude in the form of clothing as fetish object. 
the 'prologue metaphor of cutting posits a gap-split-absence, which 
the metonymy of the fetish garments attempts to disavow': 
The desire expressed... cannot be directly named or 
diegetically presented: it can only be generated by a 
hidden discourse, which like the discourse of the 
unconscious in dreams, Freudian slips, or bungled 
actions disturbs and rearranges the memory tra 
logical speech, and action of our daily lives. 
William's analyses are heavily informed by Lacan's re-reading of 
Freud's tiered model; it is, however, important for my argument on 
posmodernism that these later theoretical perspectives are kept 
apart from early Surrealist film makers' use of Freud for reasons I 
will demonstrate. Nonetheless, I do find Williams very useful in 
the task of defining the real/representation relations in 
Surrealist f ilms especially in conjunction with Christian Metzs 
development of Lacan's revaluation of condensation and displacement 
in view of Benveniste/Jakobson's work on linguistic figuration. 
Metz proposes a four-part 'logic' or taxonomy of visual (rather 
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than verbal) tropes 
- 
metaphor and metonymy in relations of both 
Icontiguity' and 'similarity' - as a mode of operation common-to 
both dream-work and film signfication. 'Every figural operation in 
a text corresponds to mental paths that can be laid down in the 
minds of the creator or spectator'142; in Part IV of Psychoanalysis 
and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier (1982), Metz contends that film 
and drew figuration share their use of the poles of metaphor and 
metonymy but notes that film Surrealism is exceptional in its 
manipulation of referential and discursive relations within the 
figural operations: 
It does of course happen, especially (but not only) in 
more or less non-representational contexts (this is 
partly what defines them), that metaphorical juxta- 
positions 
- 
'ideas', sparks, incongruous encounters... 
invade the surface fabric of the text and are 
responsible for a large proportion of the final 
contiguities, which is to say most of the work as such. 
But in these cases metaphor is creating not metonymy but 
the syntagma. It does not serve to fabricate or 
underline relations of proximity in the world, or in 
the diegesis... but to activate relations between 
elements coexisting in the discourse, and ultimately (although this limit is never reach., -_d 4 ýo exclude any juxtapositions coming from elsewhere. 
Following this, rather than treating metaphor/metonyiny as 'poetic' 
figures distinct from the 'realistic' narrative in which they are 
embedded, Williams agrees that Surrealist film dissolves the 
distinction and refuses the spectator a diegetic reality in 
relation to which a metaphor or metonymy may function. Rather than 
working as individual rhetorical tropes, metonymy and metaphor form 
a 'figural complex' and, in imitation of the dream-work, it is 
desire which is the 'cause' that 'figures' the whole film. 
One must be careful to retain a historical perspective and 
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observe that the Surrealist movement's understanding of Freud 
carmot be made to support the rigour of this form of 
pyschoanalytical exegesis for at least one good reason. For 
Breton, Ernst, Bufiuel and Dallo, Freud's 'discovery' of the 
unconscious validated their wish to escape from the rationality and 
constriction of conscious social life and into the free expression 
of human desire. Freud's psychoanalysis, on the other hand, was 
largely concerned with the process of curing psychic disturbances 
to facilitate the patient's return to a 'normal' existence, and not 
with encouraging the free play of unconscious processes in the name 
of the liberation of the imagination. This distinction is of 
profound importance for assessing the political purpose of 
Surrealism, a purpose which may be lost through concentrating 
solely on psychoanalysis and forgetting 'depaysement'. The 
political consequence of artistic 'depaysement', or spectatorial 
disorientation, sought by Surrealist film makers, cannot be 
recuperated in Brechtian terms. Ben Brewster in his article 'From 
Shklovsky to Brecht: A Reply' makes the point that Surrealism does 
not retain a distance or margin from which reality may be 
perceived: 
Brecht talked of a 'return from alienation' to 
distinguish his own position from that of the 
historical avant-gardes: 'Dadaism and surrealism use 
alienation effects of the most extreme kind. Their 
objects do not return from alienation'. Their use of the 
A-effect was primitive 'because the function of this art 
is paralysed from the social point of view, so that here 
art no longer functions. As far mits effect is 
concerned, it ends in amusement. 
Breton, in a lecture in 1934, spoke of the disjunction between 
Surrealist political and artistic activity: 
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In reality two problems exist: one is the problem of 
knowledge raised, at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, by the relations between the conscious and the 
unconscious. We Surrealists seemed chosen for this 
problem: we were the first to apply to its solution a 
special method, which still appears to us among the most 
suitable and capable of perfection: we see no reason to 
renounce it. The other problem which presents itself to 
us is that of the social action to be adopted 
- 
action 
which, according to us, has its proper method in 
dialectical materialism, action which we cannot forego 
in as much as we hold that the liberation of mankind is 
the first condition for the liberation of the spirit, 
and that this liberation of ff kjýg can only be expected 
from the proletarian revolution. ' 
Enlisting art in the project of emancipating individuals from the 
constraints of conscious thought and conventional morality must 
place Surrealism under the Modernist narrative of liberty. But the 
effect of that 'revolution' cannot be understood in orthodox 
political terms, that is, it is difficult to reconcile the 
libertarian end point of Surrealism with the dictates of Marxist 
philosophy since liberation is not determined in relation to the 
organization of social 'reality'. Even an orthodox Freudian 
reading provides interpretative logic and structure to films in 
which the Surrealists had disintegrated coherence and causality in 
pursuit of a 'depaysement' effect without explicable sense. For 
this reason, it is not possible to plot differentiations for 
Surrealism as either autonomous or socially useful knowledge, nor 
place its mode of film signification along the real/representation 
divide. This is not, I would suggest, without significance, and I 
shall return in Chapter Five to question the implications for a 
definition of postmodernism of the fact that Surrealism does not 
fit easily with Lyotards's Modernist recits. 
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v Rationality 
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-124- 
9. Peter Bürger, Iheory of the Avant-Garde (1984). 
10. ed. P. Adams Sitneyq The Avant Garde Film (1978)9 p.. v. 
11. Colin MacCabe, 'Realism and the Cinema: Notes on Some 
Brechtian Theses', Screen, 15: 2 (1974)9 pp. 7-27. See also his 
'Principles of Realism and Pleasure', Screen, 17: 3 (1976), pp. 7- 
28. 
12. See Thorold Dickinson, A Discovery of Cinema (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1971); Barry Salt, Film Sty e 
Technology: History and Analysis (London: Starword, 1983) and more 
recently, John Wyver's The Moving Image (Oxford: Basil Blackwellp 
1989), esp. pp. 5-34. 
13. 
of Film: 
Mast aný (1974), 
The terms are Siegfried Kracauer's, taken from his 
the Red221? tion of Physical Rea (1960) collected in 
I Cohen, Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings 
pp. 7-2i. 
Abstract Formalim 
14. Clement Greenberg, IModernist Painters' (1965), in eds. 
F. Francina & C. Harrison, Modern Art and Modernism (1982), pp. 5- 
10 (p. 5). My emphasis. 
15. ibid. p. 5. 
16. ibid. p. 5. 
17. For a theoretical assessment of Analytical Cubism, see 
John Goldingis chapter in ed. Nick Stangos, Concý2ts of Modern Art (London. Thames and Hudson: 1981 edition), pp. 50-77, or Chapter 
Three of Herbert Read's A Concise History of Modern Painting (London: Thames and Hudson, 0 edition), pp. -67-104. 
18. Germaine(Dulac,. in ed. Sitney, The Avant Garde Film (1978), pp. 43-48 p. 43 
19. Germaine Dulac, in ed. Sitney (1978), pp. 31-35. 
20. Jean Epstein, cited by Hans Richter (1955), p. 18. 
21. Jean Epstein, 'The Essence of Cinema' (1923), in ed. 
Sitney (1978), pp. 24-5 (p. 25). See also his 'For a New Avant- 
Garde in the same volume, pp. 26-30. 
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POSIMDERNISM AND DELEGITIMATION: 
THE NARRATIVE OF SPECUIATION 
My understanding of Lyotard's thesis was earlier advanced in 
order to provide firm epistemological grounds for defining the 
historical and theoretical conditions of Modernist film practices. 
Having appropriated Lyotard's claim made more generally for the 
production of scientific knowledge and assessing its validity for 
the sphere of the aesthetic and specifically for the area of fihn, 
I would suggest that Lyotardfs theory of modern scientific 
knowledge has also been extremely fruitful for making the 
conceptual parameters of film Modernism explicit. From the four 
types of film practice identified, it is possible to suggest that 
the metanarratives of liberty and speculation do indeed legitimate 
film practices as Modernist and this permits a more precise 
understanding of the meaning of Modernism construed as artistic 
practice 'governed' by the 
-recits. But, before pursuing 
Lyotard's model to the point at which it may frame a definition of 
postmodernism as a post-narrative condition consequent on the 
delegitimation of the grands recits, it is important to make 
explicit what has been implicit in my exposition of the 
metanarratives so far. Film Modernism must be grasped as 
constituted epistemologically by metanarratives which together 
define the necessary conditions under which film is instituted as 
Modernist knowledge. From the point Of view of understanding the 
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consequences of postmodernist delegitimation, it is important to 
note not only that Modernism comes to be defined by two divergent 
forms of legitimation, but also to identify precisely what it is 
about the metanarratives that allows films produced under the 
narratives of emancipation and speculation to unify rather than 
divide a Modernist 'condition'. Accordingly, I wish to argue that 
the Modernism of both speculative and emancipatory films derives 
from the fact that they are both underwritten by implicit appeal to 
that which I would term rationality imperatives. The imperative 
towards legitimating art practice as rational 'knowledge', it must 
be observed, is manifested quite differently by each gLand r6cit; 
the considerable divergences in artistic form, 'content' and 
social/political intention which I have used to separate 
speculative frcxn emancipatory film practices can, in some measure, 
be attributed to a more fundamental division at the level of the 
form that the rationality imperative takes. Sumiarily, the 
distinction can be represented as follows: 
Speculative knowledge of film is sanctioned by a rationalizing 
imperative: 
a) the Kantian/Greenbergian process of 'rationalization' must 
be given full weight here in determining that true or 
authentic Modernism is synonymous with Abstraction- 
Minimalism as medium-specific knowledge. This is founded 
upon a philosophical and quasi-historical narrative which 
culminates in the fulfilment of aesthetic internal 'self- 
criticism'; 
b) the 'hero' of the narrative is a sublimated imperative to 
reduce the function and 'content' of art to its radical 
constituents (using the words 'reduc 
. 
1' and 'radical' in the 
mathematical sense of logical root), 
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c) speculative film posits an autonomous spectatorg external to 
the formal investigation of film-as-material, or else 
proposes that the goal of speculative knowledge is rational 
c. onsciousness through apperception and cognition of material 
processes. 
imperat ve 
knowledge of film is sanctioned b, an instrumental 
a) the project of liberty is founded on the analysis of the 
role of film as mass cultural medium in creating and 
sustaining conditions of social inequality. Emancipatory 
discourse, however, retains a functional role for film by 
making it a potential resource for producing critical 
knowledge of those conditions; 
b) the 'hero' of the narrative of liberty is the sublimated 
imperative whose historical telos is completed by the 
production of film which is socially just and non- 
oppressive; 
c) emancipatory film reduces the margin between text and 
spectator by incorporating strategies of defamiliarization 
and distantiation to stimulate critical (rather than 
ewtional) spectatorship towards the goal of social liberty. 
Given, then, that Modernism is legitimated by two 
recits, and, given that the metanarratives specify the meaning of 
Modernist rationality differently, it is possible to arrive at two 
quite distinct readings of the cultural condition of postmodernism 
depending on which narrative one believes we are 'post'. The 
concept of post-narrativity highlights different issues for each 
metanarrative: for speculation, what happens to the larger social 
relations of Modernism between the avant-garde, autonomous art and 
mass culture; for liberty, how does the loss of the metanarrative 
challenge that Modernism which makes art the source of radical 
critique of 'dominant' culture, and how does postmodernist thinking 
respond to Modernism's political 'use' of aesthetics? Answering 
these questions, however, is not as straightforward as it might 
first appear and I shall endeavour to unravel some of the 
complexities that are produced by thinking of postmodernism. and 
film within Lyotard's theory. 
To complicate matters a little further, it is very important 
to state at this point that the design drawn so far has 
intentionally misrepresented film Modernism. My discussion of how 
the metanarratives have defined the conceptual parameters by which 
film is legitimated as Modernist has been framed in a deliberately 
gender 'neutral' way, centring on predominantly male film makers 
and theorists. This has resulted in a highly selective and partial 
picture of what is at issue in thinking of postmodernism as a post- 
narrative condition since feminism's relation to Modernism and the 
avant-garde has been withheld. I have to this point kept feminism 
out of the central course of this analysis and have done this for 
several reasons. Firstly, the processes by which the Modernist 
metanarratives lose their validating authority must not be regarded 
as an epistemological matter alone but as stemming from 
historically and culturally determined pressures or 
'interventions': it is important to recognize that it is feminism 
which makes explicit the problematic relations between Modernist 
notions of art and cultural politics in a more radical way than my 
analysis of Modernism to date might specify. Secondlyp because it 
is feminism which renders most visible the politir-al consequences 
inherent in thinking of postmodernism within Lyotard's framework; 
and, thirdly, from a post-narrative point of view, some forms of 
feminism have unc-ertain'status within the modernism/postmc)dernism 
divide. The chief point I wish to establish here is that the 
emergence of feminist avant-garde practices actively contest the 
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Modernist differentiations upon which speculative aesthetic 
knowledge is based but some forms of feminist avant-gardism are 
clearly governed by the epistemological determinations of the 
emancipatory metanarrative. I have, though, found comparatively 
little sustained theoretical work on the relations between 
feminism, f Um Modernism and the avant-garde (compared with 
feminist analysis of mainstream cinema) so that most of what 
follaws must be read as a tentative attempt to Imap' the politics 
of gender in order to cast a different light upon the meanings of 
the terms 'avant-garde' and Modernism. Similarly, the historical 
and conceptual emergence of feminism throws up a series of problems 
that are absent from the political concerns of previous 
emancipatory film which render Lyotard's theory of delegitimation 
highly contentious. To pre-empt my findings a little, I have 
encountered a real difficulty in attempting to reconcile two 
divergent readings of postmodernism as consequent upon the 'crisis 
of metanarratives': one which is compatible with recent feminist 
film theory and politics, and one which would deny feminist claims 
for intervention in the sphere of the asethetic at all. It thus 
remains to be assessed whether feminism is implicated in the 
bankruptcy of emancipatory aesthetic knowledge that Lyotard's 
schema would suggest is properly definitive of a postmodernist 
condition. I shall go on to question where feminism is situated in 
Lyotard's analysis (which is far from clear at this stage), and ask 
whether forms of feminist film theory can move beyond the impasse 
of Modernist epistemology into the domain of the postmodern without 
losing their claims to political effectivity. However, my first 
task in this Chapter is (in a necessarily schematic way) to ask why 
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and under what conditions feminism conjoins with the Modernist_ 
problematic to demonstrate its key role in delegitimating the 
narrative of s lation. 
Fead ni = arml the Avant-Garde 
It is a notoriously difficult task to pose definitive relations 
between feminism and cinema. B. Ruby Rich is right to argue that 
the sheer range of phrases used to define this relationship 
- 
'films by women, 'feminist film', 'images of women in film' or 
'women's films' 
- 
is symptomatic of a series of confusions as to 
what specifically feminist film theory and practice should refer*2 
I shall defer offering my own analysis of this until later as it 
bears very heavily on the question of whether postmodernism, is 
simply another 'name' for feminist film theory/practice. To 
facilitate discussiong however, a working definition of one half of 
the relationship is required and provisionally I concur with 
Annette Kuhn's much-cited formulation of the political project of 
feminism as: 
... 
a set of political practices founded in analyses of 
the social/historical position of women as subordinated, 
oppressed or exploited either within dominant modes of 
production (such as capitalism) and/or by the set Sf 
social relations of patriarchy or male domination. 
Kuhn's definition is useful in that it is general enough to 
encompass several major tendencies within Anglo-American feminist 
thinking. Patriarchy and capitalism can be understood as mutually 
supporting structures of domination as for Marxist/socialist 
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fermimisms which hold patriarchy to be a highly oppressive though 
secondary system produced by the primary inequalities of the 
ecmxnic structure of society. At the same time, it allows for 
radical/separatist critiques of gender and sexual relations which 
owe little to Marxist analysis of economic or class hierarchies but 
which stress instead the historical/global endurance of patriarchy 
despite wholly diverse social and economic systems. 4 Despite these 
major theoretical differences, it is fair to say that all forms of 
feminism address themselves to the subordination of women through 
the mechanisms and operations of patriarchal power which, in this 
instance, relates to the production, exhibition and consumption of 
cinema. As a primary site of the cultural construction, 
reproduction and maintainance of sexual inequality, both the 
institution of cinema and its products, films, provide a host of 
possible avenues for analysis; my concern at present is strictly 
limited to outlining the conditions under which feminism can be 
brought under the Modernist metanarratives. 
Good political reasons for why some feminist film practices 
have come to have an 'objective alliance' with the radical avant- 
garde5 can be traced to the beginnings of Second Wave feminism in 
the late 1960s/70s when critique centred on the increasingly sexist 
and oppressive nature of dominant representations of women in 
mainstream cinema (for instance Molly Haskell's seminal 
his torical/socio logical study From Reverence to Rape (1975) and 
Marjorie Rosen's Popcorn Venus (1973)). Haskell and Rosen belong 
with the initial formulation of a feminist 'cultural politics' 
which sought to engage with mass media (rather than fine art or 
literary) representations and challenge them as influential sites 
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of the cultural enforcenxmt of patriarchy. The 'negative' or 
counter work of 'Images' film criticism called attention to the 
manner in which mainstream characters and roles for women were 
circumscibed by patriarchal values (whore, vamp, mother, sex- 
goddess, victim) and stimulated demands for more 'realistic' and 
less idealized, stereotypical and often brutalized public imagery. 
6 
Linda Artel and Susan Wengraf, amongst many others, argued for 
alternative 'positive' images and films that provide non-sexist 
role models, attitudes and behaviour on subjects ranging from 
family relations, single parenthood2 the workplace, abortion, 
childcare, sexuality and biographies from women's history for 
consciousness raising. 7 This broadly sociological approach to film 
was soon challenged for its the assumption that films ran be gauged 
solely according to the truthfulness of their content measured 
against socially predetermined status and experience of real C2- 
existing women. Claire Johnson's highly influential Notes on 
Women's Cinema (1973) offers an early critique of stereotypical or 
'Images of Women' film criticism. Drawing on Erwin Panofsky's 
analysis of iconography as a simplifying code for understanding 
early f ilm narrative, and on Roland Barthes' theory that- icons are 
part of 'mythological' operations which work to 'naturalize' 
ideology, Johnson argues that images of women cannot be judged by a 
direct correspondence between real women's roles under patriarchy 
and the use made of women's image (as 'sign') in film: 
In rejecting a sociological analysis of woman in the 
cinema we reject any view in terms of realism, for this 
would involve an acceptance of the apparent natural denotation of the sign and would involve a denial of the 
reality of myth in operation. 
The call for direct changes in the represented content of films 
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fails to consider the prior cultural and filmic processes at work 
in producing and constructing those images: 
Within a sexist ideology and male-dominated cinemaq woman 
is presented as what she represents for man... despite 
the enormous emphasis placed on women as spectacle in the 
cinema, woman as woman is largely absent. 
The central thrust of this criticism must, of course, be placed in 
the context of a widespread political rejection of realism in 
feminist film theory at this time: 
Any revolutionary strategy must challenge the depiction 
of reality; it is not enough to discuss the oppression of 
women within the text of the film; the language of the 
cinema/depiction of reality must also be interrogatgd so 
that a break between ideology and text is effected. 
The turn away from the 'what? ' of content to the 'how? ' of f ilm. 
meaning in feminist thinking was also precipitated by another 
source 
- 
the failure to discover a credible 'authentic' feminist 
film aesthetic in the work of female directors. 9 Kuhn has made the 
important point that feminist work within the avant-garde was 
preceded by a great deal of historical research into what was hoped 
to be a lost or repressed history of female involvement in the 
dominant studio-based productions systems of Hollywood. Restoring 
that history has to date yielded a disappointing but unsurprising 
picture of a few exceptions to the rule that female employment in 
commercial film making before late 1960-70s was confined to areas 
such as costume, set design, makeup, continuity, acting and, 
occasionally, editing but very rarely, in directorial and 
production roles. Dorothy Arzner and Ida Lupinog 'literally the 
only women to direct film in Hollywood until the 1970s' are joined 
by a few European female directors 
- 
Fascist documentarian Leni 
Riefenstahl, Leontine Sagan and later, Mai Zetterling and Agnes 
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ermLn3L Varda. 10 The failure to glean a consistent and positively fi ist 
film aesthetic from these few led to several related C. OmlusiOns: 
a) films by women are not automatically feminist films: Simply 
exchanging female for male creative personnel cannot guarantee 
film content that is useful for the political/social goals of 
challenging patriarchal definitions of sexual difference; 
b) looking to the director for the origin of film meaning 'imports 
a series of humanist assumptions not conducive to feminist film 
making and political criticism: the source of meaning is 
I outside' the film in the person of the director, that is, 
individually rather than socially derived; the spectator's 
meaning-making activity is subordinate to directorial 
intention; the role of criticism is to construct and evaluate a 
canon of Great Directors (and/or auteurs) so that personal 
'vision' is valued above political reception (which also denies 
the co-operative nature of film production); 
it is the visual language of mainstream cinema and not just 
directorial intention that produces oppresssive representations 
of women: cinematic conventions of realism, narrative, genre, 
and spectatorial identification together with codes of 
lighting, camera angle, editing and frame composition must also 
be understood as. constituitive of meaning. 
Together, these signal a shift in critical concern away from the 
'image' or 'message' level of content to the processes of meaning 
production/reception. This first phase in feminist cultural 
politics offered two divergent paths for theoretical attention: the 
analysis of the mechanisms of textual production within mainstream 
'popular' commercial cinema and/or its wholesale rejection in 
favour of work within the avant-garde, which, it should be clear, 
was similarly preoccupied with articulating alternative film form. 
It is the second option that I wish to pursue here by looking at 
the possibilities of conjunction between Modernism and feminist 
film practice-theory that are open from the point of view of the 
metanarratives. 
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From a theoretical perspective, it is most interesting to 
begin mapping feminism's relation to Modernism from the point of 
view of speculation rather than the narrative of liberty. This may 
at first seem an odd way to proceed given that feminism is broadly 
concerned with analysing and redressing cultural, social, economic 
and political inequality within patriarchy/capitalism which might 
propose that the narrative of liberty would be more appropriate for 
legitimating feminist film under Modernism. However, the tensions 
arising from attempts to utilize speculative film for feminist ends 
are essential for understanding one half of the process of 
delegitimation. 
From a historical perspective, it is also pertinent to place 
feminism within the context of the speculative narrative since this 
has major consequences for a) placing feminism in relation to a 
Modernism/postmodernism divide, and b) defining postmodernism. For 
instance, equating Modernism with the narrative of the reduction of 
each medium to its material 'support' allows a simple chronological 
definition of post-Modernism as those socially orientated filmaking 
practices which historically 'come after' centripetal, autonomous 
film. Noel Carroll's contribution to The Postmodern Moment is 
germane. 11 His answer to the question 'what is postmodernism? ' is 
primarily a chronological one; Carroll identifies 'authentic' 
Modernism with structural film which dominated the American avant- 
garde scene during the late 1960s/early 70s and then defines post- Cp- 
Modernism by the largely feminist-inspired reactions to the 
reduction of film to structural fundamentals. While this might be 
a temporally accurate description of succession, it fails to 
address the conceptual terms upon which feminism firstly conjoins 
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with speculative film practice and subsequently supplies the 
impetus for its historical demise and the dissolution of its 
properly epistemological differentiations. Having already stated 
my objection that radically autonanous Abstract Formalism sui 
does not permit feminism (or any other political/social 
comern) to be articulated, it is possible to move forward to 
consider feminism and formal film, and feminism and structural 
film. 
emudsm and Structural Filn 
It is clear that structural film emerged within a highly 
politicized environment combining a 'sense of unified oppositional 
movement' 
- 
Vietnam and student protest, black, gay and women's 
rights 
- 
to produce a 'language of criticism, quasi-theory, and 
appreciation... that invited everyone to board the train of film 
history and ride into a bountiful future'. 12 Specifically 
formulated against commercial cinema, the male-dominated 
structuralist avant-garde film makers in both Europe and the USA of 
the 1960s must also be seen as challenging the preceding 
mythopoetic psychodramas and music/dance formal f ilms of the late 
1940s/50s. Structural film's rejection of formal film is an 
important one for charting feminist engagement with Modernist 
avant-gardism for, amongst its male practitioners (Curtis 
Harrington, Kenneth Anger), the formal avant-garde also included 
the earliest female film makers to use avant-garde practices to 
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- 
Sarah Arledge, explore issues related to feminism and film 
Germane Dulac, Maya Deren and Shirley Clark-13 Formal film, as 
outlined in Chapter Two, is set apart from structural film because 
it is 'reproductive' in Richter's sense; a largely associative and 
poetic use of a recognizable image-base is subjected to temporal 
and spatial distortion but the representational function of images 
is retained for the exploration of subject matter and content. E. 
Arm Kaplan suggests that 'women attracted to the experimental film 
were often searching for an outlet for their inner experiences, 
sensations, feelings, thoughts'. 14 It is not surprising, 
therefore, that they should choose to work in a richly symbolic, 
expressionist and often surrealistic vein that would allow the 
cinematic exploration and expression of the 'personal'. These may 
be regarded as initial attempts to articulate a different cinema 
outside dominant realist representations of women which were 
'mystified, made at once a lynchpin of visual pleasure and the 
affirmation of male dominance' and 'hitherto rendered invisible by 
means of the sexualized female fantasy form'. 15 Both Sandy 
Flitterman-Lewis and Genette Vincendeau16 grant Dulac the title of 
first feminist film maker for her film The Smiling Madame Beudet 
(1923) though Kaplan is equivocal: while the film 1 serves the 
important function of exposing the positionality of women in 
patriarchy' by using filmic, distortions to 'present the inner pain 
and wish-fulfillment fantasies of a wife suffocating in a 
provincial marriage' and (uniquely for the time) from the point of 
view of the female protagonist, she nonetheless 'has no sense of 
17 
alternatives'. It is arguable whether the works should qualify 
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as feminist in any strong sense on other grounds; for early female 
experimental film makers film making is essentially regarded as a 
means of subjective personal expression without broader political 
or collective claims beyond those of the individual artist. Such 
commitment to a 19th century Romantic view of the unique expressive 
artist can be gauged in the pedagogical efforts of Maya Deren to 
create an alternative film culture of production, exhibition and 
distribution based on individual creativity during the 1940s and 
50s which had been highly influential in defining the terms of 
avant-garde rejection of studio-based commercial cinema: 
Cameras do not make films; film-makers make films. 
Improve your films not by adding more equipment and 
personnel but by using what you have to the fullest 
capacity. The most important part of your equipment is 
yourself: your mobile body, your imaginative mind, and 
your freedom to use both. 
This is a pertinent distinction. One of the prisnary economic and 
ideological distinctions dividing Modernist from dominant film is 
that the former is grounded in a 'craft' or 'artisanal' ethic 
- 
unique films of personal expression created by 'artists' with full 
control over materials - while the latter mass produces a 
standardized product wholly controlled by the financial constraints 
of commercial cinema industries (film maker v. director). 19 
Annette Kuhn has noted that for feminist filmmakers this division 
may 'embody a certain contradiction' not experienced by male avant- 
garde practitioners: 'between on the one hand the individualism 
inherent in the concept of self 
-expression and on the other the 
social character of feamnist politicst. 20 Nonetheless, whatever 
feminist 'message' can be drawn from the work of Clarke, Deren and 
-150- 
Dulac derives from an expressive model of film meaning which 
permits the use of representational qualities of film imagery for 
personal exploration, 
It is noteworthy, then, that the advent of structural film in 
the 1960s/70s is accompanied by a break with the literary-poetic 
idea that film should. express at all. In pursuit of filmic 
specificity, structural film sheds the 'theatrical' remnants of the 
formal f ilm's mode of representation 
- 
dance as drama, personal 
metaphor as narrative - and, from a feminist point of view, an 
important means for symbolic, expressionistic examinations of 
personal female subjectivity. Some forms of structural film move 
far beyond the abolition of represented content; Carro Is 
definition of structural film is s1M* lar to mine though he stresses 
the importance of the systemic approach to film structure (e. g. 
Frampton's Zorn's Lemma (1970)) and J. J. Murphy's Print Generation 
(1973)), and of cornputer-generated serial systems in defining the 
structural aesthetic: 
... 
like the minimalists in their reaction to the 
psychodramatic and mythic pretentions of abstract 
expressionism, these new filmakers adopted strategies to 
depersonalize, distance and 'cool out' their medium. Thus 
they came to adopt generative strategies that removed a 
great deal of moment-to-moment decision Tiking, and, 
therefore, expressivity from their work. 
This is an interesting theoretical turn. The development of 
structural film towards minimalist reduction is the extreme outcome 
of the progress of speculation towards medium-specific aesthetic 
knowledge: non-representational, 'author-less' and militantly 
divorced from dominant social experience of cinema. Of what 
possible value could a 'depersonalized' and 'content-less' film 
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aesthetic be to feminism which is defined by a highly politicized 
understanding of the 'personal' as the fundamental site of 
patriarchal definitions of the gendered self and ultimately 
concerned with challenging the cultural representation of women? 
This is not to suggest that feminist attempts to appropriate 
structural film's examination of the material constituents of the 
illusionist image-base 
- 
film, light, projection, time 
- 
have not 
been made. Annabel Nicholson's Reel Time (1973) addresses a 
relationship between the projector and a sewing machine, 'running 
loops of film of herself sewing film through the sewing-machine, 
then the projector, until the film tears and starts to slip'. In 
Handtinting (1967), Joyce Wieland draws a parallel between film 
making and embroidery 'puncturing the strip with needles and dyeing 
the celluloid'. 22 While both pieces explore material filmic 
processes, they also canuent upon women's relationship to the 
production of meaning, and to the culturally determined meaning of 
production. 23 Traditionally not defined as art, women's domestic 
production is made relevant to the practice of film making which, 
until the 1960s/70s brought relatively greater access to 
r-orq: )aratively inexpensive film technology, had also traditionally 
excluded women as creators 
- 
While these are important 
considerations, revealing the unarguable male dominance of both 
commercial and experimental film making, the point of simply 
juxtaposing domestic with aesthetic production is a rather liMited. 
one of value mainly to a previously politicized audience drawn from 
experimental film making circles within the avant-garde. This 
raises a further set of issues which complicate the political 
strategies of spewlative feminism: 
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a) investigation of the internal specificity Of film largely 
works against the broader purport of social critique: in- 
terms of my analysis, the autonomous imperative to reduce film 
to its perceptual 'base' which underwrites the Modernism of 
structural film ensures that it remains irreducibly 
centripetal; 
b) feminist film makers working within the avant-garde declare a 
tactical refusal to engage with realist film making which, by 
definition, denies access both to the dominant means of 
representation and to its broader non-specialist audience* 
I stated in Chapter two that the dominant concept of Modernism was 
that of autonany. Fran Peter Bijrger's Theory of the Avant-Garde 
(1984), however, it is evidently important to distinguish two 
distinct but interrelated levels of analysis when using the concept 
of autonorny: 
a) the broadest level of the cultural constituition of art 
defined as a specialized category of perception and/or 
knowledge; 
b) the more particular level of the effects of that constitution 
on the political import of formal tecbniques specifically 
available to film. 
The first level concerns what may be termed art's structural 
autonomy which predetermines the purpose, production and reception 
of any 'aesthetic' object in bourgeois society (indeed, which 
defines it as art p2r. Ee)- The second relates more directly to an 
increasing tendency away from represented or recognizable content 
towards immanent specificity. Under the narrative of speculation, 
of course, the two are inextricable. If it is true that the 
'function of cultural objectifications is institutionally 
determined' then I would suggest that structural film is a truly 
Modernist example of Býwger's theory that the 'apartness from the 
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praxis of life that had always constituted the institutional status 
of art in bourgeois society now becomes the content of works. 
Institutional frame and content coincide' and 'social 
ineffectuality stands revealed as -the essence of art'. 
24 The 
questions raised are large ones: isn't there a contradiction in 
terms in arguing that autonomous art is also functional for 
political ob. jectives if in its strongest sense speculative art is 
confined to the specificity of aesthetic knowledge - the proper 
subject of art is art - to which questions of social utility do not 
apply? Similarly, does not the fact that speculative film is 
essentially an avant-garde practice also necessarily set lu'n'ts on 
a broadly based political effectivity? In view of my analysis, 
attempts to reorientate structural film towards political (rather 
t-Imm- 'purely' filmic) concerns most clearly illustrate the tension 
arising from pressing speculative film into the service of 
political 
- 
feminist 
- 
emancipation. 
At this point it is illuminating to return to Lyotard's 
contention that the narrative of speculation contains within it the 
seeds of its own delegitimation. It will be recalled that the 
Enlightenment pursuit of autonomous bodies of speculative knowledge 
determines that 'true knowledge' is 'always indirect knowledge: it 
is composed of reported statements that are incorporated into the 
metanarrative of a subject that guarantees their legitimacy' (PC, 
p. 35). It might be argued that feminism is similarly engaged in 
the long-term goal of producing knowledges that will effectively 
'add up' to iust such an epistemological totality: feminist 
cultural theory, feminist science, feminist art, feminist 
jurisprudence, feminist political science etc. The primary 
-154- 
justification for speculative knowledge is that it should 
contribute to a larger 'project of totalization' (PC, p. 34). - But 
it must be remembered that speculative knowledge is legitimated as 
disinterested knowledge, knowledge for 'its own sake': the process 
of delegitimation. relates to the inability of this recit to 
integrate its knowledges; the 'weave of the encyclopaedic net' that 
binds the relatively independent knowledges together is loosened to 
the point where the original raison d"e'tre of narrative knowledge 
is lost. Put simply, the specialization of knowledges that both 
Habermas and Lyotard identify with Enlightenment modernity andq 
more specifically with the Modernist period, intensifies to the 
(post-narrative) point at which each sphere of enquiry is 'set 
free' to define its nature and purpose according solely to its own 
internal conditions (whether speaking of ethics, science or 
aesthetics). Without the metanarrative to 'supervise' them, 
specialized knowledges are no longer speculative in the sense 
defined in Chapter One, but language games with their own rules 
with 'no special calling to supervise the game of praxis' (PC, p. 
40). The political 'supervisory' claims of f ermadsm, thus bring 
into play the 'language game' specified by the narrative of 
liberty. In Lyotard's schema, this produces a 'major conflict 
reminiscent of the split introduced by the Kantian critique between 
knowing and willing': 
oo it is a conflict between a language-game made of ýenotations 
answerable only to the criterion of truth, 
and a language game governing ethical, social and 
political practice which necessarily involves decisions 
and obligationsý in other words, utterances expected to 
be just rather than true and which in the final analysis lie outside the realm of scientific knowledge. 
(PC, p- 32). 
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As film practice under the narrative of speculation is Predicated 
on the principle of autonomy, it carries with it concomitant 
differentiations between filmic specificity/representation, avant- 
garde/popular culture, aesthetic value/entertaiment. This would 
suggest that feminist engagement with immanent knowledge cannot be 
sustained without confronting the very conditions which constitute 
the sphere of the aesthetic as autonomous, that is, without 
questioning those Modernist differentiations that permit the 
aesthetic to be carved out as a specialized sphere concerned with 
art-specific knowledge. 
With the preceding discussion in mind, it becomes possible to 
understand the proliferation of discrete post-structural film 
making practices which appeared during the 1970s and early '80s as 
evidence of delegitimation. Noel Carroll suggests a 'fledgling 
taxonomy' to order a variety of emergent forms 
- 
Deconstructionist, New Talkie, Punk, New Psychodramas and New 
Symbolism. The accuracy of Carroll's labels is not an important 
consideration. However, the terms of disengagement are and it is 
the irreconcilable nature of the Kantian conflict above which I 
suggest is at the core of the de-differentiating process of post- 
speculative postmodernism. 
To support an initial reading of post-speculative and post- 
autonomous feminist avant-garde practices during the 1970s/80s as 
post-Modernist, it is necessary to set their chronological 
emergence within a more general background of theoretical change. 
New film forms such as feminist Deconstructionist and New Talkie 
cannot be appreciated without acknowledging the 'immense 
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theoretical revolution' that accompanies and separates them from 
the theoretical presuppostions of structural film. The 'post-'68' 
critical climate which emerged out of various configurations of 
Althusserian Marxism, Lacanian psychoanalysis and linguistic 
semiotics, as Carroll notes, clearly marks a break with the 
I preferred rhetoric' of much structural film - 'phenanenology, 
cognitive psychology, math and natural science'. 25 The theoretical 
dominance of critical methodologies derived f rom Marxist, 
structuralist, post-structuralist and psychoanalytical theory 
during the '70s needs to be established but it is not my purpose 
here to explore these individually. Rather, to illustrate the 
process of delegitimation more precisely, I shall limit discussion 
to the radical change in conceptual status of the 
viewing subject. and use seminal 'moments' to substantiate my claim 
that 'post-structural' film forms are predicated on two crucial de- 
differentiations of speculative Modernism: a) the 'end' of the 
category of aesthetic 'purity'; and b) the 'death' of autonomous 
laiowledge. Again, this is best approached through the f ocus of 
feminist theory and I shall begin by returning to 
structural/materialism. 
Belegitimation: The Narrative of Speculation 
The British materialist branch Of strUCtural f ilm makers (the 
London Film-makers Co-operative 
, 
especially Gidal) of fer cogent 
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arguments against the apolitical effects of structural film that 
Gidal contends makes it 'merely another aesthetic mode... without 
important functional meaning outside its mere differentiation per 
se fran previous modes'026 Experienced as autonomous art within 
the confines of exclusionary gallery/art-house environments, 
structural film's 'film as film, message is destined to be 
passively consumed as pure formalism without political consequence 
despite feminist intentions to reorientate structural film towards 
the production of social knowledge. But this does not spell the 
end of feminist alliance with speculative film. Indeed, Gidal's 
objection can be seen to provide more substantial ground for 
articulating feminist critique within the narrative of speculation 
which centres on the the shift in epistemological importance from 
the film maker to the film viewer, and to the politicization of the 
ex2ýrience of spectatorship. The important 'functional meaning' 
absent from Wieland and Nicholson's films (which 'document[s] the 
film making techniques via what we are given to see by the 
illusionist capacities of the photochemical recording device 
(film)') derives from the lack of the 'materialist' part of the 
acniation. The 'materialism' of film practice must produce instead I- 
'film's abstract, a filmic, real in which process is instituted as a 
process, not the documentation of a process'. 27 Gidal's rejection 
of f ilms of pure structure in favour of the experience of material 
process is inextricable from his Althusserian concern to circumvent 
modes of identification that bind the spectator through 
representational practices to bourgeois ideologies. Thus 
identificatory mechanisms, he argues, are not restricted to 
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identifications 'with' characters on screen but are active at more 
fundamental levels; for instance, the abstract colour-field films 
of Paul Sharits have a 'grainy, perspectivally deep illusionism' 
within which the 'documentary truth of the represented film grain 
becomes the dominant factor, the narrative even'. 28 Even this will 
'foster imaginary identities' that need to be resisted by the 
active viewer, identities which in conventional narrative are 
produced through character, story, plot, camera angle and distanceg 
f rame composition and editing. That these are also necessarily 
sites of the reproduction of patriarchal ideologies offers a 
persuasive model for feminist film makers within the avant-garde. 
It is the investment of dominant realist cinema in regimes of 
spectatorial identification that leads Gidal to argue that only 
'radical' feminists have grasped the true significance of wholly 
nýgatory action against bourgeois/patriarchal illusionism: 
We must learn to manage without the reproduction of 
identifications through, for example, familial 
structures, without the reproduction of identification 
through structures of representation, familial 
orientation and biologism, being merelýqthe birthplace of 
such modes for the individuated self. 
Hence the 'purely' aesthetic concerns of structural film are 
supposedly countered by Gidal's claims for a politically 
emancipatory didacticism: 
A film can inculcate positions which force attempts 
- 
moment to moment attempts 
- 
at knowledge, attempts at delineating precisely the perception of distance between 
perception and (absent) knowledge. The apprehension of 
the functiSaing of that distance is a position in 
knowledge. 
If its underlying epistemological model can be formulated in this 
way: the experience of filmic process = experience of subjectivity 
= consciousness = knowledge = reality, then aesthetic experience 
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is thus finally rational experience resulting in knowledge of the 
'real' outside filmic representation (as process). It is the final 
appeal to the viewing subject's consciousness (as a 'position in 
knowledge') which provides the starting point for delegitimation by 
feminist questioning of the kind of spectator it proposes. 
Constance Penley is particularly sharp in her analysis of 
structural/materialist film and suggests that its epistemological 
assumptions determine that its political project is iLmtenable. 31 
To support her argument, Penley draws upon several highly 
influential sources which inform a 'metapsychological' account of 
the functioning of cinem spectatorship. 
Firstly, Jacques Lacan's work on the Imaginary constitution of 
the subject based on the notion that sub. iectivity is f ounded on a 
primarily visual investment of the scopic drive. For Lacan, 
subjectivity is profoundly illusory in that it is instituted by the 
mis-recognition of one's own unity in an Other's image: the Mirror 
Stage constitutes the 'registration of the totality of a body 
previously lived as fragmented'. 32 As a 'structuring function' and 
not a positive relationship between self and others, Imaginary 
identification (before entry through language to the Symbolic 
spaces of 'I' defined in familial/social/sexual terms) 'prefigures 
the whole dialer-tic between alienation and subjectivity', that is, 
all ensuing relations of self to Other. 
Secondly, Christian Metz's Lacanian-based theory that the 
primary constitution of the cinematic signifier is also a 
psychoanalytic one, f ounded on the play between the perception and 
Imaginary of presence/absence: 
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The spectator is absent from the screen: contrary to the 
child in the mirror, he cannot identify with himself as 
an object, but only some obýiects which are there without 
him. In this sense the screen is not a mirror. This t' 
the perceived is entirely on the side of the obýiectq and 
there is no longer any equivalent of the own image, of 
that unique mix of perceived and subject (of other and I) 
which was precisely the figure necessary to disengage the 
one from the other. At the cinema, it is always the other 
who is on the screen; as for me, I am there to look at 
him. I take no part in the perceived, on the contrary, I 
am all-perceiving... absent from the screen, but 
certainly present in the auditorium, a great eye and ear 
without which the perceived would have no one to perceive 
it, the constituit&ve instance, in other words, of the 
cinema signifier. " 
Metz continues that what is 'characteristic of the cinema is not 
the imaginary that it may happen to represent, it is the imaginary 
which it is from the start': the imaginary constitution of the 
cinematic signifier demands that the 'spectator identifies with 
himself, with himself as a pure act of perception (as wakefulness, 
alertness): as condition of possibility of the perceived and hence 
as a kind of transcendetal subject, anterior to every there is,. 34 
Penley argues that primary identification with images qua cinematic 
es ensures that 'what the images depict (even what film 
processes they represent) do not have that much to do with the 
identification which establishes the spectator as transcendental 
subiect'. 35 Several interrelated points follow from this analysis. 
Structural/materialist attempts to thwart the spectator's 
'imaginary relation' to film by disavowing representation, 
narrative and fiction signally fail to grasp the 'most fundamental 
identification', the 'subject's own activity of looking', which 
precedes any form of cinematic spectating; it might then be argued 
that structural/materialism cannot escape from (but actually 
intensifies) the primary 'condition of illusion' it seeks to thwart 
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by promoting the 'construction of a conscious subject, unif ied and 
affirmed as the place of synthesis of all perceptions (a 
'materialist' transcendental subject)i. 36 Indeed, if cinematic 
spectatorship of any sort of film form is predicated on the primarY 
act of identification, it is neither theoretically nor politically 
useful to construct a model of spectatorship which posits an 
epistemological space 'beyond' that. The spectator proposed by 
Gidal and his anti-identification stress on the rational and 
conscious passage of the spectator to political awareness and 
knowledge 
- 
'watching oneself watching' 
- 
fails to acknowledge that 
viewing film is always already determined by a primary unconscious 
identification with the camera. The very act of spectating, when 
tied to the desire to know and 'investigate', produces a powerful 
subject-effect which in an extreme form slides from 'epistemology 
into epistemophilia (the concept denoting the power to know)': 
This perversion comprises the attempted mastery of 
knowledge and the demonstration of the all-powerfulness 
of the subiect. Attempted mastery of knowledge (or of 
desire) traps the subject in an imaginary relation, an 
endless circle of trying to know, and since the object of 
all knowing is a knowledge of -deiire, there is no end and 
no way out ý7 especially if the subject's aim is full 
knowledge. 
Consequently, from a feminist point of view, while it is possible 
to ally with structural/materialism's wish to eluidinate the 
reproduction of oppressive bourgeois and/or patriarchal practices, 
the construction of a 'transcendental' viewing subject amounts to a 
conscious perceiving self that is by definition outside of 
historical and social determination. Negatory practices cannot but 
fail to address the wholly cultural and historical conditions which 
have led to the endemic sexual oppressiveness of dominant forms of 
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cinematic representation. 
It is, of course, quite possible to read strmtural/ 
materialism in a non-epistemological way. Consider the terms of 
Stephen Heath's pyscho-textual analysis of spectator/text relations 
in Gidal's film practice. Structural/materialism 'has no for 
the look, ceaselessly displaced, outphased, a problem of seeing: it 
is anti-voyeuristic'. For instance, the use of repetition: 
In Condition of Illusion, which involves the instability 
of possibilities of recogntion (speed of camera movement, 
use of focus, proximity, angle, etc., leaving only a few 
objects and places in the room identifiable according to 
the norms of photographic reproduction), 
I 
the repetition 
suggests a possiblity of 'catching up', making sure', 
'verifying' which in fact remains iinexploitable, 
ineffective (one never sees 'more'), resistant in the 
very literalness of the re 
, 
5eý&tion (no variation, 
modulation, no 'new angle 
This is important for the decentred concept of subjectivity it 
embodies. Heath continues: 
What is intended, what the practice addresses, is not a 
spectator as unified subject, timed by a narrative 
action, making the relations the film makes to be made, 
coming in the pleasure of the mastery of those relations, 
of the positioned view they offer, but a spectator, a 
spectating activity, at the limit of any fixed 
subjectivity, materially inconsistent, dispersed in 
process, beyond the accommodation of reality and pleasure 
principles. 'Boredom' is a word that is sometimes assumed 
by the film-makers with regard to their film, the 
boredom which is the loss of the ' inary unity of the 
subject-ego and the very grain of drive against that 
coherent fiction, the boredom which Barthes sees close to jouissance 'it is Jouissance seen from the shores of 
pleasure'). 
S9 
Even though it is not easy to square the negatory terms of Heath's 
analysis with an epistemological project (which may circumvent 
Penley's objection), I would nonetheless insist that a film form 
which results in instabilityv displacementg and loss of coherence 
and unity is difficult to appropriate for properly feminist aims. 
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In short, feminist relations with structuralist/materialist film 
are troubled by both Gidal's and Heath's accounts: 
a) the epistemophilic desire for a 'scientific' investigation of 
the controlling perceiving self has little in common with a 
specifically feminist understanding of what 'coming-to- 
consciousness' should produce i. e. knowledge of the entirely 
social/cultural conditions of cinema's techniques of 
oppression; 
b) the production of a fragmented subject 'dispersed in process' 
cannot then be recuperated for a positive politics of feminist 
emancipation; one would have to demonstrate that 'Jouissance' 
is gender-specific which Heath's analysis does not. 
The strength of the case for defining certain post-structural 
film forms as post-Modernist can be gauged in the distance between, 
on one side, negatory anti-identification as it is manifested in 
structural/materialist film and, on the other, feminist 
deconstructionist theories of filmic subjectivity. Feminist 
deconstructiori rejects both the supra-epistemological spectator of 
speculative film for what I understand as its Modernist non- 
gendered. foundations, and the theory/practice of radically 
decentred subjectivity for arguing specifically female or even 
feminist subjectivity out of theoretical existence. Consequently, 
feminist deconstructive practices are primarily defined by their 
negotiation of a new understanding of subjectivity which can be 
appreciated most clearly as challenging the legitimation binaries 
of speculative film. 
This must be referred back to the theoretical 'problematic', 
mainly disseminated in Britain through the pages of Screen, which 
separates post-structural avant-garde forms of the 1970s from the 
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cognitiveý-pe-rc. eptual-phenomemlogicaI bases of 1960s structural 
film. Anthony Easthope's review of 'The Trajectory of Screen 1971- 
79' provides a useful simmary of a critical 'conjuncture' formed 
from the 'encounter of Marxism and psychoanalyis on the terrain of 
semiotics'. 40 For my purposes, what is highly significant about 
this period is the reconceptualization of film as a triply 
determined 'specific signifying practice': 
"0 . 'signifying' is the recognition of a language as a 
systematic articulation of meanings; 'practice' refers to 
the process of this articulation, to the work of the 
production of meanings, and in doing so brings into the 
argument the problem of the subject within that work; 
'specific' gives the necessity for the analysis of a 
particular signifying practice in its specift ý1 formations (which is not a commitment to some 'purity'). 
The concept of film as a 'specific signifying practice' explicitly 
rejects the category of 'purity' which differentiates autonomous 
art from popular cultural film. Considered in semiological terms 
as a 'specific' language or 'systematic' process of articulation, 
it becomes conceptually important to grasp what is specific to f ilm 
signification sul generis and thus to jettison the notion that 
there is a substantive distinction to be made between particular 
'formations' or configurations of film signification. Louis 
Althusser's reformulation of Marx's concept of ideology provided a 
powerful tool in the process of de-differentiating Modernism's 
split between High Art and Low Culture by repudiating the existence 
of the 'aesthetic' as the a-historical, transcendent and 
essentially derived category of previous autonomous (bourgeois) 
epistemology. Broadlyt as Tony Bennett argues in Formalism and 
Marxism (1979) 
, 
to ask the 'eternal' question of what art (or in 
this instance, film) 'is' cannot be part of a materialist 
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philosophy which is predicated on the histori of conceptual 
apparatuses. Rather, the question becoms what does art '&'i that 
is, how does it function in particular historical conjuctures. 
Bennett argues for a historically materialist analysis of 
literature (but without the 'epistemological ballast' he finds in 
both Althusser's formulation of ideology and Macherey's theory of 
literary production and the idealism inherent in thinking of both 
as 'invariant structures). 42 I cite Bennett's work as a clear 
statement of the anti-essentialist/anti-purity position which also 
underpins the break from structural film epistemology which had 
investigated the 'essence' of film and the 'nature' of spectatorial 
perception in the experience of 'apperceptive reflexivity'. 43 An 
'epistemological break' such as this would suggest is manifested in 
the formulation of the field of film as, cultural production, a 
model of film meaning constructed without recourse to the 
art/popular culture divide, or to qualitative judgements about 
aesthetic value. Thus 'instances' of film signification 
- 
realist, 
documentary, generic, avant-garde 
- 
are not differentiated along 
the speculative Modernist axis of art/popular culture but rather 
theoretically demarcated by analysis of the particular 
configLwation of systemic filmic signification arid/or of the 
ideological operations they might perform 
- 
disruptive, 
confirmatory or 'fissured'. This is not to say that qualitative 
judgements dropped out of critical discourse but rather that their 
foundations shifted. Indeed, the institutional legitimation of 
academic discourses on popular forms of communication during the 
1970s (Film Studies, Cultural Studies, Communication and Media 
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Studies) also testifies to the dissolution of speculative 
Modernism's value-laden separation of realms. 44 For fem3justsq the 
legitimation of popular culture as object of academic analysis is 
inextricable from its irreversible politicization. The Modernist 
speculative differentiations which equate art with autonany and 
with 'specifically aesthetic' knowledge are no longer functional 
within a critical discourse that constructs its object of knowledge 
(cinematic 'institution', filmic 'texts') through radically 
incommensurate theories of signification and language, theories of 
ideology and apparatus, and theories of subýjectivity and 
psychoanalysis. Two major consequenc-es can be observed from the 
rejection of the rationalizing imperative sustaining speculative 
Modernism. On one side, the newly expanded field brings popular 
cultural productions within the scope of feminist/politically 
informed analysis and spawns some very influential '(re)readings 
for ideology' which contest the blanket assumption that popular 
texts are automatically 'affirmative' in the sense understood by 
previous Marxist philosphers of the Frankfurt School (and one could 
cite in this respect, for instance, Claire Johnson's work on 
Dorothy Arzner, textual analyses of the f ilm noir genre, Douglas 
Sirk's melodrama, or individual readings of films such as Ccxna or 
Klute45). On the other, the reduced margin between art and popular 
cultural fictions that this shift embodies fundamentally recasts 
the terms of avant-garde film practices and the political claims 
that can be made for them. 
The weakening of speculative legitimation, which permits the 
expanded field of cultural production rather than aesthetic 
reduction and politicizes popular film as a primary site of 
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ideological (mis)representation, is simultaneously matched by 
avant-garde practices which are intimately related to the 
experience of popular cultural film forms in a way that previous 
speculative film is not. Noel Carroll states: 
To deconstruct in film is always of necessity to 
deconstruct something, something else, something other 
than the deconstruction itself. That object is usually of 
the nature of a familiar cultural artifact -a 
preexisting film, genre, TV program, ad, a traditional 
compositional schema, traditiýgal iconography, or even 
the conventions of narration. 
Another major symptom of post-speculative post-Modernism might be 
isolated here in that the avant-garde agenda is now set according 
to a politics of 'intervention' rather than autonomous alternative: 
If deconstructive cinema thus defines itself in relation 
to dominant cinema, it is not a static entity, because 
its character at any moment is always shaped, in an 
inverse manner, by dominant cinema... always, so to 47 
speak, casting a sideways glance at dominant cinema. 
Similarly, Mary Ann Doane suggests 'contemporary film making 
addresses itself to the activity of uncoding, de-coding, 
deconstructing the given images'. 48 Avant-gardism in this mode 
operates within a much reduced distance between dominant and 
counter-cinema since its aim is to expose the functionings of 
culturally pregiven artifices which can be achieved only by 
its structures and strategies. Hence the political necessity for 
rejecting the purity aesthetic of structural film and 'returning' 
to content, narrative, personal expression and, in a crude sense, 
to meaning and content. But it should be evident that parallels 
with earlier female makers of pre-structural formal film cannot be 
pressed given that the 
-theoretical underpinnings are so radically 
dissimilar. Nor do I think this is quite enough to distinguish 
feminist deconstructionist film from old-style Brechtian formal 
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techniques of distarrciation already identified as the mainstay of 
Godardian anti-illusionism. Feminist deconstruction begins with a 
concern for: 
... 
the textual operations 
characteristic of dominant 
provoke spectators into an 
existence and effectivity 
consequently 46 o engender a these codes. 
and modes of address 
cinema, the aim being to 
awareness of the actual 
of dominant codes, and 
critical attitude towards 
Hence the more properly formal techniques of alienation are not 
directed at film artifice per se but involve a process of re- 
orientating or diverting culturally established expectations 
towards specifically feminist readings/meanings. Feminist 
deconstruction is distirr-tive because of its shift fr(xn what I have 
argued is a speculative Modernist differentiation which considers 
'the film text as an autonomous set of formal strategies' (and by 
extension, the spectator as an autonomous entity), and 'towards a 
notion of the interaction between spectator and text'. 50 The kind 
of 'interaction' that post-speculative film theory offers, however, 
must be placed in the context of the current theoretical bases of 
film as a 'signifying practice' 
- 
language, ideology, 
psychoanalysis: 
a) the systemic structure of langua determines that 'language 
is not a function of the speaker ; the individual does not 
pre-exist the system and cannot, in Saussure's terms, 'create 
or modify it by himself'; 
b) the Unconscious is 'structured like a language'; the Lacani 
? ýschoanalytic Imaginary subject is constituted as 'I' in the 
misrecognition' of illusory unity which permits entry to 
Symbolic identifications through positional categories of language; 
c) the function of ideology and its 'misrepresentation of the 
real relations of production' chiefly operates through the 
interpellation or 'hailing' of the subject as individual, 
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Taking all three together, the conceptual distance between 
spectator and text is greatly reduced; subjectivity does not 
'belong' to the self-possessed and external individual but bec-Omes 
a function of the systems by which it is 'spoken': 'questions of 
signification cannot be divided from the processes by which viewing 
subjects are caught up in, formed by, and construct 
meanings'. 51 Within this schema the 'specificity' of film, as 
against other cultural practices, can be located in its dependence C51- 
on psycho-textual orderings of the scopic drive which 'suture' the 
subject into its representation. Metzs analysis of Hollywood 
illusionism provided the basis for a model based on the spectatorls 
1 gaze': 
the spectator is absent from the screen as perceived, 
bu he is also (the two things inevitably go together) 
present there and even all-present as a verceiver. At 
every moment I am in the film by my look s caress. This 
presence often remains diffuse, geographically 
undifferentiated, evenly distributed over the whole 
surface of the screen; or more precisely hovering, like 
the psychoanalyst's listening ready to catch on 
preferentially to some motif in the film, according to my 
own fantasies as a spectator, without the cinematic code 
itself intervening to govern this anchorage and impose it 
on the whole audience. But in other cases, certain 
articles of the cinematic code or sub-codes... are made 
responsible for suggesting to the spectator the vector 
along which his permanent identification with his own look should be ext ed temporarily inside the film (the 
perceived) itself. 
However, it is difficult to overstate the importance of theoretical 
feminism in concentrating critical attention on the ways in which 
filmic texts operate to constitute or construct subject positions 
for its intended audience. The most influential in this respect is 
Laura Mulvey's psychoanalytically-derived theory, outlined in 
'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' (1975)9 that the textual 
economy of dominant narrative illusionist cinemag based on 
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fetishism and voyeurism, is at the same time a patriarchal sexual 
economy which works to split the gaze (and with it, desire and 
pleasure) along the axis of active male/passive female. For 
Mulvey, the filmic system of Hollywood illusionism is inevitably 
concerned with chanelling visual pleasure so that its male/female 
audience can only identify with a male gaze through which women are 
objectified, that is, signified by their 'to be looked at-nessle 
Thus Metz's 'articles of the cinematic code or sub-codes' are not 
neutral cinematic means but means of constructing and reinforcing 
patriarchal values in the field of the visual. Shot-reverse shot 
patterns, subJective shots, 'suture', point of view shots, 
narrative closure, visual signification through lighting, framing 
and costume conspire to deny women access to the power of a non- 
castrating/ed image, and to insist on their acquiescence in 
identifying with the male protagonist/male viewer's 
objectification. Mulvey's essay has had profound consequences for 
feminist analyses of mainstream dominant cinema but at present I 
cite her essay as a pivotal moment in the development of post- 
structural avant-garde practices. Though specifically addressed to 
mainstream Hollywood, Mulvey's analysis concludes with some 
thoughts on the kind of counter-cinema that might challenge its 
oppressive specular regime and offer a specifically feminist film 
making practice: 
The first blow against the monolithic accumulation of 
traditional film conventions... is to free the look of 
the camera from its materiality in time and space and the 
look of the audience into dialectics, passionate 
detachment. There is no doubt that this destroys the 
satisfaction, pleasure and privilege of the 'invisible 
guest', and highlights how film has de35nded on 
voyeuristic active/passive mechanisms. 
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Crucially, the 'distinguishing mark' of ferrminist deconstruction, 
'as against other non-dominant and anti-dominant formslq is its 
'recruitment of the spectator's active relation to the 
signification process for certain sign'f'eds, or areas of 
substantive concern'. 54 Mulvey thus advocates film forms which re- 
negotiate subject positioning as produced in dominant cinema but 
nonetheless acknowledges the largely negatory and dis-pleasing 
position this sets upon the strategies of the avant-garde. 
Because feminist deconstruction is both an aim and a process, 
it is not reducible to a set of formal techniques and hence the 
range of possibilities for deconstructive practices is as large as 
the field of cultural film production itself 
- 
culturally dominant 
narrative structures, genres, visual significations of the female 
body, structures of the gaze. Even a few exemplary texts should 
demonstrate that such strategic heterogeneity frustrates any 
attempt to recuperate feminist deconstruction for an avant-garde 
form and, in several ways, it is difficult to find a common link 
beyond the shared intention to 'interrogate' the desire-pleasure 
mechanisms of dominant film. 
Sally Potter's recasting of the narrative of Puccini's 'La 
Boheme' (a High Cultural artifact) in Thriller (1979), for 
instame, is: 
structured around a rearrangement of narrative 
dai; course in dominant cinema by the instatement of a 
womants questioning voice as the film's organising 
principle. By its recruitment of investigatory narrative 
structure and first-person voice-over, Thriller at once 
draws upon, parodies, challenges and transforms the 
narra ve and cinematic codes of the Hollywood film 
noir. 
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This intentian might be easy to reconcile with Carroll Is contention 
that 'decOnstructiOn might be thought of as the autodestruction of 
the film itself through the staged collision of the elements within 
it,. 56 However, the Eisensteinjan flavour of such analysis 
certainly reduces another cited exampleg Michelle Citron's Daughte 
Rite (1978), to non-gendered verfremdungseffekt. It is true that 
Daughter Rite shares with anti-illusionism a play upon the 
discrepancy between visual representation and verbal commentary 
(sound/image disjunction). But by mixing two distinct modes - the 
confessional (which deals with mother/daughter relations) set 
aginst 'sequences 
- 
marked cinematically as 'direct' documentary - 
in which two sisters act out their relationships with one another 
and with their absent mothert, 57 Citron's work is thus more 
interesting for the ways in which cinematic modes of address are 
deconstructed. In particular, the conflict between the modes works 
to reveal that both film documentary and autobiography are 
complicit with placing and containing female discourses on familial 
relationships. E. Am Kaplan writes: 
The use of home movies and old photographs is crucial as 
a device that establishes continuity through time and 
reflects the fiction making that, as Metz and Heath have 
shown, pervades even the documentary. Used as 
unproblematic representations, the past images function 
to seal individual change instead of providing evidence 
of the way women and their bodies are constructed by the 
signifying practices of both the social and psychological 
institutions in which they are embeddede.. this 
construction makes a main theme in... Daughter Rite (1978) where the slowing down of home movies enAblees us 
to see that the representations are far from an 'innocent 
recording', that the process of making the movies itselg 
functions to construct the place for the female child. 
And Kuhn comments that the structure of spectatorial engagement 
cannot be attributed to textual deconstruction alone: 
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The distarrciation, if such it is, is not that of the 
critical spectator of the Brechtian film. The subject 
matter and the intimacy of address... draw the spectator 
closely into the representation, in effect replicating 
the pain and ambivalence of our hostile and loving 
feelings towards those to whom we are closest, our 
mothers in particular... Moreover, if only by virtue of 
the kinds of issues it deals with, the film constructs an 
address which acknowledges sexual difference as crucial 
to the signifying process. Male and female will surely 
read this film differently. At the same time, the 
representation clearly constructs no unitary sub. jectivity 
for spectators of either gender. Daughter Rite appears to 
offer a relationship of spectator and text in which 
distanciation does not necessarily ensue from gaps 
between discourses 59 although an actively critical 
perspective might. 
In a wholly different way, McCall, Pajackowska, Tyndall and 
Weinstock's Sigmnd Freud's Dora (1979) is a sophisticated film 
which is partly structured around encounters between Freud and his 
case study Dora which are used to argue that Freudian 
psychoanalysis is a power discourse which 'accounts' for female 
sexuality and desire in heterosexual and phallocentric terms. 
Kaplan suggests that this critique is carried through on many 
levels. The opening sequence uses an extreme close-up of a female 
mouth to discuss womens' relationship to the discourse of 
psychoanalysis: 
The Talking Lips argue against their lover's belief that 
psycho-analysis is a discourse that offers reality; for 
the woman, it is rather a discourse shot through with 
bourgeois, capitalist ideology that looks at the 
individual outside of real history and of real struggle, 
and is ultimately more lil-a a sophisticated language game 
which was never innocent. 
g5 
At another level, contemporary visual objectifications of the 
female image (advertising images and porn clips) are used to 
counterpoint the various stages in the course of Dora's 
pyschoanalysis to which Kaplan rightly ascribes a comic function 
thou2h serious in their illustration of phallocentric N-7-- 
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I commnalities' in the images. More broadly, Dora's rejection of 
Freud's interpretation of her 'hysterical' symptoms in terms of 
repressed desire for her father/Freud himself is mirrored by the 
unsuccessful closure of films's overall 'romance' narrative 
structure (female submission after temporary resistance). The 
four-part stucture of Sigmund Freud's Dora offers an interpretative 
key to the founding absence which can be seen to structure the 
film's questioning of how women are forced to identify with 
phallocentric objectifications of their own image: the absence of 
the Mother-figure as a positive term in Freudian psychoanalysis is 
highlighted in the last section of the film. Through the use of 
letters written/spoken off-camera both by Dora's 'mother' (and by 
an abstract Mother), the film returns to pose questions of the 
repression of pre-Oedipal female-female identification in the 
Freudian narrative of the 'family romance'; the Mother-figure 
becomes symbolic of a potential 'space' outside of a phallocentric 
order which demands her disavowal. 61 
A fourth example of deconstructionist film form unites a 
series of films that Carroll terms New Talkies which share an 
overriding concern with the psychoanalytical-ideological importance 
of the ways in which language and film narrative construct sexual 
difference and predetermine subject positioning. The locus 
classicus of the New Talkie, Laura Mulvey/Peter Wollen's Riddles of 
the Sphinx (1976), carries through Mulvey's argument for a film 
politics of 'passionate detachment' by explicitly incorporating 
theoretical propositions drawn from current debates on female 
subjectivity, psychoanalysis and patriarchal ideology. Again, 
debts to Godard and Straub/Huillet are profound in terms of formal 
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techniques 
- 
fragmented sequence shots, intertitles, 3600 pans, 
direct address, and self-reflexive inclusion of film makers. But 
the purpose of dislocation is made more complex by the film's 
declared aim of attempting to 'speak' for women outside of 
patriarchal symbolic codes. 
Mary Am Doane has taken up these issues in her article 
'Women's Stake: Filming the Female Body' which addresses the 
enormous difficulty facing filmmakers attempting to 'elaborate a 
new syntax, thus "speaking! ' the female body differently, even 
haltingly or inarticulately from the perspective of a classical 
syntax'. 62 The Anti-illusionist techniques of distantiation are 
simply not available to feminists who understand cinema to be 
wholly imbricated with the psycho-social functionings of individual 
subjectivity under patriarchy: 
A machine for the production of images and sounds, the 
cinema generates and guarantees pleasure by a 
corroboration of the spectator's identity. Because that 
identity is bound up with that of the voyeur and the 
fetish, because it requires for its support the 
attributes of the 'non-castrated', the potential for 
illusory mastery of the signifier, it is not accessible 
to the-female6pectator, who, in buying her ticket, must 
deny her sex. 
At a more profound level, Doane argues that representing the female 
body outside of these terms is, in a sense, an 'impossibility'. 
Doane addresses Michelle Montrelay's Lacanian description of the 
different trajectories through the Oedipus complex, which produces 
sexed identities on the basis of absence/presence (articulated upon 
the privileged signifier of the 'third term', the 'phallus'). For 
the male child, desire, as the perpetually deferred sea ch for the 
I original' illusory 'plenitude' experienced in terms of the 
relation of oneness with the Mother, is brought into play at the 
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moment of recognition of the loss of this unity through the entry 
of the Father: paternal prohibition against incest forces a split 
between desire and the object of desire, and male desire is 
constituted as an endlessly deferred pursuit of lost unity. Male 
renunciation of pre-Oedipal identification with the Motherg and 
identification with the interdictory authority of the Fatherg must 
be forced: there must be something at 'stake' in order to secure 
the male identification with the Law of Father. In Elizabeth 
Lyon's terms, 'neither subject, man or woman, can have the phallus; 
it represents lack for both sexes'. 64 For the male child, the 
stake' is symbolized by the perms which functions to 'represent 
the lack' at the heart of the loss of original plenitude: 
identification with the interdictory authority of the Father is 
founded on the threat of loss or castration which the female in 
turn comes to signify. The male child is thus positioned as a 
privileged and powerful 'owner' of the means to symbolic power and 
identification with the Father follows fr(xn the recognition that 
the penis-phallus offers a new form of plenitude, a 'comforting and 
recuperative presencet65 standing against the potentially 
castrating perception of female 'lack'. Doane's reading of 
Montrelay argues that the constitution of masculine/feminine also 
produces quite different male/female relations to representation 
itself. In terms of language, the originating structure of sexual 
difference 'sets in motion the organized relay of differences which 
constitute language and so the human subject'; male entry into the 
realm of the Symbolic (culturep language, representation) is 
guaranteed by the phallus as primary signifer which is the 
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condition of differentially-defined signification itself. The 
origination of female identity in Lacanian terms insists that women 
'lack the lack' which permits entry into the Symbolic order of 
language and representation, and the image of woman must always 
entail the threat of castration. From this scenario, Montrelay 
corr, ludes that, because females do not have the means for 
symbolizing the phallus, their relationship to language can only be 
a negative one. Female desire cannot be known, cannot be thought 
in positive terms, since the condition of entry into language and 
representation is predicated on 'female' as 'absence'. However, 
the political value of Lacanian theory for theorists such as 
Montrelay and Doane and for a politics of film making derives 
primarily from his insistence on the lack of absolute fixity in 
subjective positioning. Kate Linker argues that it is important to 
keep in mind that language (here, film language) can construct 
other positions if Lacan's insistence on the non-foundational 
character of subjectivity is observed. A positive programme for a 
new politics of difference can be founded by returning: 
... 
to the subject's circling around this fantasy of 
unity, emphasizing the subject's divided and uncohesive 
status, its fundamental dependency on the signifier. And 
its inherent instability, for Lacan stresses that this 
subject is in process, produced in and through the 
modalities of language: if it is constituted through the 
formative stages that underly the acquisition of 
language, this structuring is not definitive, the subject 
is constantly formed and re-formedq positioned and re- 
positioned in every speech act. This f lux in the subject 
has important implications for ideology, which aims to 
produce the appearance of a unified subject, masking or 
covering division... [and for] the role played by 
specularity, ang6to the look as guarantee of imaginary 
self-coherence. 
Riddles of the Sphinx thus attempts to break with patriarchal modes 
-178- 
of visual language in order to shatter the illusions of unified and 
cohesive subject positions (male active/female passive) demanded 
for dominant representation to 'take place' (actuallyq to 'take the 
place of'). But whereas Heath's jouissance makes no claims for the 
gendering of this destruction of unity, Riddles does. The purpose 
of de-unifying 'feminine' subjectivity is part of an attempt to 
'speak' from the margins of repressed female discourse. Riddles, 
as with Sigmund Freud's Dora, is particularly concerned positively 
to revaluate the patriarchal repression of the Mother construed as 
castrated Other (mirrored in phallocentric psychoanalytic 
accounts). A photograph of Greta Garbo as the Sphinx is used as a 
guiding metaphor for the manner in which patriarchy simultaneously 
idealizes and objectifies cultural images of women and assigns them 
an absent 'space', at the margins of an Oedipal/phallocentric. 
constitution of social and psychical order. The Sphinx image is 
symbolic of this exclusion and 'represents, not the voice of truth, 
not an answering voice, but its opposite: a questioning voice, a 
voice asking a riddle': the Sphinx is 'outside the city gates, she 
challenges the culture of the city, with its order of kinship and 
its order of knowledge, a culture and a political system which 
assigns women a subordinate place' (Laura Mulvey's direct 
address). 67 Thus the formal destruction of conventional modes of 
address which are dependent on the 'illusory mastery' of the 
cinematic signifier are integral to a dislocation of patriarchal 
insciptions of the meaning of the female body as Mother. This is 
figured quite literally during the initial 3600 pan of Louise and 
baby: 
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The words on the sound track during the pan are 
deliberately scrambled, emerging as word associations and 
not as coherent associations and not as coherentt ordered 
sentences. They present the contradictory feelings of 
mothering: its burdensome nature, with endless routinest 
and the warm, cosy feelings of closeness and sheltering 
that also exist. Presumably, ordered sentences would 
express only male notions of mothering, and if women ar 98 
to assert their own discourse, it must take a new formo, 
I shall return to consider some of the political consequences of 
this position in relation to the post-structuralist deconstruction 
of subjectivity shortly. At present, I wish to continue with my 
application of Lyotard's delegitimation theory which has immediate 
bearing on defining postmodernism. 
From these few examples it would be tempting to conclude that 
'postmodernist' best defines the political and theoretical aims and 
objectives of feminist deconstructionist film. In some respects, 
ý1- 
- these films do indeed exhibit certain features which 'nave also been 
taken to be definitive of the emergence of postmodernism in other 
fields, such as painting and sculpture. 
Firstly, one can identify the incorporation of alien material 
- 
language, theory, writing, mass media imagery 
- 
which clearly 
signals a rejection of the 'purity' of speculative Modernism. For 
Craig Owens: 
The eruption of language into the aesthetic field... is 
coincident with, if not the definitive index of, the 
emergence of postmodernism. This 'catastrophe' disrupted 
the stability of modernist partitioning of the aesthetic field into discrete areas of specific competence; one of 
its most deeply felt shocks dislodged literary activity from the enclaves into which it had settled only to 
stagnate 
- 
poetry, the novel, the essay... 
- 
and 
dispersed 64 t across the entire spectrum of aesthetic 
activity. 
However, Hal Foster is right to criticize Owens for reducing 
Modernism to late Modernist (speculative) minimalism in order to 
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define postmodernism. by the importation of 'impure' language into 
medium-specific art. My own analysis of Eisenstein and Godard_ 
shows clearly that the 'eruption of language' into film discourse 
is actually present within Modernism, if Modernism is understood 
more complexly as construed by both metanarratives. 
SecondlY, the generic collision or dis-location of dominant 
codes of signification and narrative structure which destroy the 
notion of aesthetic autonomy in favour of opening up filmic 
discourse to the space of Barthesian cultural textuality, 'a multi- 
dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them 
original, blend and clash'. 70 Using letters, photographs, 'found' 
film, home movies, advertising images, spoken narration and generic 
quotations frorn previous film modes, the deconstructive film text 
thus beomes a matter of intertextual, or 'allegorical' reading. 
For Foster: 
Contingent, this art exists in (or as) a web of 
references, not necessarily located in any one form, 
medium, or site. As the object is destructured, so is the 
subject (viewer), and the modernist order of the arts 
decentred. Such art is 'allegorical' in nature. Temporal 
and spatial at once, it dissolves the old order; so too 
it opposes the 'pure sipl of late-modernist art and 
plays, instead, on the distance which separa ýT s 
signifier from signified, sign from meaning'. 
Thirdly, by questioning the visual operations of patriarchy at 
work in dominant cinema, Mulvey/Wollen, Citron, Potter draw 
attention to the manner in which dorninant structures of 
representation function to exclude and 'silence' 'feminine' or 
feminist voices and positions. In these respects, I agree that the 
films do represent a fundamental and irreparable fracturing of 
autonomous and aesthetic speculative Modernism. Again, in Owen's 
terms: 
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In the modern period the authority of the work of artg 
its claim to represent some authentic vision of the 
world, did not reside in its uniqueness or singularityg 
as is often said; rather that authority was based on the 
universality modern aesthetics attributed to the forms 
utilized for the representation of vision, over aTd- above 
differences in content due to the production of works in 
concrete historical circumstances... Not only does the 
postmodernist work claim no such authority, i ý2 also 
actively seeks to undermine all such claims. 
However, one cannot pass too quickly over the assertion that 
feminism and postmodernism are interchangable. Contesting the 
monolithic unified masculine viewer, dominant forms of cinematic 
'reality' and structures of desire in order to take apart 
patriarchal cinematic Ilanguage', feminist deconstructionist film 
is an important response to the notion that for those marginalized 
by dominant culture, a sense of identity as constructed through 
impersonal and social relations of power (rather than a sense of 
identity as a reflection of an inner 'essence') has been 
present. 73 Accordingly, I have much sympathy with Waugh's 
contention that labelling feminist cultural theory and practice 
'postrm)dernist' can elide very real political differences between 
feminist and other theorists (who understand language and 
representation in terms of decentring, free play, aporia and 
'gaming'). For instance, as I shall proceed to argue, Lyotard's 
postmodernist 'agenda' is a problematic one for feminism, and to 
equate them uncritically runs a high risk of effacing feminism's 1- 
stake' in debates on the meaning of postmodernist subjectivity and 
identity. It is worth recalling Adrienne Rich's warning that 
'naming' is in itself a political act: 
Whatever is unnamed, undepicted. in images, whatever is 
omitted from biography, censored in collections of 
letters, whatever is mis-named. as something else, made 
difficult to come by, whatever is buried in the memory by 
the collapse of meaning under an inadequate or lying 
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language 
- 
this will become not merely unspoken but 
unspeakable. 74 
More importantly, Waugh's resistance to the act of appropriation or 
'mis-naming' performed by sliding feminism under the postmodernist 
label is founded on a refusal to cede the position that it is 
feminism which recognizes the political 
- 
rather than simply 
theoretical 
- 
implications of the extent to which 'subjectivity is 
constructed through the institutional dispositions of relations of 
power as well as those of fictional convention'. 75 
For feminist, as much as for leftist/Marxist critics, the 
rejection of the autonomous space of 'purely' aesthetic knowledge 
which is entailed by the imperative to 'rationalize' artistic 
knowledge, is largely an enabling one, providing the conceptual 
distance for revealing the extent to which the speculative 
narrative constructs its 'object' through historico-epistemological 
exclusions in order to permit film to be art, that is, to be 
Modernist. Instead, from the point of view of cultural production, 
film as visual signification is theorized as social, economic, 
ideological and psychical practice wholly inscribed and embedded 
within dominant relations of power and oppression. Feminism, I 
have argued, is historically and theoretically instrumental in 
delegitimating the Modernist narrative which reduces art to the 
pursuit of medium-specificity. But it would be a mistake, when 
seen from Lyotard's perspective, to rest a definition of 
postmodernism on the politicization of cultural production which 
accarpanies feminist delegitimation of the grand r6cit of 
speculation. Even if it is granted that feminism does effectively 
put an end to the Modernist claims of speculative knowledge, it 
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might well be objected that post-speculative feminism simply 
rejoins the other Modernist metanarrative, that of emancipation- 
Clearly, within Lyotard's framework, such appeal to the recit 
of emancipation cannot be justified since postmodernism must be 
understood without the epistemological certainties derived from 
that narrative as well. Thus, having outlined the conditions under 
which the narrative of speculation is rendered 'bankrupt'2 my next 
task is to investigate how the process of delegitimation contests 
the Modernist notion of film as legitimated by the narrative of 
emancipation. 
For feminism, this is by far the more problematic line of 
enquiry set in motion by the central thesis of The Postmodern 
Condition. But to understand why the narrative of liberty can no 
longer be justified as a model for emancipatory aesthetics, and why 
feminism must take its delegitimation seriously, the 
epistemological foundations of the emancipatory metanarrative need 
to be established more fully. Accordingly, the next Chapter will 
address the 'rationality imperative' sustaining avant-garde 
knowledge as the 'instrument' of liberty, and establish its 
relationship to Modernist constructions of the 'social bond'. This 
should serve to locate a consideration of the consequences of 
Lyotard's theory of postmodernism as a condition of multiplicity 
and fragmentation for the epistemological models of the social bond 
underlying feminist theories of avant-garde practice. From these 
issues, I would suggest, the question emerges most urgently: does 
the loss of metanarrative models of the social bond necessarily 
entail the loss of the means to emancipation? 
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NOM: CHAFM TMUM 
1. Christine Lindey Is study of the rise of American 
Abstractionism from initially oppositional critique of consumer 
Capitalism to High Art 'offical avant-garde' provides an 
interesting parallel to the ideological consequences of identifying 
I radical' in the mathematical sense with 'radical' in the sense of 
political critique. My point is that the pursuit of 'specificity' 
and the political function of critique should not be conflated when 
they actually imply quite distinct meanings for the term 'avant- 
prde' under the narrative of speculation: the two senses of 
radical' should not, therefore, be automatically conjoined. See 
Lindey, Art in the Cold War: from Vladivostock to Kalamazoo 1945-62 (London: The Herbert Pressq 19-90T. - 
ni sm and the Avant-Garde 
2. B. Ruby Rich, 'In the Name of Feminist Film Criticism'. 
Jump Cut, 19 (1979), in ed. P. Steven, Jump Cut Antho (1985)9 
pp. 209-30. 
3. Annette Kuhn, Women's Pictures: Feminism and Cinema (1982)9 p. 4. The major theoretical issues raised by attempts to 
reconcile feminist with Marxist thought can be found in Feminism 
and Materialism: Women and Modes of Production co-edited by Kuhn & 
Wolpe (London: RKP, 1978) and the special ediEion of Feminist 
Review on Socialist Feminism (1984). See also Michelle Barrett, 
Women's Oppression Today: (London: Verso, 1980) and Coward & Ellis, 
Language and Materialism (1977). Similarly, radical separatist 
positions can be found in eds. Koedt/Levine/Rapone, Radical 
Feminism, (New York: Quadrangle Bookes, 1973); Adrienne Rich 
'Compulsory heterosexuality and lesbian existence' in eds. Snitow/ 
Stansell/Thompson, Desire: The Politics of Sexuality (London: 
Virago, 1983); and Sheila Jefferie's, Anti-Climax (London: Women's 
Press, 1990). 1 have intentionally restricted definition at this 
stage to the Anglo-American feminist 'tradition' derived from 
liberal-humanism at the expense (amongst others) of French feminism 
as propounded by H61ene Cixious, Luce Irigary and Julia Kristeva (concerned with language, semiotics and textuality rather than 
political reformism and social change): I have some difficulty in 
establishing much common ground between the two groups, on both 
theoretical and political counts. A useful English language 
introduction to French feminism is edited by Elaine Marks & 
Isabelle de Courtivron New French Feminisms (New York: Harvester, 
1981). See Toril Moi's Sexual7T--extual Politics (1985) for an 
examination of this issue. 
5. The term 'objective alliance' is taken from Laura Mulvey's 
article 'Feminism, Film and the 'Avant-Garde"g originally 
published in Frameworkq 10 (1979)9 pp. 3-10 and reprinted in ed. M. 
Jacobus, Women Writingg Writing About Women (London: Croom Heim, 
1979)9 pp. 177-95* 
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ith ImaRes of 6. See Griselda Pollock, 'WMt's Wrong wi 
Women? ', Screen 
- 
Education, 24: Autumn (1977)9 pp. 25-33, and 
Elizabeth Cowie, 'Women, Re esentation and the Image1q, Screen 
Education, 23: Summer (1977T, pp. 15-23. 'Tmees' criticism in 
literary studies provides a methodological parallel in analysing 
how female characters were represented in male-authored texts in 
terms of stereotypes subjected to the exercise of male power. 
Seminal texts here are Mary Ellman's Thinkin About Women (New 
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CHAPIER FOUR 
POSIMDERNISM AND DELEGITIMTION: 
THE NARRATIVE OF LIBERTY 
I have argued that the emergence of feminism is crucial to the 
process by which speculative Modernism loses its claim to validate 
the production of Modernist film. Lyotard's theory of the 
delegitimation of the recit of liberty, it will be recalled 
from Chapter One, rests primarily with the dissolution of the 
'social bond' that the metanarrative specifies as the philosophical 
grounding for the production of modern knowledge. He argues that 
discourses on society 
- 
the relations between individuals and the 
social whole 
- 
since the nineteenth century have been governed by 
two 'basic representational models': 
a) Derived from Comte and early French sociology in which society 
is understood to form an organic whole 'in the absence of which it ceases to be a society (and sociology ceases to have an 
object of study)'; (Pcý P. 11) 
b) Derived from Marx and analyses of emergent capitalism which 
conceives of society as fundamentally and irreconcilably split between two opposing classes and driven by class struggle, the 
motor force of historical change. 
Although diametrically opposed on most other counts, these two 
mc)dels may now be understood as Modernist constructions of social 
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explanation and their status as such must be questioned. Most 
importantly, it is the function of knowledge within the two models 
that offers the quickest route to the core of postmodernist 
rejection of the metanarratives. Exemplifying the firstq Talcott 
Parson's functional sociology develops organic unity into a comept, 
of society determined by 'systemic self-regulation'. In his 
description, 'the most essential condition for successful dynamic 
analysis is a contirwal and systematic reference of every problem 
to the state of the system as a whole'. Thus a 'process or set of 
conditions either 'contributes' to the maintenance (or development) 
of the system or it is 'dysfunctional' in that it detracts from the 
integration, effectiveness, etc., of the system' (PCq p. 12). 
Lyotard's characterization of Parsonian unitotality by its concept 
of society as a 'stable' system suggests two ways in which the 
function of knowledge can be envisaged. Firstly, optimistically 
which 'corresponds to the stabilization of the growth economies and 
societies of abundance under the aegis of the modern welfare 
state'. Furnishing the political enterprises of liberal 'social 
engineering', Parsons' analysis rests on the given of a 'harmony 
between the needs and hopes of individuals or groups and the 
functions guaranteed by the system' (PC, p. 11). 1 The second 
version of functionalism offers to explain the contemporary 
explosion of information technologies as evidence of knowledge 
functioning as a contributory component of a 'hard' technocratic 
totality; as Lyotard points out, this comes very near to defining a 
purely performative or 'cybernetic' system in which knowledge as 
tecbnology is legitimated by the system's operative requirements 
(power and control relations of inefficent/efficient, min' 
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input-maximum output): 
Even when its rules are in the process of changing and 
innovations are occurring, even when its dysfunctions (such as strikes, crises, unemployment, or political 
revolutions) inspire hope and lead to the belief in an 
alternative, even then what is actually taking place is 
only an internal readjustment, and its result can be no 
more than an increase in the system's 'viability'. The 
only alternative to this kind of performance improvement 
is entropy, or decline. 
(PC, pp. 11-12) 
The Marxian conception, however, offers a critical model to 
counteract the 'cynical' schema of a functional totality whose very 
effectivity offers little in the way of hope or optimism to those 
who aspire to make socio-political/economic challenges to the 
functioning of that totality. 2 In contrast, Marx's oppositional 
model proposes that dialectical conflict is inherent in social 
structure and that each historical mode of production (relations 
and forces of production, mode of ownership and exchange) contains 
revolutionary potential for class struggle against oppression, 
exploitation, and alienation. The 'end of history' thesis entailed 
by an emancipatory telos projects its historical completion in the 
emergence a non-divided social structure (Particularly within the 
state-political discourses of Marxist-Leninist thinking), and 
posits a future 'communist' condition of non-reified labour and 
non-alientated human self-identity. Prior to the final transition 
from socialism to properly unitotal coauunism, the bifurcated model 
of society in classical Marxist social theory should not be 
understood as an absolute split. Even where the radical force of 
I vulgar' deterministic-analyses have been sophisticated (as in 
Althusser's shift of transformative capacity from economic base to 
'relatively autonomous' sphere of 'superstructural' ideology)q some 
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non-reducible concept of social totality must remain in tact in 
order for a relational conflict to make any senseq structural 
causality notwithstanding. 3 Without this final determinantg the 
critical model is I blurred to the point of losing all of its 
radicality'; the emancipatory project founders and is 'reduced to 
the status of a "utopia" or "hope"' (PC, p. 13). 
It is true that Lyotard's terms are drawn very broadly indeed 
though his characterization of Parsonian and Marxist social models 
as 'unitotal' is valid. The loss of the metanarrative concept of 
social 'totality' has profound consequences for the way in which 
the political function of aesthetic knowledge is conceived. In 
order to specify more clearly how film is legitimated (and then 
delegitimated) as Modernist emancipatory knowledge under the grand 
r6cit of liberty, a wider consideration of postmodernist critiques 
of the relations between the social bond and the 'use' of film is 
required. This should serve to locate an inquiry into feminism's 
place within the modernist/postmodernist divide which Lyotard's 
post-narrative schema seems to suggest, and then to situate some 
observations on why I think Lyotard actually fails to capitalize on 
the 'space' cleared by the loss of metanarratives and resorts 
instead to Modernist notions of the role of the avant-garde. 
Instnnmtality and the Use of Aestheti 
Frcxn the perspective of critical knowledge, performative film 
ran be crudely equated with f ilms that increase or maintain the 
functioning of the social system. Againg Althusser's formulation 
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of a critical function for aesthetic knowledge is important for 
highlighting the divergent concerns of the two Modernist views of 
the social bond. At the cost of conceptual sophistication but to 
the gain of brevity, Althusser's theory of ideology can be 
summarized for my present purposes as follows: 
a) ideology is a system of material production with a high degree 
of autonomy from raw economic relations but which is concerned 
with the production and reproduction of capitalist social 
relations; 
b) ideology in general is an 'omni-historical reality... present 
in the same form throughout what we call history (history of 
class societies)': it ýs the necessary precondition of specific 
or concrete ideologies ; 
the effectivity of ideology is not secured on the terrain of 
state repressive institutions 
- 
the police or military 
- 
but 
operates through 'ideological state apparatuses' 
- 
schools 
church, the family and the media 
- 
which work to 'produce 
imaginary social relations in place of knowledge of the 
objective relations of capitalist class existence; 
d) as opposed to 'subject-less' science, ideology is subject- 
centred and effects a 'misrecognition of real relations' 
through the function '(which def ines it) of 'constituting' 
concrete individuals as concrete subjects' by 'hailing' or 
interpellating subjects as subjects of/to ideological 
misrepresentation. 
. 
My reading of Althusser's theory of ideology has clearly stressed 
its role in securing the social relations of production; in this, 
ideology which might be fairly described as a functional 
- 
even 
performative 
- 
social mechanism which, when successfulq increases 
capitalism's efficiency by producing a workforce largely 
unconscious of their 'real' conditions of labour exploitation and 
alienated subjectivity. Several theoristshave argued that 
Althusser's theory of ideology is so profoundly functional that it 
is very dif f icult to f ind space within this schema f or the social 
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praxis that Marxism is founded upon. 5 In fairness? howeverg it is 
true that Althusser does at least attempt to address the question - 
under what conditions is it possible for interpellated subjects to 
become concrete individuals capable of acting outside of mis- 
representation i. e. how can non-ideological knowledge be produced? 
partial though highly problematic answer can be found in 
Althusser Is propositions regarding the cognitive capacity of 
critical or 'authentic art' to rupture everyday or 'lived' 
ideological relations by 'making visible' (donner a voir), 'by 
establishing a distance fr(xn it, the reality of the existing 
ideologyl 
, 
transfixing it so that we might see its operations at 
6 
work'. The disruptive function of 'authentic art' is clearly 
derived fran Brecht's theory and practice of epic theatre7 though 
Althusser adapts his premiss within a Lacanian framework: 
materialist art must be concerned with breaking the ideological 
circuit of identification in which the spectator is interpellated 
as 'humanist' individual, as autonomous and self-possessed Absolute 
Subject, and thus prevented from grasping the material and social 
conditions which constitute the historical subject. I do not wish 
to rehearse well-worn debates on whether, for instance, Althusser's 
work on Cremonini as a 'painter of the abstract', of 'determinate 
absences', is a convincing analysis of how such radical 
dissociation from ideology is effected. I am more interested in 
his founding assertion that art is a 'specific' form of cognition: 
Art (I mean authentic art, not works of an average or 
mediocre level) does not give us a knowledge in the 
strict sense, it therefore does not replace knowledge (in 
the modern sense: scientifc knowledge), but what it gives 
us does nevertheless maintain a certain specific 
relationship with knowledge. This relationship is not one 
of identity but one of difference. 6 
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Occupying a mediating ground between 'imaginary' representati ons of 
the Real, and knowledge of the true cDnditions of the Real gained 
through materialism as a 'scierre', art's specificity resides in 
its capacity for internal disruption or distantiation from 
ideology. This is entirely consonant with my earlier assessment of 
Althusser's role in challenging accounts of art's specificity in 
purely speculative terms (art as art specific knowledge). But 
Althusser's account troubles me on two counts. Firstly, the fact 
that a category of the aesthetic is maintained at all. Tony 
Bennett9 is right to point out that Althusser's claims to cognitive 
specificity for authentic art actually contradict the more 
materialist/Russian Formalist assertion that there 'is' no 
essential category of art as such; Althusser does not transcend the 
problematic of bourgeois aesthetics because 'authentic art' is 
essentially predefined and thus excepted from historical analysis 
of cultural productions according to their specific and concrete 
relations between the 'relatively autonomous' spheres of the 
economic, the ideological and the political. Secondly, my point 
would be to question the circularity of Althusser's attempt to 
secure a critical function for art. If art makes us ' see' 
'conclusions without premisses', whereas knowledge makes us 
penetrate into the mechanisms which produce 'conclusions' out of 
the 'premisses', what kind of cognitive status does authentic art 
really have? 10 Althusser argues that art can provide critical 
knowledge only because it is differentiated from ideology through 
its capacity to distantiate the subject f rom the imaginary 
experience of lived reality i. e. through its specificity as a mode 
of cognition. But where does art's specificity really reside if it 
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is 'authentic' only when the 'knowledge' it offers coincides (or 
represents through the absences which structure it) knowledge 
alr supplied by historical materialism as 'science'? In other 
words, art's relative autonomy vis-a-vis both science and ideology 
is illusory since its knowledge cannot be 'perceived' without the 
viewer being already cognizant of the principles of Marxist 
philosophy and theory: 
Like all knowledge, the knowledge of art ? resupposes a 
preluininary rupture with the language of ideological 
span ' and the constitution of a body of scientific 
concepts to replace it. It is essential to be conscious 
of the necessity for this rupture with ideology to be 
able to undertake ? ie constitution of the edifice of a 
knowledge of art. 
Althusser is insistent upon the fact that aesthetic works cannot in 
themselves supply direct knowledge of the subject's ideological 
misrepresentation, nor the means for arriving at the 'premisses' of 
historical materialism. Similarly, ideology cannot furnish the 
means for its own critique so how can art's disruptive and hence 
critical function become apparent without the prior interpretative 
schema in place? In short, aesthetic knowledge has no 
specificity; it is reduced to the status of a supplement and its 
relation to knowledge is made transparent. 
Within Marxist thought, the idea that knowledge must be 
effective as a 'weapon' in the class struggle is crucial to its 
critical endeavour. But from Lyotard's analysis this 'given' of 
critical thinking under the narrative of liberty is made highly 
questionable and provides a starting point for its delegitimation. 
If knowledge is legitimate as knowledge if and only if it coincides 
with the requirements of the critical projer-t, knowledge becomes a 
tool or instrument in the project of emancipation, that is, 'used 
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in one way or another as aids in programming the system' (PC, p. 
13)o 
From a post-narrative viewpoint, it becomes apparent that 
power and domination are perbaps inevitably secreted within the 
I emancipatory' model which demands that aesthetic knowledge be 
instrumental in the name of the People. Lyotard is fully alert to 
the underlying danger of making knowledge functional for the 
overall critique of alienated society and this centres on the 
'instrumentality' that its unititotal perspective commands. 
Stephen White's analysis 'Post-structuralism and Political 
Reflection' would suggest that there are good grounds for placing 
Lyotard within post-structuralist thinking. 12 Like Derrida, de Man 
and Foucault, Lyotard is highly sensitive to the political 
consequences of cognitive schemas which depend on metaphysical 
binaries. The general strategy for deconstructing binarism: 
*9. takes what is claimed to be authoritative, logical, 
and universal and breaks those claims down, exposing 
arbitrariness, ambiguity, and conventionality 
- 
in short, 
exposing a power1ghenomenon where it was claimed only 
reason existed* 
Applying this to Althusser, I would suggest that he retains the 
category of authentic art as knowledge only to the extent that it 
is 'useful' to the critical project of emancipation, and art which 
does not perform this function is consigned to the performative 
sphere of ideology. At the State/political level, Lyotard is 
wholly justified in arguing that the telos of emancipated 
unitotality can be forced to slide into totalitarian repression. 
One should not have to point to the very real historical 
manifestations of national-political totalitarian regimes 
legitimated by the principle of Marxist unitotality in the 
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twentieth century 
- 
the USSR, the People's Republic of Chinag 
Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Xlbaniaq East 
Germany 
- 
to appreciate that Lyotard's characterization of 
totalizing discourses in terms of 'terror' should extend far beyond 
a concern for mere language games: knowledge legitimation, as he 
constantly reminds the reader, is inextricable from its State 
political social embodiments. 
It may still be possible to object that these are extreme 
manifestations of totalizing discourse and do not challenge the 
emancipatory aspirations of Western European liberal democracies. 
However, I find Lyotard particularly persuasive in his proposition 
that even the mildest forms of unitotality, such as consensus, 
share a canpulsion to instrumentalize; this is especially important 
for grasping what the concept of post-narrativity means in terms of 
the grounding of aesthetic knowledge. 
With regard to contemporary theories based on the normative 
legitimacy of consensus, Habermas once again provides the material 
for deconstructive strategies employed to dismantle the 
hierarchical terms of privileged/devalued binaries 
- 
felicitous/non-felicitous, serious/fictive, just/unjust which 
inform his conception of a language pragmatics that will eventually 
culminate in the socialg political and ethical condition of 
intersubjective communicative rationality. I do not have space 
here to do more than indicate the main outlines of Habermas's 
theory which are useful primarily for setting the terms of 
Lyotard's critique. It is interesting, as Scott Lash has noted, to 
observe that Habermas begins from the same premiss as post- 
structuralism, namely, that 'language, not consciousness, is the 
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human differentia specifica': 
Unlike the empirical realism of the early Wittfenstein, 
for whom language I replaces 
consciousness as a mirror of 
nature', Habermas s signifiers do not directly latch on 
to referents in the real world... Habermas eschews any 
notion of 'sign', in which the signifier stands in for a 
natural connection with signified or concept. 
Understanding in communication between interlocutors is 
brough about instead through an attachment of signifier 
to signifed that is conventional and rule-bound. The only 
disparity with Saussure 
- 
and there is arguably no 
disparity with Eco 
- 
is that rules replace the play of 
differene 14of elements, and focus is on instead of 
language. 
But Habermas is obviously not going to follow the line of Derridean 
theories of language which stress instead its radical instability 
and open-endedness. After Searle and Austin, Habermas takes a 
pragmatic view of language as consisting of speech acts, capable of 
co-ordinating and performing social actions; it is the rule-bound 
nature of speech-acts which permits them to be utilized for the 
project of 'harmonizing' discourse towards the goal of 
cammicative rationality. White observes that for Habermas: 
.. 
what is seminal about Austin's work is that it ý1*scovered 
'a mechanism of action coordination in the 
illocutionary binding force (Bildungskraft] of linguistic 
utterance'. For this binding-force to take hold in 
everyday practice, speech must be subject to certain 
limitations. 'These limitations, under which 
illocutionary acts develop an action-cordinating force 
and release action-relevapp consequences, define the 
sphere of normal speech. " 
Such statements are a deconstructionist's dream and White is not 
slow to point out how 'normal' speech (which 'co-ordinates action 
in the world') is functional only by excluding 'fictive' speech 
which is partially suspended from performing this role. Habermas 
argues that fictive speech is not concerned with validity claims in 
the manner of normal or ordinary speech. Here: 
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[The] neutralization of the binding force unburdens the 
disempowered illocutionary acts from the decision 
pressure of tive everyday practice- it suspends 
the sphere of ordinary speech and empowers 
tspeech] for 
the playful creation of new worlds - or rather: for the 
pure demonstration of the world-di losing power of 
ative linguistic expressions, 
fg 
This opens up three possible critiques. 
The first is local in that deconstruction would question the 
secondarity of fictive (poetic, artistic, metaphoric) speech to 
normal or serious speech utterance. One could employ Derridals 
strategies in 'White Mythologies' to argue with White that 'action 
co-ordination is ultimately held together by nothing but fictions 
whose fictionality has been forgotten', and that the separation is 
an arbitrary one. 17 
The second critique follows on fran this and relates to the 
fact that fictive language is granted only a suspension of 
'counterpressure from the confirming process of practice in the 
world'. The definition of artistic expression as a space for 
'playful creation' and the purity of its capacity to disclose 
'worlds' must be questioned because the space of free-play for 
innovation is made conditional on the prior criterion of 
contributing to the development of consensual intersubjectivity. 
This should alert any post-structualist to the mechanisms by which 
programmes for social justice are metadiscursively underwritten by 
some form of coercion and control. 
The third critique inevitably follows on from those preceding 
and centres on the role (and by implication the kind) of aesthetic 
knowledge Habermas is proposing. As already noted, Habermas's 
project of modernity can be completed only when aesthetic 
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experience is fully integrated into a 'practical discourse' 
(Diskurs) which would equally conjoin political, ethical, practical 
and cognitive knowledge in a unified experience for the subject. 
Thus against Lyotardq the specificity and variety of language games 
(denotativet prescriptive, performative, etc. ) are thus subsumed by 
a consensual metadiscourse which demands that the legitimacy of any 
statement resides in its contribution to emancipation and that 
justice results from the 'regularization of permitted moves in all 
language games' (PC, pp. 105-06). In proposing a system of social 
justice based on means-ends consensus (a horizon that Lyotard 
argues is never reached) Habermas closes down the heterogeneity of 
the language 'moves' that Lyotard contends constitute the 
cmuninication networks of which individuals are 'nodal points'. 
Hence it is not just Habermas's adherence to a teleology of 
emancipation that renders him suspect but that the means to this 
universally rational end are either in White's phrase 'subtly 
impositional''or, according to Lyotard's construction of postmodern 
social pragmaticsý a disguised form of 'terror', which despite its 
declared intention coerces knowledge to become 'transparent', to 
perform. Dumm accurately identifies the risk entailed by making 
aesthetic-expressive and moral-practical spheres into resources for 
learning: 
... 
the aesthetic dimension must be structured by 
Habermas so as to enable a kind of learning to take 
place. The substance of this learning is 'to make 
subjects more reflective in relation to who or what is 
structuring the interpretation of their 
Bedurfnisnatur'... this discipline of self-reflection is 
engaged in a project that might render the self more and 
more trayparent. and, hence, accessible to instruments of 
control. 
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Lyotard charges Habermasq and by extension any other theorist who 
founds the concept of critical knowledge upon the ground of its 
'use' value, with 'ravaging the heterogeneity of the play of 
language' in the name of instrumental rationality. It is possible 
to venture, then, that the Modernist emancipatory recit is 
subject to postmodernist delegitimation because of its sustaining 
'instrumental imperative' which regulates and controls the sphere 
of the aesthetic as use-value. More importantly for my analysis, 
postmdernist rejection of the narrative of liberty also seeks to 
demnstrate that instrumental aesthetics are 'terroristic' in the 
sense that they depend for their effectivity upon homangenized, 
conceptions of the social bond. White draws an interesting 
conclusion from his examination of Habermas and post-structuralist 
critiques: 
Post-structuralism is not satisfied with extracting the 
admission that a theorist's cognitive machinery is linked 
to nonfoundationalist norms or conventions. Rather it 
turns its analysis immediately to the way in which these 
norms or conventions are 'produced by acts of exclusion'. 
In short, it is always concerned to chart the points at 
which any cognitive machinery or norms for coordinating 
action 
- 
constructed under the pull or responsibility to 
act 
- 
simultaneously and necessarily create and 
marginalize an Other. 19 
This seems to be the most appropriate point at which to ask the 
fundamental question of where feminism is to be located within the 
debates surrounding political projects which 'reify art into a 
resource'? If, as I have argued, the project of avant-gardes under 
the metanarrative of liberty is sanctioned by an instrumental 
rative and also demands the construction of a homogeneous 
I social bond', is the feminist 'use' of film similarly open to 
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Lyotard's charge of 'terrorism'? In my view, the primary issue of 
whether feminism can sustain its political project against post- 
structuralist critiques of the subject must be addressed f or it is 
here that the most far-reaching challenges to Modernist 
emancipatory legitimation of film can be gauged. The next section, 
then, will be concerned to assess how far feminism is also 
- licated in those 'acts of exclusion' which ma ginalize the 
Other, and will follow through to consider how postmodernist calls 
for 'multiplicity' have begun to influence a post-narrative 
politics of fibn spectatorship, 
Feed ni sm, --I- and the Social Bond 
To locate my guiding concern for feminism, film and the 
avant-garde, I must return to the point at which I concluded the 
last Chapter with the proposition that the emergence of feminist 
film theory was highly influential in the delegitimation of 'pure' 
speculative knowledge. Feminist theory and deconstructionist, film 
practice contest the Modernist speculative space f rom which wornen 
are 'absent' as objects of knowledge and trigger off a series of 
questions which clearly reveal the extent to which knowledge 
production is inextricable from power relations: What counts as 
legitimate knowledge? Who can produce knowledge and who can't? 
What is knowledge 'for'? Knowledge of what? In whose name? Such 
critiques were evidently undertaken with the broader aspiration 
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that knowledge of the techniques of oppression would be useful to 
the overall project of producing specifically feminist (i. e. non- 
oppressed) forms of cinematic subjectivity. It should not need 
repeating that post-speculative f eamnism is thus placed back within i' 
the narrative of emancipation as dominant theoretical model. There 
are clearly parallels with Marxist emancipatory discourse: society 
is basically bifurcated according to the social and sexual division 
between men and women who are alienated by the oppressive 
hierarchical categories of masculine and feminine; feminist demands 
for women's emancipation from inequality and oppression are tied to 
the teleology of a potential organization of social relations freed 
from sexist, hierarchical patriarchal domination. Towards that 
end, avant-garde/aesthetic knowledge must be utilized as part of 
the overall project of securing a less oppressive, more just 
society. But the parallel does not hold for long. It is simply 
not possible to obscure the fact that feminism has articulated its 
demands for legitimation as knowledge explicitly a 
homogenous concept of 'the People'. To put this more pointedly, 
second Wave feminist thinking forces a lateral split in the 
constitution of the domain of Modernist knowledges and reveals how 
'human emancipation' implicit in Marxist philosophies of Progress 
had always implied a subjugation and effacement of those who do not 
recognize themselves in the 'humanity' that this phrase implies. 
Establishing that feminism does fracture a monolithic 
oppositional discourse, however, is relatively straightforward and 
the following quotation from Christine Di Stefano neatly situates 
my own analysis of feminism's role in inaugurating an initial split 
in unitotal knowledge: 
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Contemporary Western feminism is firmly located in the 
modernist ethos, which made possible the feminist 
identification and critique of gender... The concept-of 
gender has made it possible for feminists to 
simultaneously explain and delegit3iMize the presumed 
homology between biological and social sex differences. 
At the same time, however, gender (rather than sex) 
differences have emerged as highly significant, salient 
features which do more to divide and distinguish men and 
women from each other than to make them paý6s of some 
larger, complementary, 'humanistic' whole. 
But this raises the tricky issue of whether feminism, in turn, 
doesn't simply replicate the unitotal structure which permits 
critical knowledge for Marxism, and thereby 'risks' being 
implicated in the 'terrorism' of totalizing and 'instrumental' 
thinking. Were this to prove to be the case, then the terms of 
Lyotard's critique would be equally valid if applied to feminist 
claims for emancipatory knowledge, The most concise way towards 
answering this challenge lies in assessing if feminism construes 
its social bond within the parameters of Modernist (Enlightenment) 
epistemlogy, or within anti-epistemological postmodernist/post- 
structuralist philosophy. This has formed the substance of recent 
debates concerning feminism and epistemology, and has brought the 
principle of 'unitotality' to the fore. 
It is as well to be clear what epistemology is, or does. 
Sandra Harding suggests that 'considered frm sociological and 
historical perspective, epistemologies are justificatory 
strategies': like 'moral codes, they present themselves as 
challenging 'might make right' 
- 
this time in the domain of 
knowledge claims'. This should not be mistaken for the claim that 
all epistemologies 'end. up rationalizing the beliefs of the 
powerful' or else 'epistemology would only be an honorific used to 
designate the winners in such struggles'. 21 Both Margareta Halberg 
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and Sandra Harding suggest that a coherent feminist epistemology 
must stake its claim against two 'traditional discourses' 
- 
objectivism and its 'loyal opposition' interpretationism/ 
relativism. 22 Objectivism 
- 
the mainstay of speculative science 
- 
insists that 'scientific claim can be produced only through 
dispassionate, value-free, disinterested, point-of-viewless 
objective inquiry procedures, and that research generated or guided 
by feminist concerns clearly cannot meet such standards'. 23 From 
Stephano's modernist view, it is possible to arrive at the general 
proposition that the concept of gender in relation to epistemology 
and the social bond entails the explicit assumption that there is: 
a) a divisory split between genders through which women are united 
by a common experience as an ef fect of gendering, that there exists 
an essential and irreducible communality between women; which b) 
necessitates the formulation of an epistemology which accounts for 
this difference and, more politically, produces specifically 
feminist knowledge to counter the social dominance of masculine 
ways of thinking, researching and investigating. Modernist 
feminist theories of knowledge thus start from the base point that 
traditional epistemology is male-centred which produces male- 
centred knowledge. In film theory, feminists have successfully 
outlined the inability of male theorists to conceive that sexual 
difference may be at the centre of their analyses (for instance, 
Jacqueline Rose's critique of Comolli's theory of disavowal for its 
non-differentiation between male and female relations to the 
cinematic apparatus; Janet Bergstrom's work on Bellour's theory of 
textual segmentation and the sexual economy of enunciation in 
narrative cinema). 24 Relativism, on the other hand, challenges 
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objectivism from the point of view that 'concepts must be 
understood as relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical 
framework, paradigm, form of life, society, or culture'. 25 This 
would seem to fit feminism's requirements. Relativism, however, 
can be understood in a limited or radical sense, both of which can 
cause huge problems for the project of a feminist epistemology. 
Limited relativism allows feminist challenges to male-centred 
laiawledge on the grounds of higher truth claims (crudely, that 
'better' or 'less false' knowledge ran be Produced if the 
androcentric bias of male knowledge is corrected): 'unless one 
supposes that male-based theories somehow misdescribe reality and 
amsrepresent how things are, it is difficult to make much sense of 
much feminist... criticism'. 26 However, this makes it difficult 
not to fall back into a form of 'feminist objectivism' which would 
lay claim to the truth of feminist analysis measured against male- 
biased knowledge. Both Halberg and Jane Flax have also objected to 
such 'female standpoint theory' for assumptions derived from an 
'uncritical appropriation' of Enlighterunent ideas: 
These include an optimistic belief that people act 
rationally in their own interests and that reality has a 
structure that perfect reason (once perfected) can 
discover... the notion of such a standpoint also assumes 
that the oppressed are not in fundamental ways damaged by 
their social experience. On the contrary this position 
assumes that the oppressed have a privileged (and not just different) relation and ability to comprehend a 
reality that is 'out there' waiting for our 
representation. 27 
Such foundationalist claims are challenged by post-Enlightenment 
thinking on three counts. Firstly, radical relativism takes the 
critique of objectivism to its logical extreme and argues that if 
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'truth' is relatively defined then there is no way of arriving at 
non-relative or objective Truth. A femiijuist standpoint cannot be 
justified without finally appealing to claim for its own 
objectivity; if this objectivity is only relative (to feminism) it 
follows that it cannot take a place as a privileged standpoint but 
is reduced to the status of being just one of many interpretations 
and its claims to explanatory strength are severely weakened. 
Secondly, if feminist epistemology is founded on the existence of 
female subjects constituted 'outside' of representation, it brings 
forth 'all the dichotomies on which Enlightenment epistemology 
rests, including subject/object, rational/irrational, reason/ 
emotion, and language/reality'. Post-structuralist critiques of 
epistemological projects reject the 'presuppositions involved in 
these dichotomies 
- 
the ideas of coherent, unified self, a 
rationalist and individualist model of knowing and the 
possibilities of a metalanguage'. 28 However, in line with my 
inquiry into how the social bond is specified by feminism, the most 
important critique which can be made of attempts to ground feminist 
epistemology in the realm of female experience is that from 
Lyotard's perspective it entails a totalized conception. In Flax's 
view, standpoint theory 'supposes gendered social relations in 
which there is a category of beings who are fundamentally like each 
other by virtue of their sex... it assumes the otherness men assign 
to women. Crucially, Flax continues, feminist standpoint 
epistemology 'assumes that women, unlike men, can be free of 
determination from their own participation in relations of 
domination such as those rooted in the social relations of race, 
class or homophobia'. 29 In other words, the notion of a feminist 
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epistemology cannot be sustained without eradicating differences 
between women and essentializing the heterogeneity of black, Asian, 
lesbian, religiousý geographical and class experience into a non- 
oppressing ideal abstract 
- 
Woman. Halberg corrludes rather 
pessimistically that feminist epistemology is thus an 'impossible 
project': either it accepts its implication in a structure of 
domination and essentializes women into a homogeneous social bond, 
or else it takes the concept of difference to its logical 
conclusion and gives up the idea of a specifically feminist 
knowledge which can satisfactorily address those differences. 
This is an interesting point at which to return to Lyotard. 
It is possible to state that the delegitimation of the 
metanarrative of liberty is fuelled by the demand for legitimation 
itself. Historically, feminism triggers off a series of competing 
claims to legitimation from socially and historically 
underrepresented and oppressed Others. Having opened up the space 
of 'difference', it can be held that feminism is thus subject to 
its own delegitimation by the proliferation of knowledge claims 
made fran the point of view of interest groups who contest the 
homogenizing effects produced by analyses of gender made from a 
highly partial (ethnocentric/heterosexist) perspective. It would 
seem that Halberg sbares Lyotard's postmodernist concern to avoid 
the conceptual snares of enforcing homogeneity upon a heterogeneous 
constituency, and it is clear that anti-foundationalism poses a 
real theoretical problem for feminists who take post-structuralist 
critiques of totalizing thought seriously enough to arrive at the 
conclusion that such splintering is beyond the recuperation of a 
non-totalizing feminist emancipatory discourse. 
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How, then, does the preceding excursus on debates in feminist 
epistemology relate to the political project sustaining feminist 
intervention in avant-garde film making? I would argue that the 
issues raised are crucial for grasping that, under the grand recit 
of libertyq aesthetic knowledge and the role of the avant-garde are 
bound to both an instrumental imperative and to a 'terroristic' 
social bond. This has important repercussions for my earlier 
discussion of feminist decxmtructionist cinema and its role in 
delegitimating the narrative of speculation. From this outline, it 
1. %If%^ 
. 
omes possible to see that it does not escape the governing 
conditions of the emancipatory metanarrative and must take its 
place, after all, as a properly Modernist aesthetic. I would 
suggest that the primary source of the Modernism of feminist 
deconstructionism can be attributed to the status accorded to 
psychoanalysis for conceptualizing the negatory work of feminist 
avant-garde practice: Lyotard's strictures against the 
epistemological 'cost' of grand narratives are borne out if 
feminist appropriation of psychoanalysis for film politics is 
understood as fundamentally rooted in an epistemological model of a 
'differerr-e' which is also monolithically the Same. This becomes 
most apparent when versions of Lacanian theory are deployed to 
articulate claims for a feminist cinema which permits women to 
I speak' rather than be 'spoken' for by patriarchal discourse. I 
would hold that theoretical discourses which seek to utilize 
Modernist psychoanalytical models of difference for emancipatory 
knowledge also exert unacknowledged 'totalizing' pressures which 
render them, frcxn a post-narrative position, delegitimate. The 
next section, then, will firstly address how the psychoanalytical 
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paradigm is embedded within the metanarrative of emancipation and, 
secondly, confront the issue of whether feminism can sustain its 
political project against postýstructuralist critiques of 'the' 
female subject for it is here that the most far-reaching challenges 
to Modernist emancipatory legitimation of filin can be gauged. 
Delqýitimation: The Narrative of Liberty 
For explaining the simultaneous repression of female sexuality 
and spectacularization of the female image in dominant cinema, 
psychoanalytical notions of subjectivity and mechanisms of 
identification are very powerfulq particularly for challenging the 
institutionalization of the male Gaze and 'decentring' its claims 
to rationality and power. The destruction of visual pleasure that 
Mulvey and Jobnston propose is the destruction of specifically male 
pleasure which is held to structure dominant narratives as 
narratives of male desire. Feminist deconstructionist film is thus 
bound to the negatory task of re-staging spectatorial desire, in 
order to break with the phallocentric. function of the female image 
within them. Feminist deconstructionism is also concerned to 
articulate a positive programme, and asks: how is it possible to 
film the female body without recapitulating phallocentric, 
inscriptions of women built upon the disavowal of their castrating 
threat? The affirmative aspect of feminist deconstruction is thus 
concerned with the production of a film language of specifically 
female desire, a 'women's language' of visual signification. 
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However, within the terms of Lacanian psychoanalysis, this is 
rendered highly problematic: if the denial of sexual difference is 
at the same time the repression of female desire, Woman, as 
positive term rather than negatively definedq must remain 'the 
umamable, the unsaid'. 30 Mulvey and Jobnson have concluded from 
this scenario that female desire can only be spoken through/by a 
'politics of the unconscious' which must assert sexual difference 
in order to force a rupture 'at the point where the patriarchal 
subject is formed and female desire is repressed: castration,. 31 
In terms associated with Julia Kristeva's theory of the 
relationship between the repression of a pre-Syuibolic semiotic 
realm and the 'feminine, transgression of the patriarchal symbolic 
order must take place within language. Accordingly, feminist 
avant-garde practices must 'work toward dislocating and 
restructuring the symbolic order in order to change the function, 
in the moment of perception of sexual difference, of the entry of 
the third term in the production of the symbolic signifier' thus 
'creating a new subject and a new order of language that will 
assert rather than repress sexual difference'. 32 Mulvey makes a 
direct link between Kristeva's work on poetic language 
(transgression through the 'eruption of linguistic excess, 
involving the pleasure and the 'feminine' directly opposed to the 
logical language and repression endemic to patriarchy'), and her 
own practice in Riddles of the in which pleasure and 
involvement 'are not the result of identification, narrative 
tension or eroticized femininity, but arise from surprising and 
excessive use of the camera, unfamiliar framing of scenes and the 
# 33 human body 
, 
Mulvey and Wollen use a panoply of Anti 
-217- 
Illusionist teckmiques for dislocating the female spectator's 
relation to the psycho-sexual economy of the film text: 
... 
separations between form and content, division of the 
text into seven sections, use of the single circular (360 
degrees) camera movements for single scenes to build up 
the woman's story as a series of tableaux... a mixture of 
theory ang4fiction9 purely visual elements and exposition 
of ideas. 
For Doane, the use of circular movernents 'effects a continual 
displacerrm! nt of the gaze which 'catches' the woman's body only 
accidently 
, 
amentarily 
, 
refusing to hold or f ix her in the f rame' 
thus escaping from the voyeuristic/fetishistic function of the 
female image in dominant cinema. 35 The political value of such 
film forms to feminism is premissed on the Kristevan notion that 
only new languages can produce new subjects. Through the use of 
Anti-illusionist strategies, a filmic experience of the dis- 
integration, in-coherence and fracturing of phallocentrically- 
defined subjectivity is considered a necessary prelude to the 
female viewer's critical reconstruction of a politicized feminist 
subjectivity. Yet, despite the apparently liberatory promise of 
such formulations, I am interested in teasing out the means by 
which feminist deconstructionism is enmeshed with the 'terrorism' 
of the grand recit of emancipation. 
Approaching this proposition firstly from a general angle, 
several critics have questioned the political value of 
psychoanalytic avant-gardism, to feminism and have argued that it is 
extremely limited where it leads feminist film makers to work under 
A. I- 
- 
the Kristevan assumption that the only 'site' open for a non- 
repressed, even 'authentic' female voice is negative, that is, 
outside of logic, representation and narrative order per se. This 
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is a whollY justifiable conclusion to arrive at from within a 
Lacanian perspective which holds that the perception of sexual 
difference, forced by the threat of castration and the acquisition 
of language, are the conditions of entry into the realm of the 
Symbolic; that, in other words, rational language is itself 'male'. 
In her critique of Riddles of the Sphinx, Judith Williamson objects 
to the danger inherent in the deconstructionist tactic of 
subverting the cultural value-ladenness of symbols. The sphinx, 
she argues: 
... 
can be seen as part of a strategy intended to evoke 
mystery and an image of inscrutable womanhood, as a 
preliminary to their 'deconstruction' with the later role 
of the Sphinx as speaking subject: 'she' is given a 
voice. But this involves a fundamental misconception: you 
don't dispel a myth by trying to make it speak, or reject 
an image by giving it a voice with which to deny itself. 
The film undercuts its own strategy, by not recognizing 
that the power of the image of Female Mystery is so 
strong that it functions in the most traditional way and 
is too strong to be undercut bX anZoLng later in the 
film 
- 
even if this were intended. " 
The use of the image of the Sphinx, and structuring of the film 
around 'femaleness' as the 'riddle' which cannot be answered, also 
carries the inherent risk of intensifying dominant social and 
cultural meanings of femininity which most feminists vehemently 
reject: women 'not only have a mystical, symbolic, irrational 
speech: it is shown as being unintelligible even to themselves' and 
the 'introduction expressly describes the Sphinx as "disordering 
logical categories"'. All this 'justifies the prevailing view of 
women's bounteous, timeless unreason and is completely complicit 
with the image of women which is inscribed in male rational 
discourse as the representation of its opposite'. 
37 My own viewing 
of the film produced a similar reading. The film cannot escape 
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from proposing the following 'equation': the Sphinx = Mystery = 
Irrational = Unconscious = Women = Unintelligibility. Williamson 
is acute in pointing out that perpetuating the division between 
Oedipus/Male/Conscious v. Sphinx/Female/Unconscious is to remain 
within the terms that exclude women from the order of rationality 
and cultural power. It must here remain an open question if such a 
conclusion is the inevitable result of feminism's engagement with 
irredeemably phallocentric Freudian and Lacanian theory. 38 
However, it is important to note that other feminist film theorists 
have challenged the phallocentrically-defined processes of sexual 
differentiation proposed by them, and have called for a revaluation 
within psychoanalysis of the 'absent' figure, the place of the 
castrated Mother. This revision, it is argued, might produce a 
critical film form that, for Kaplan, will 'represent the start of a 
new language, a new Syabolic Law'. Mothering 'has been repressed 
in patriarchy but may, for that reason, provide a gap through which 
women can begin to assert their voices and find a subjectivity': 
The domination of women by the male gaze is part of 
patriarchal strategy to contain the threat that the 
mother embodies, and to control the positive and negative 
impulses that memory traces of being mothered have left 
in the male unconscious. Women, in turn, have learned to 
associate their sexuality with domination by the male 
gaze, a position involving a high degree of masochism in 
finding their objectification erotic... Female sexuality 
has been taken over by the male gaze [and] because of 
patriarchy's intricate involvement in heterosexuality, 
its discourse has been able to control female sexuality, 
including lesbian relations. But while Motherhood has of 
course been annexed by the symbolic. 9 Kristeva and others have shown that some part remains unviolated, unable to 
be penetrated by patriarchy. This is because, unlike in 
the realm of sexuality, some part of Motherhood lies 
networks, economy. It is outside of patriarchal cone " 
this part that eludes control. 
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Riddles of the Daughter Rite and FreuudL's Dora each 
question the scenario which produces the signification of the- 
Mother as castrated, offering instead a potential space for 
reformulating the male psychical trajectory which provokes the 
'extremity of patriarchal domination of female sexuality' as a 
'reaction to helplessness in the face of the threat that Motherhood 
represents'. 40 However, the suggested 'return' to the Mother has 
also been criticized for its unacknowledged biologism which permits 
women a 'voice' on the condition of identification with a 
bodily/cultural function. Both Williamson and Peter Gidal have 
argued that: 
999 if anything has not been repressed in patriarchy it is Mothering (and the Law of the Symbolic). Mothering as 
constructed in patriarchy is not coincidentally the most 
oppressive, most conventional, position 'for' women. I 
is defining via biologism a place for woman's 'voice'. 
But I want to leave aside both the specific criticism of Riddles 
and internal debates within psychoanalysis centring on a potential 
shift in the Symbolic meaning of the concept of Mother to suggest 
that, even if it were possible to formulate the 'place' of female 
discourse and/or female desire, it would seem that posing the 
original problem in terms of the search for a specifically 
'feminine' discourse cannot avoid falling into the essentializing 
trap that the recit of liberty unwittingly demands. 
Psychoanalytical-feminist deconstruction is clearly predicated upon 
a didactic enterprise which binds it closely to that which I have 
defined as Modernism specified by the narrative of liberty. But it 
is tied to the Modernist metanarrative in a more profound way which 
is highly significant for a reading of its emancipatory 
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strategies: deconstructionist feminism purports to offer a 'new 
language' of female desire but the use of psychoanalysis for 
emancipatory kncwledge within the feminist avant-garde is 
inescapably bound to a Modernist social bond which predetermines 
that female 'liberation' is conditional upon compulsory 
identification with a constituency homogeneously construed. 
Feminist avant-garde practice can thus be defined as Modernist 
where its intended female/feminist audience is conceived within the 
horizon of an idealized homogenous totality of Women (here 
guaranteed by psychical processes which produce female subjects). 
In other words, deconstructionist feminism must accept the risk of 
positioning an abstract or lunitotal' Woman, of claiming to 'speak' 
to and for all women regardless of a series of other pressures 
conditioning spectatorial identification. This is not to suggest 
that psychoanalysis is rendered delegitimate for reasons which are 
hrmanent to it; it is possible to argue that the explanatory power 
of libidinal theories of subjectivity are perfectly adequate to 
account for a bi-polar sexual economy of filmic signification. 
Rather, I am concerned to indicate that Modernist feminist avant- 
garde f ilin and criticism are marked by a tendency to construct 
transformatory practices from the initial assumption of an 
epistemological bond between women which, in this context, is 
guaranteed by the psychical processes which deliver sexually 
differentiated beings* How else is it possible to ground the 
project of a specifically 'feminine aesthetic' without denying 
postmodernist counterclaims that abstract and 'unitotal' concepts 
constitute a foundation for emancipatory knowledge only through the 
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deployment of a totalized 'fiction' which takes for granted an 
irreducible unity between women? 
Returning to my conclusion that 'incredulity' towards the 
grand recit of liberty is fuelled by the demand for legitimation, 
the especial limitations of psychoanalysis for film feminism become 
most apparent at the point at which demands for the recognition of 
a heterogeneous notion of the constituency of feminism (and/or of 
women) are made sirice this clearly demands attention to the 'extra- 
textual' which psychoanalytical theories alone cannot accommodate 
(colour, class, etc. ). The metatheoretical appeal to the notion of 
Motherhood, for instance, is constructed homogeneously which, fran 
the point of view of multiplicity, blocks analysis of the variety 
of modes in which that function is socially and historically 
constituted. In this respect, I find Lyotard's postmodernist 
rejection of epistemological unitotality very useful for grasping 
the ways in which certain feminist film theories are embedded 
within Modernism, and for appreciating that calls for legitimation 
from historically unrepresented Others also demand the most urgent 
revisions of the fundamentally Modernist underpinnings supporting 
early feminist interventions in counter-cinema. In short, the 
feminist avant-garde practices I have discussed have very narrowly 
defined notions of their constituents. I want now to consider how 
this broad epistemological framework also underlies the way in 
which 'emancipatory' relations between film texts, female 
spectators and identification are actually modelled for it is here 
that the 'instrumental' imperative is most clearly manifested. 
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Postmoodernism: The Polid of Fragmentation 
have suggested that what sets feminist deconstructionist 
engagement with film apart from the discourses of emancipation 
already documented as Anti-illusionist is that a psychoanalytically 
derived notion of subjectivity does not, indeed cannot, appeal to 
an extra-textual and 'neutral' spectator. To posit subjectivity in 
terms of self-possessed individuality would be to deny at once the 
prior functioning of psycho-textual structures at work in the 
construction of oppressive gendered subjectivity. lbus, to avoid 
the pitfalls already noted of tying a specifically 'feminine' 
discourse to preexistent biological difference, Lacan's emphasis on 
language as a system which produces rather than represents sexual 
difference is observed. In Elizabeth Cowie's view, it is then 
possible to theorize 'woman' 'not as a given, biologically or 
psychologically, but as a category produced in signifying 
practices': 'what must be grasped in addressing women and film is 
the double problem of the production of woman as a category and of 
the film as a signifying system'. 42 Taking this further, 
Jacqueline Rose holds that Lacants theory must be taken to mean 
that there can be 'no pre-discursive reality': 
... 
in so far as it is the order of language which 
constructs sexuality around the male term, or the 
privileging of that term which shows sexuality to be 
constructed within language, so this raises the issue of 
women's relatioý ýp to that language and that sexuality 
simultaneously. 
Despite the slippage in Rose's terminology which actually suggests 
that women have a 'relationship' to male language and sexuality 
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(i. e. that 'women' is a category of meaning which already pre- 
exists linguistic/sexual construction), 44 this position supports 
the transgressive aesthetic of psychoanalytic formalism by making 
textuality the 'point of production' of sexually differentiated 
subject positions, of masculine/feminine. Understood in this way, 
it is evident that this formulation marks a shift from the earlier 
feminist notion that cinematic language is sexually coded to the 
quite different proposition, that sexual difference is actually 
produced by/through/in the enunciation of cinematic language. If, 
then, female subjectivity is a determined effect of/by film 
language, it follows that transgressing the dominant mode of that 
positioning must also be a matter of inscrib the spectator as an 
ef fect of textual organization. What does this imply for 
text/spectator relations if measured against Lyotard's 
postmodernist resistance to instrumentality? If psychoanalysis is 
vital to feminism for empbasizing the 'activity of reading, of 
seeing film as a textual practice rather than an autonomous object 
of study or consumption, 45, in its Modernist form it is nonetheless 
questionable what degree of 'activity' is being permitted to f emale 
spectators. The use of Anti-illusionist techniques appear to of fer 
the film reader a creative role in the construction in the 
I meaning' of the text but, within a psychoanalytical framework, 
this is to a large extent illusory. I would suggest instead that 
the 'use' of avant-garde aesthetics as instrument in the service of 
feminist politics finds its corollary in an exclusive concern for 
the enunciation of subjectivity through cinematic language which 
makes spectatorial activity a highly predetermined one, which can 
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problematize positionality and reading as a matter of textual 
enunciation only. Where such conceptual priority is granted to the 
textual production of subjectivity, it is difficult to assess what 
meaningful role spectators are being expected to play; 
deconstructionist, 'recruitment' of female viewers offers little 
activity beyond that of occupying the textually prescribed position 
of idealized Female Spectator. Here, it is held that spectatorial 
identification and positionilty are inscibed into/by the text thus 
the notion of the 'textual' is granted a high degree of autonorny 
and determinacy. In this way, the Modernist film/spectator binary 
which deconstructionist film rejected in structural film 
- 
the 
spectator as autonomousq self-possessed and external to the fihn 
text 
- 
is actually preserved by its reversal (which is not its 
transcendence). Feminist 'use' of instrumental Modernist 
aesthetics requires highly determinate formulations of 
text/spectator relations in order to ensure its political 
effectivity and this, one could argue, is the strength of its 
appeal for feminism. However, one must ask: what could be more 
homogenizing and less emarnipatory than a view of spectatorship 
which objectifies and privileges the notion of 'text' at the 
conceptual expense of the viewer who is given to be sutured into 
the film text as a function of its enunciation? Within the 
'instrumental' parameters of the avant-garde under the 
metanarrative of liberty, female film spectators are offered few 
options beyond accepting a textually prescibed interpellation (as 
Female Subject), or else of refusing the 'politics of displeasure', 
and thereby falling into a politically unacceptable position of 
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seeking 'pleasures' from essentially masochistic and oppressive 
structures of narrative, filmic enunciationg spectacularization of 
female image, and so on. It is worth asking whether the same terms 
which deny wornen access to the pleasures of spectatorship (except 
through masochistic identification) are not here repeated: is not 
the deliberate seeking out of 'displeasure' as advocated by mulvey 
et al. in itself not far removed frcxn that of the masochist? More 
pointedly, the 'instrumentalism' of the either/or choice offered by 
this model brings into question the entire Modernist conceptual 
framework which defines feminist appropriation of psychoanalysis 
for theorizing avant-garde film politics. 
Fr(xn my analysis so far, it is possible to outline the three 
main characteristics which bind feminist deconstructionism to the 
grand recit of liberty: 
a) the 'instrumental' notion of textually inscribed/presr-ribed 
subjectivity which situates female spectators as an effect of 
signification; 
b) an implied dependence on a metanarrative social bond which 
results in the theoretical construction of a homogeneous unity 
1 Woman 1; 
c) the aesthetic of transgression which has sustained the 
emanicipatory Modernist function of the avant-garde. 
It is not easy to split these apart since they are so tightly 
related but I would suggest that the fundamental source of pressure 
for the break-up of Modernist emancipatory models of spectatorship 
stems from demands for legitimation which I have argued sets in 
motion the delegitimation of the gran re"cit of liberty. Thus, 
frcxn a post-narrative perspective, discourses which address and 
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position 'the' spectator as Woman are ambivalently situated; post- 
speculative, certainly, but the delegitimation of the narrative of 
liberty requires theoretical models which respect the proliferation 
of legitimation claims that I discussed as postmodernist 
epistemological claims, and these find no place in the Modernist 
psychoanalytical model of Difference. If a female audience is 
construed homogenously according to an unconscious libidinal 
binary, those factors which differentiate women from each other, 
and which multiply the possibilities of being positioned as a 
female spectator, cannot be represented. Without considering that 
gender positionality is also intersected by social, historical and 
ideological considerations, there is little room for assessing how 
primary psychical sexual differentiation might be socially and 
historically experienced 'differently' for women who are 
diversified by colour, religion, age, sexual orientation, 
education, class and occupation. Placing these claims against 
feminist deconstructionism's 'unitotal' suppositions, it is clear 
that the emergence of a postmodernist politics of 'multiplicity' 
cannot be adequately formulated within the Modernist framework of 
deconstructionism. Hence I want to put forward the proposition 
that the broader terms of the demand for legitimation discussed 
above are directly mirrored within feminist film theory by emergent 
demands. for cinematic representation. The delegitimation of the 
Modernist femiadst rmarrative of liberty must, therefore, be 
accoýied by a radical revaluation of each of the Modernist 
tenets identified above. 
The primary point of departure must be to question the status 
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of psychoanalysis and its use in justifying negatory avant-garde 
strategies of deconstructionist disruption. A few feminist 
theorists have begun this taskq stimulated by the overriding need 
to escape fran the political and theoretical constraints placed 
upon the development of a 'specifically feminist' cinema construed 
within negatory parameters. B. Ruby Rich draws out the impasse 
confronting film makers faced with phallocentric theories which 
leave no space for formulating female subjectivity in positive 
terms: 
According to Mulvey, the woman is not visible in the 
audience which is perceived as male; according to 
Johnston, the woman is not visible on the screen... How 
does one formulate an understanding of a structure that 
insists on our absence even in the face of our presence? 
What is there in a film with which a woman viewer 
identifies? How can the contradictions be used as 
critique. And how do all these factors influence what one 
makes as a woman filipmaker, or specifically as a 
feminist film maker? " 
Similarly, Lesley Stern: 
The conceptualisation of desire, a theorisation of its 
inscription within cinematic language, has been useful 
for understanding the fascination of the cinema in its 
ideological dimension... but in so far as this work is 
still being located within the problematic of castration 
it promotes a politics of neetion. and blocks the 
question of feminine desire. 
I have argued already that the text/spectator model of feminist 
deconstruction is both 'instrumental' and homogenizing: it is more 
relevant at this stage to stress instead that one of the most 
important outcomes of critical engagement with feminist Modernism 
I has been to re-evaluate the fundamental source of such thinking 
- 
the conception that cinematic 'language' is co-extensive with 
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masculinity and that feminist cinema must be founded on 
transgressing that language. Teresa de Lauretis has recently 
argued for a 're-vision' of what she correctly contends has bec(xne: 
the established film-theoretical view of cinematic 
identification, namely that with the look is masculine, 
and identification with the image is feminine... that the 
camera (technology)ý the look (voyeurism), and the scopic drive itself partake of the phallic and thu somehow are 
entities or figures of a masculine nature. 
40 
This fundamental act of 're-vision' has several consequences which 
. 
01 
relate directly to the 'bankruptcy' of the feminist recit of 
emancipation. 
Firstly, a revaluation of the negatory aesthetic of 
transgression which sanctions the deconstructionist project of 
subverting dominant representational practices through 'work on the 
signifer'. Beneath the objections of each critic cited above, one 
can detect a deeper dissatisfaction with the Modernist assumptions 
which have supported the notion that textual strategies for 
destabilizing, for putting the suject 'into crisis', are 
necessarily politically effective. There are actually two distinct 
points at issue here: on the one side, the political objective of 
'decentring' the viewing subject andq on the other, the notion that 
spectatorship is a predominantly textual matter. Lesley Stern's 
review of the 'Feminism and Cinema' Special Event at the Edinburgh 
Film Festival (1979) lucidly draws out the highly problematic 
nature of posing feminism and cinema in terms of the 'politics of 
displeasure', especially in the way that it specifies the audience 
for 'specifically feminist film'. It is important to ask what, for 
instance, becanes of those female spectators who do not possess the 
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necessary reading competence to take displeasure from the 
dislocation and the refusal of representation as demanded by such 
practices? But, more crucially, Stern argues that: 
The viewing subject has to ac 
. 
ertain extent displaced the 
social audience 
- 
both as object of knowledge and site of 
transformation. Heterogeniety has been invoked as a 
conceptual tool to put the subject in crisis 
- 
the 
viewing subject9 the 'subjects' of special events. But 
one gains the impression that the audience for the 
special events has assumed an unquestioned homogeneity in 
part guaranteed by unanimous agreem: Zyt that the subject 
must be put into crisis, decentred. 
Within the context of my argument, this is an important critique as 
it clearly reveals the point at which the Modernist conceptual 
horizon is reached, the principle of 'unitotality' being secreted 
at a highly abstract level: even the radical project of decentring 
the subject cannot escape, at another level, from 'ironically 
ensuring a very safe, central and functional place to the concept 
of the subject as an imaginary category'. 50 That this subject is 
constituted in 'unitotal' terms produces a politics of 
spectatorship which seeks from its viewers what in fact may be 
termed a 'decentred homogeniety'. To women whose 'differences' are 
rendered invisible within the Modernist avant-garde, 'decentring' 
offers little: from this perspective, the objective of putting 
'the' female subject into crisis stands exposed as a cultural 
privilege exercised by those women (predominantly white, 
heterosexual, educated middle-class) whose experience of culturally 
'centred' identity can afford the luxury of 'jouissance' and 
'dispersal'. In other words, to pose the specificity of feminist 
film in terms of the undermining of positionality M 
-, 
g-e is to void 
the polymorphicity of the 'social audience' from the outset. Two 
parallel lines are thus opened for argument, which both bear 
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heavily on the terms of development of a postmodernist feminist 
politics of spectatorship: 
a) for permitting the 'outside' of textual discourse a much 
greater degree of influence in determining that the 'meaning' 
of subjectivity cannot be reduced to a idealized vision of 
viewers as homogenous female subjects. This must entail the 
reformulation of deconstructionist feminism's instrumental, 
text-constructed model of spectatorial inscription; 
b) for recognizing the claims of women who are 'constituted 
1 51 socially, outside the text, in different sets of relations 
, that is, colour, class, economic, and sexual relations. This 
must entail a reworking of the implicit homogeneity of 
Modernist feminism's notion of its constituent audience. 
Following either of these routes, I suggest, will lead to the 
conclusion that the Modernist model of spectatorship (which sets 
itself representation) must be jettisoned to accommodate 
postmodernist demands for representation thus making way for the 
exploration of cinematic forms which do not assume text/spectator 
relations are solely a matter of textual productivity, and which 
are constructive rather than transgressive and deconstructive. 
Whether this is enough in itself to constitute a postmodernist 
politics of feminist f ilm becomes a matter of real contention when 
the second line of argument, concerning the 'multiplicity' of the 
audience of feminist film, is examined. Firstly, however, the 
theoretical potential for constructive feminist cinema needs to be 
explored. 
It must be noted that the concept of spectatorship as formally 
constructed, text-positioned enunciation has frequently and 
cogently been challenged by feminists without having recourse to a 
notion of 'postmodernism' to frame their rejection. 52 This once 
again suggests caution in too readily drawing upon diverse, and 
often contrary, lines of argument within feminism as wholly 
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conclusive evidence of a postmodernist 'break'. Feminism, despite 
recent characterizations which I shall soon assess, has been marked 
by heated debate on the most politically effective forms of cinema 
since its emergence as a theoretical and cultural force of 
oppositional critique. I would therefore be wary of placing a 
chronological construction of succession upon recent rejections of 
the text/spectator relations implicit in some models of 
subjectivity in favour not of the textual production of 
identificationg but of the reception of texts by socially and 
historically constituted audiences. Nonetheless, it is only by 
working through feminist 'alliance' with Modernist avant-gardism 
that the recognition of the need for film practices which are 
founded on quite different assumptions about 'specifically 
feminist' aesthetic knowledge has been forced. With Mellencamp, 
Doane and Williams, de Lauretis's act of 'revisiont53 argues for 
sme historical distance from early feminism which - necessarily - 
engaged with the negative aesthetics of deconstructionism but 
should now be superseded. This critique parallels my earlier point 
(discussed with regard to debates in modernist/postmodernist 
feminist epistemology) that feminism's initial role was most 
crucially manifested in the splitting of 'neutral' (male, or 
properly 'unitotal' knowledge), and of 'envisioning' women as the 
subject of knowledge: 
As af orm of political critique or critical politics , and 
through the specific consciousness that women have 
developed to analyse the subject's relations to 
sociohistorical reality, feminism has not only invented 
new strategies or created new texts, but more importantly 
it has conceived a new social subject, women: as 
speakers, writers, readers, spectators, users and5Wakers 
of cultural forms, shapers of cultural processes. 
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Having accomplished this, the negatory function of engagement with 
deconstructionist 'subversion' of the basic cinematic apparatus 
must be reviewed, and de Lauretis suggests that feminist film 
makers have begun to recognize a different aim for feminist cinema: 
The project of women's cinema is no longer that of destroying or disrupting man-centred vision by 
representing its blind spots, its gaps, or its repressed. 
The effort and challenge now are how to effect another 
vision: to construct other objects and subjects of 
vision, and to formulate the conditions of 
representability of another social subject. 55 
The most important outcome of the $loss' of negatory feminism is 
the loss of its concomitant notion that femirdst spectatorship is a ii 
matter of textual 'appointmenti. Thus, the formulation of a 
constructive mode of feminist cinema is predicated upon a shift 
towards 'an aesthetics of reception, where the spectator is the 
film's primary concern 
- 
primary in the sense that it is there from 
the beginning inscribed in the film-makers's project and even in 
the very making of the films. 56 
De Lauretis's search for film which 'addresses its spectator 
as a woman, regardless of the gender of the viewers, 57 is indeed a 
radical departure from Modernist, psychoanalytically-based 
'politics of displeasure' though the production of films that work 
from this premise has to date been small. However, much critical 
attention has been focussed on Chantal Ackerman's film Jeanne 
Dielman, 23 Quai du Cominerce. 
-1080 Bruxelles (1975) by feminists 
who are interested in the way in which it 'envisions' female 
spectators but does not 'instrumentally' interpellate them. 58 The 
most intriguing aspect of this film is to be found in the way in 
which three days in the life of a woman confined to the domestic 
sphere (as housekeeper and prostitute) are signified. That this 
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period of time includes the gradual breakdown of domestic order and 
Jeanne's stabbing her client on his third visit does not amount to 
a narrative of events as in traditional realist film. Janet 
Bergstom suggests that the 'film's sense depends very much on the 
strict, chronological progression of events' which is established 
by granting 'real time' duration to actions (bathing, washing 
dishes, peeling potatoes) usually elided in favour of narrative 
economy. These 'carry a high degree of anxiety as the fiction 
proceeds' so the 'fact of prostitution and the visualization of 
murder... evens out into equal signficance with the many 
conventionally less important images'. 59 But Jeanne Dielman... is 
intriguing for the manner in which 'economy of the enunciation of 
the images' matches subject matter. Bergstrom points to the fact 
that the entire film is shot in medium scale from a static camera 
position which avoids the frequent shifts to privilege point-of- 
view characteristic of 'classic' narrative film. Similarly, the 
absence of traditional editing patterns is noteworthy: 
Unlike the network of looks in most films which is 
mediated predominantly by eye-line matches and other 
kinds of match-cutting, the logic of viewer/viewed in 
this film by-passes the fiction. The system of subjective 
shots is eliminated and with it a logic of spatial 
matches ratJpnalized by the interest of various 
characters. " 
The refusal of shot-reverse shot sequences effectively thwarts the 
spectator's 'suturing' into the narrative which distances the 
spectator from the diegetic events, and denies the spectator access 
to the pleasure of an emotional identification with Jeanne and her 
I narrative'. Estrangement, or critical detachment, then, is not 
Godardian in that distantiation does not derive from the textual 
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fragmentation of patterns of spectatorship. The 'feminism' of the 
film does not stem simply from formal filmic techniques but from 
the way in which Jeanne's sileme is set against visual duration 
and temporal elisions: 
Who speaks when she speaks? In Rainer's Film About Women 
Who... for example, the woman's thoughts are spoken by a iiall-evoice-over narration. The woman is separated from 
her own language. She is quite literally spoken by men. 
In Jeanne Dielman the problem is expressed through 
diagetic silence. Although the repression of the woman's 
voice is naturalized by the fiction 
- 
most of Jeanne's 
time is spent alone, and she and her son need few words 
to sustain their relationship 
- 
the duration, both of the 
shots and of the fiction, and the lack of variation in 
the enuciatýyn of the images work to denaturalize this 
repression. 
Rather, the 'logic of the organization of shots reverts to the 
camera annd its marked controller, a feminist filmmaker'. 62 
Bergstom concludes that Jeanne's diegetic silence 'brings us into a 
discourse of women's looks, through a women's viewpoint': the 
'controlling discourse is constructed of looks, not voices. A 
dialectic operates between the one looking (camera/director) and 
what is being looked at (characters' actions, characters' 
space)': 63 
What the film constructs 
- 
formally and artfully, to be 
sure 
- 
is a picture of female experience, of duration, 
perceptions, events, relationships and silences, which 
feels immediately and ýTr! stionably true. And in this 
sense the 'pre-aesthetic is aesthetic rather than 
aestheticized, as in film liýGýodarTs Two or Three 
Things I Know About Her, Polanski's Repulsion, or 
Antonini's Eclipse. To say the same thing in anothgý way, 
Ackerman's film addresses the spectator as female. 
For my argument, the most significant aspect of Jeanne Dielman 
is that it does not attempt to interpellate its audience a priori 
and offers a powerful alternative to the deconstructivist model. 
Again, de Lauretis is acute in her analysis: 
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the textual space extends to the spectator... 
essing, speaking to, making room, but not (how very 
unusual and rema le) cajoling, soliciting, seducing. [This film does] not put me in the place of the female 
spectator, [does] not assign me a role, a self-image, a 
positionality in language or desire. Instead, [it makes] 
a place for what I will call me, knowing that I don't 
know it, and give 'me' space to try to know, to see, to 
understand. Put another way, by adressing mg. as a woman, 
they do not bind me or appoint me as Woman. "
This is a concise err.. apsulation of an 'anti-instrumentalist' 
version of film feminism and might be held to circumvent failings 
of the Modernist model of transgressive spectatorship and thus 
recamiend it as a form of post-Modernist feminism for permitting 
film practices which do not assume that female audiences can, be 
monolithically interpellated. This, it is true, does open up a 
space for rethinking Modernist relations between text and spectator 
more canplexly: hence the project of a constructive mode of 
feminist cinema conjoins with the concerns of the second line of 
argument outlined above, regarding the definition of postmodernism 
as a condition of 'multiplicity'. However, I do not see that this 
project goes far enough to satisfy my proposition with regard to 
the demand for legitimation and for representation. My discussion 
of feminist/post-structuralist critiques of the subject makes it 
difficult to ignore the fact that de Lauretis's reading of Jeanne 
Dielman... 
_, 
despite the evident accommodation of a non-capitalized 
notion of 'woman', is nonetheless dependent on the implicit 
assuniption of an experiential 'social bond' between women which 
predefines the audience for feminist film. Despite claims that the 
mechanisms for 'suturing' and textually constructing female 
subjectivity are absent, it is questionable whether both the fibn 
and its commentators are not still falling into the same 
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#totalizing' trap as the negative aesthetic. The full emergence of 
postmodernism, I have argued, must be defined by the delegitimation 
of both Modernist metanarratives, and the dissolution of the 
metanarrative bond must give way to the nodal or network model of 
social relations as a cmdition of heteromorphous multiplicity. 
In respect of the full import of postmodernist critiques of the 
subject of feminist emancipation, it is at this point that the 
delegitimation of the narrative of liberty poses acute problems for 
feminism, and for feminist avant-garde 'knowledge'. 
Consider the terms of Jobnston's anti-instrumentalist 
critique: the 'notion of the 'reader' is a purely theoretical 
construct. Real readers are subjects in history rather than 
subjects of a single text': 
... 
feminist film practice can no longer be seen simply 
in terms of the effectivity of a system of 
representation, but rather as production by and of 
subjects already in social practices which often involve 
heterogenopp and often contradictory positions in 
ideology. " 
This is an important challenge which insists that film audiences 
are constituted by individuals who are also formed by social and 
historical experiences which may produce radically divergent 
readings at the point of textual reception. Nonetheless, from 
recent debates concerning feminism's relation to postwdernism, it 
would appear that Johnston's demand for a less homogeneous notion 
of spectatorial subjectivity (and for a form of 'contextual 
analysis'), is still governed by the notion that a heterogeniety of 
reception can ultimately be returned to a unity at a higher level 
- 
to the unifying social experience of male/female or masculine/ 
feminine gender difference. Even this minimal claim for unity 
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based on gender (even if the experience of gendering is admitted to 
be non-monolithic and at times contradictory) has been subjected to 
serious revision. Some postmodernist feminists have made wholesale 
revaluations of the epistemological privilege granted to gender in 
the social construction of 'difference' on the grounds of its 
potential for marginalizing and repressing multiplicity. For 
feminism, this must necessarily entail rethinking even the 
principle of binary difference which has until recently been 
adequate to define its political and emancipatory project. Nancy 
Fraser and Linda Nicholson suggest that feaminism should not limit 
the proliferation of 'difference' which post-structuralist 
critiques of 'centred' epistemc)logies set in place, and must 
respect the deconstruction of the notion of female identity upon 
which earlier Modernist feminism is based. Instead, they propose 
that postmodernist-feminism 'dispense with the idea of a subiect of 
history' and 'replace unitary notions of women and feminine gender 
identity with plural, cxxnplexly structured conceptions of social 
identity, treating gender as one relevant strand among others, 
attending to class, race, ethnicity'. 67 Jane Flax quite explicitly 
embraces the idea that deconstruction of the 'myth' of the 
Cartesian stable, unified Self should be pushed further to 
deconstruct the male/female binary (the root cause of early 
feminist 'totalizing' epistemologies): 
9e. there is no force or reality outside our social 
relations and activity (e. g. history, reason, progress, 
science, some transcendental essence) that will rescue us 
from partiality and differences. Our lives and alliances 
belong with those who seek to further decentre the world 
- 
although we should reserve our right 6 go be suspicious 
of their motives and visions as well. 
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Similarly, Harding refuses the 'delusion of return to an 'original 
unity" which Di Stephano takes to 'designate the fiction of - 
wholeness applied to the self, to the group, to the ideal of a 
comprehensive politics or theoryg to the epistemological problem of 
the subiect-obiect relationship, and to the political vision of 
commal (totalitarian) utopia'. 69 
It would seem frorn postmodernist critiques that Modernist 
feminism's emancipatory proiect is rendered delegitimate because of 
the unitotal bond tying its female constituents, and an either/or 
choice for feminism is proposed: either Modernist feminism 
characterized by metanarrative, universalized and thus 
'terroristic' in-different construction of the female social bond), 
or postmodernist proliferation (which deconstructs gender analytics 
and refuses the 'fiction of wholeness' in favour of multiplicity 
and non-hanogeneity). But set out in this way, the most urgent 
question raised by Lyotard's thesis is obscured: how far can the I-- 
postriodernist notion of heterogeneity be pushed and still remain 
within the metadiscursive. boundary of feminism? In other words, if 
all claims for unity are 'terroristic', what returns the 
multiplicity of differences to a feminist eakincipatory project? 
Further, what real meaning is left of the term 'feminism' if it can 
no longer command a sense of communality or unity between women? 
Without the social bond from the recit of liberty, feminism 
must be contented with its role as but one part of a 'politics of 
solidarity' between fragmented 'selves' but, consequently, the 
I utopia' of a political movement which can adequately command the 
heterogeneity of its constituents is rendered unsustainable. If 
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the line of post-structuralist thinking about totalization is taken 
to its logical conclusion, the possibilities for constructing ' 
feminist film forms which do not at the same time exclude and 
marginalize the claims of at least some Others look increasingly 
unlikely, and feminism's emancipatory claims are seriously 
t1weatened. This points towards a most dangerous end-point of 
setting the critique of 'totalization' in motion: when, where and 
whether to limit the multiplication of differences? Pushed to its 
extreme, a radical reading of heteromorphous postmodernism leaves 
no theoretical means by which to return li'Mitless 'differences' to 
a common 'politics of solidarity', let alone a politics based on 
the 'monolithic' assumptions required for feminist, gender- 
determined politics. Postmodernist feminists, as Bordo, is keen to 
indicate, thus tread a difficult path: even Harding's 'politics of 
solidarity' is but partially differentiated, being clearly 
envisaged with predefined 'unities' in mind (Black women, white 
working class, Lesbian, Third World women). Logically, even this 
degree of differentiation is open to the same critiques of 
hawgenization and totalization laid against Modernist feminism. 
As Halberg notes: 
When feminists make use of the poststructuralist concept 
of 'difference', they are in fact not just (sic) 
integrating the concept itself. What emerges is a new way 
of doing philosophy, which has as one of its basic tenets 
the reiection of the logic of identity. Many feminists 
seem to refer to multiple subjects that would be 
interpreted ideally in an ideal situation. We find a gap, 
then, between the understanding of 'difference' as a term 
denoting many different realities, and looking at it as 
the mainstay for the anti-thesis of unifed, present and 
limited entities. 7U- 
The full consequences of the postmDdemist proliferation of 
-241- 
differeme are 
- 
intentionally 
- 
destabilizing: from the 
dissipation of metanarrative 'bonding', it is instructive to note 
Am Curthoy's conclusion about solipsism, in other words, that 
without delimitation and boundaries of some kind, [we] are 'all 
reduced in the end to categories of one,. 71 
It is very important, then, to consider what the effect of 
losing a Modernist epistemological bond has upon the project of 
feminist avant-garde film sime it is here that the exponential 
multiplication of the social constituency becomes even more fraught 
and problematic. Feminist deconstruction has been rejected for the 
'totalized' corneption of the female social bond and I have argued 
that even the constructive mode of feminist cinema is implicitly 
Modernist for its residual dependence on a 'unitotal', experiential 
bond. But this bond is exactly what grounds them in the Modernist 
narrative of liberty, and it is upon this unity that Modernist 
feminism sustains its political 'use' of avant-garde aesthetics to 
tell the 'story' of female emancipation. For Modernist feminism, 
the post-narrative loss of the social bond and consequent condition 
of multiplicity must appear rather more as an irretrievable 
splintering or fragmentation which would deny the potential for 
social critique (and, hopefully 
, 
social change) founded on gender 
differentiation. In a postmodernist situation which defines its 
subjects as splintered and partial, doesn't the feminist avant- 
garde project also collapse under the pressure for 'difference' - 
for how is it possible to formulate a mode of film practice which 
can address an audience which is non-centred, heteromrphous and, 
by definitioný fragmented beyond recuperation by a metadiscourse 
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and still remain feminist? If the c4ncept of 'difference' also 
carries with it the assumption that 'differences' are radically 
disparate and incormmaisurable, then the fracturing of metanarrative 
feminism is absolute. Thus the paradox emerges: I have argued that 
the feminist Modernist narrative of liberty dissolves under 
pressures for legitimation and yet the recognition of multiplicity 
sets its own 'trap' by potentially invalidating the gender- 
determined framework that supplies feminist avant-gardism with its 
purpose. The primary challenge set by post-structuralist critiques 
of 'the' female subject, then, is whether it is possible to 
construct a mode of cinema which does not premiss its claim to be 
emancipatory knowledge by addressing female spectators in a way 
that would deny that female subjects are always multiply 
determined. Again, De Lauretis's analysis of what she defines as 
postmodernist feminist film is instructive and her analysis of 
Lizzie Borden's Born in Flames (1983) is useful for highlighting 
some of the critical issues which arise from thinking of feminism 
within a postmodernist, framework. 
Born in Flames is a fascinating film which exemplifies my 
proposition that the delegitimation of the narrative of liberty 
stems from the demand for legitimation, and for the representation 
of female identity as 'differently' determined. Importantly2 it 
utilizes few of the features I have identified as Modernist 
strategies and exhibits a playful disregard both for the 'purity' 
aesthetic of speculative film, and for the textually transgressive 
asesthetic of deconstructionist spectatorship. An immensely 
pleasurable 'action pic, a sci-fi fanatasy, a political thriller, a 
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collage film, a snatch of the urxierground', Born in Flames is 'all 
and none of these... edited in 15-second bursts and spiked with 
yards of video transfers... seizing on a dozen facets of our daily 
media surrourxiings'. 72 At the level of form, the 'film's narrative 
remains unresolved, fragmented and difficult to followv73 and this 
is important for signifying in visual terms the allegorical 
'envisioning' that the film performs. I have found no other film 
which successfully attempts to tell a feminist 'story' without 
basing its narrative of emancipation on a homogenous conception of 
its female constituents. Born in Flames narrates a fiction of a 
post-revolutionary future: discontented with the failure of a male- 
dominated Left revolution to deliver substantial change for women, 
the film's female characters are explicitly marked by racial, 
social and sexual divergence and disparity. Out of an initial 
consciousness of this 'specific gender oppression': 
4peo several groups of women, 
(Black women, Latinas, 
lesbians, single mothers, intellectuals, political 
activists, spiritual and punk performers and a Women's 
Army) succeed in mobilizing and joining together: not by 
ignoring but,, 4paradoxically, by acknowledging their differences. 
The multiplicity of ways of being a women thus offer a multiplicity 
of ways of having a feminist consciousness and, for de Lauretis, 
like Harding and Flax above, this is conceived not as a weakening 
of feminism as a political project but a positive step towards 
recognizing the demands for representation made by traditionally 
underrepresented female Others. The strength of Born in Flames, 
and its distance from Modernist formulations of feminist avant- 
garde knowledge, can be gauged by the manner in which the film 
offers multiple points of spectatorial identification to an 
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audience that de Lauretis suggests Borden 'envisaged in its 
heterogeneity and otherness frm the text': 
What Born in Flames succeeds in representing is this 
feminist understanding: that the female subject is en- 
gendered across multiple representations of class, race, 
language and social relations; and that, therefore, 
differences among women are differences within women, 
which is why feminism can exist despite thoTe-differences 
and, as we are just beginning to understand, cannot 
continue to exist without them. The originality of this 
film's prqject is its representation of women as a social 
subject and site of differences; differences which are 
not purely sexual or merely racial, economic or (sub)cultural, but all of thegg together and often enough 
in conflict with one another. 
Once more, it must be acknowledged that a radical postmodernist 
could obiect to both Born in Flames and de Lauretis's critical 
appraisal for their residual dependence on a conception of multiple 
female subiects which can be finally recuperated for a feminist 
emancipatory project. However, the implicit bond which ties women 
across the space of difference is all that ties them to feminism 
and, without this, there is nothing to hold back the absolute 
splintering of difference into an incommensurability of partial 
perspectives. In short, if any film form which construes its 
I vision' within the conceptual parameters of feminism is challenged 
for its metanarrativized vision, nothing can be retrieved upon 
which to base even a political (but non-metanarrative) 
postmodernist (but also feminist) avant-garde cinemao 
Working through the consequences of postmodernist 
delegitimation of the metanarrative of liberty, it is evident that 
The Postmodern Condition is extremely problematic for feminism and 
the project of avant-garde film 'krxwledge'. On the positive side, 
Lyotard's critique of emancipatory Modernism should, at the least, 
alert feminism of its susceptibility to the concomitant power 
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effects of knowledge deployed by totalizing disourses and, at its 
strongest, my analysis to this point would suggest that fendmism s 
relationship to Modernism must be seriously questioned. But, on 
the other side, if Lyotard's thesis offers feminism no more than a 
choice between Modernist homogeneity and 'terrorism' or 
postmodernist dispersal and fragmentation, then feminism's 
relationship to postmodernism, must also be approached critically. 
This may be an extreme way of posing feminism's Modernist/ 
postmodernist alternatives, and I shall shortly examine whether 
this Hobson's choice is really all that The Postmodern Condition 
can offer. But before this, I want to review where the course of 
this analysis has taken an understanding of the epistemological 
shifts from Modernism to postmodernism in relation to the 
legitimation of film as an 'obiect' of knowledge. 
To this point, this work has been concerned to measure the 
explanatory strength of Lyotard's theory in The Postmodern 
Condition for defining postmodernism in the field of film. My 
primary task in Chapter Two was to propose how the two 
recits might be applied to formulate an understanding of film 
Modernism; the four ideal-types suggested that film Modernism could 
be construed as the production of film as aesthetic knowledge which 
is speculative and/or emancipatory. Having established this, 
Chapters Three and Four were concerned to use Lyotard's notion of 
postmodernism as a cultural 'incredulity' towards these Modernist 
grands recits. Accordingly, I have proposed for consideration some 
processes by which they have come to lose their legitimating 
authority: Chapter Three suggested that the emergence of feminist 
intervention in the gender-neutral version of speculative Modernism 
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was highly significant for illuminating the process by which the 
speculative metanarrative is rendered delegitimate. But 
postmodernist 'incredulity' must also extend to include the other 
, 
and Chapter Four has examined the consequences of the 
loss of the metanarrative 'social bond' underwriting Modernism's 
emancipatory metanarrative in regard to avant-garde feminist film 
projects conceived within its conceptual parameters. In short, 
the first two Chapters of my thesis have tested the validity of a 
theory of film Modernism defined as aesthetic practice governed by 
metanarratives, while the second two have been concerned with 
demonstrating that the epistemological resources of both 
metanarratives are challenged if Lyotard's thesis of 'incredulity' 
is applied. Having reached this stage, the main task is now to 
consider the broader framework of Lyotard's thesis on the 
'conditions' for postmodernist aesthetic knowledge, that is, to 
examine the terms offered by his schema for the legitimation of 
aesthetics in place of Modernist validation. It is timely, then, 
to consider how Lyotard conceives the organization of aesthetics 
after the dissolution of the grands recits. 
All forms of knowledge require legitimation; for Lyotard, the 
loss of Modemist legitimation by metanarratives has given way to 
postmodernism, a cultural condition in which knowledge is 
legitimated by 'performativity' but also by subversive manoeuvres 
of dissensual parology which replace Modernist metanarrative 
notions of resistance and critique. In the context of film, this 
formulation brings into debate one of the most distinctive products 
of Modernist differentiations - the concept of avant-gardism. I 
must signal here that my interpretation of a post-narrative field 
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of film 'knowledge' is radically at odds with Lyotard's vision of 
postmodernist aesthetics, and I want to assess how far Lyotard's 
'postmodern condition' really does theorize a 'break' from 
Modernist epistemological differentiations. More importantly, I am 
concerned that the way in which Lyotard replaces the political 
project of metanarrative avant-gardism renders feminism's 
relationship to the aftermath of delegitimation highly 
problematical. To look ahead, I want to question whether the 
'paralogical' does not in fact cause Lyotard to commit the 
performative crime he fears most, that of eluin'nating feminist 
'players I from the agonistics of language games. As a precondition 
for establishing this, the next Chapter will return to an 
examination of the concept of the avant-garde. From there, I want 
to argue that a close reading of The Postmodern Condition should 
suggest that the terms of postmodernist 'paralogy' are inconsistent 
with Lyotard's theory that the postmodernist model of the social 
bond is that of the network: nodal, fragmented and dispersed. This 
observation should lay-the foundations for a final consideration 
which will offer an alternative, more positive, mapping of the 
epistemological spaces left for feminism within a nodal, network 
model of the social bond, and for feminist film knowledge after the 
loss of the metanarratives. 
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CHAFrER FIVE 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF POSMDERNISM (1) 
My analysis has so far offered a negative framework for 
answering the question 'what is postmodernism? ', and has actually 
yielded a specific set of parameters which more properly define 
what film Modernism 'was'. Within the terms of analysis proposed, 
it is now possible to advance several versions of the meaning of 
the term 'postmodernism' for fiLm. 
Firstly, postmodernism might describe the cultural condition 
in which speculative Modernism has no use, force or function, and 
feminism's role in delegitimating this grand recit is clearly 
crucial in pressing a politicization of film spectatorship into the 
service of liberty. 
Secondly, postmodernism might be construed as a post- 
emancipatory condition in which aesthetic practice is no longer 
viable as political Itooll or instrument in the service of liberty, 
and Modernist feminism may be considered delegitimate for its 
embeddedness within discourses that are both totalizing and 
homogenizing. 
A third definition, which more closely follows Lyotard's 
analysis, would define postmodernism as a cultural condition in 
which both resources for legitimating film as aesthetic knowledge 
are bankrupt. 
Having arrived at this point, though, the thorny issue of what 
Lyotard's analysis offers in place of Modernist legitimation 
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remains to be interrogated. As already suggested, it is here that 
my application of the thesis of The Postmodern Condition to film 
runs into certain difficulties. One of the major problems arises 
when the question debated abstractly in Chapter One is re-posed: 
what degree of epistemological difference or 'break' from modernism 
does a Lyotardian notion of postmodernism imply? For the term 
'postmodernism' to stand for a radically incommensurate mode of 
knowledge 
- 
that which 'comes after' modernism by supplanting it 
- 
one would have to demonstrate that its conceptual constitution is 
temporally, logically and epistemologically discontinuous with 
modernism. But negative notions of postmodernism such as those 
above, which only designate an, absence of the conceptual parameters 
which I have suggested define film Modernism, do not of themselves 
provide a positive content that such a 'break' would imply. 
However, this may not be a real problem 
- 
to posit an absolute 
break between modernism and postmodernism would be to remain within 
a set of ideas which characterize Enlightenment thinking. 
Conversely, I have been working under the assumption that 
postmodernism is more essentially, and more complexly, grasped as 
an epistemological event which de-differentiates modernist 
categories for knowledge and therefore a full definition of 
postmodernism should raise questions about the validity of 
modernist notions such as differentiation between 'spheres', 
chronological succession and linear temporality. My point is that 
Lyotard's proposals for the 'conditions' of postmodern knowledge 
need to be assessed by asking how far they depart from the 
legitimation 'rules' of modernism, that is, how far does Lyotard's 
analysis reach in terms of de-differentiation? In short, I am 
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interested in determining whether Lyotard does not replace one form 
of modernism with a 'postmodernism' which recasts the 'conditions' 
of knowledge in the form of another. This in itself is not a major 
problem but it becomes visible as a problem for feminism in that 
its 'use' of film practices legitimated by Modernist conceptual 
foundations has been subject to serious critique: so what space 
does Lyotard leave for feminism to construe its emancipatory 
project without the resources of the emancipatory metanarrative? 
To approach an answer to this, I want firstly to establish that 
Lyotard's thinking on what becomes of avant-gardism in his schema 
is not consistent with a notion of postmodernism which should 
question its modernist origins, and then to argue that this 
inconsistency is highly significant for feminism's relation to 
Lyotardian postmodernism. 
If Chapter Three lends support to the proposition that 
speculative avant-gardism has lost its validating authority, then 
the last Chapter concluded with serious reservations about the 
viability of feminist fuse' of avant-gardism. It would appear from 
this that Lyotard's theory of postmodernism as a cultural 
'incredulity towards the metanarratives' must then raise grave 
doubts about the furr-tion of any avant-gardes which have been 
historically and conceptually associated with them. Should, then, 
Lyotard's theory be taken to mean that it is avant-gardism per se 
which is bankrupted along with the rýcits, or can avant- 
gardism be separated from its Modernist manifestations and 
retrieved for a 'postmodernist' aesthetics? To anticipate, I find 
that Lyotard's notion of dissensual paralogy, despite its 
typification as postmodernist, actually smuggles in a set of ideas 
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which the rest of his work would suggest is actually Modernist. To 
substantiate this claim, a brief summary of the functions of avant- 
gardism under Modernism is required. C), -- - 
T. he Concept of the Avant-Garde 
The concept 'avant-garde' is a metaphor informed by both 
structural and temporal dimensions: it implies both a structural 
relationship to or rather aside from something (mass culture), and 
a temporal sense of historical movement in terms of change. Under 
the narrative of speculation, avant-gardism is dominated by the 
notion of structural 'set apart-ness', so that temporality is 
confined to historical succession within the field of the 
aesthetic, measured as the history of artistic movements and of 
immanent stylistic innovation. For emancipatory avant-gardes, the 
literal sense of the metaphor (of being 'before the body') takes on 
an additional socio-political inflection so that structural 
autonomy from the 'mass' is overdetermined by a temporal commitment 
to a telos of socio-political emancipation. In this sense, avant- 
gardist aesthetic knowledge is utilized for contributing to the 
project of liberation frorn the ideological ill-effects of 
alienating mass consumption of 'classical realism'; crudely, the 
future being construed as the disappearance of oppressive forms of 
cinematic representation. The concomitant differentiations which 
accompany these metanarrative Modernist functions for film avant- 
gardism have been outlined more specifically as a series of 
binaries. A potentially 'postmodernist' avant-gardism is also 
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suggested by them but I shall defer consideration of this for the 
moment: 
Abstract Formalism: automomous art/social life, abstraction/ 
representation, High Art/low culture, 
aesthetic value/entertaiment; 
Structuralism & medium-specificity/representation 
Structural/ knowledge/pleasure, production/consumption; 
Materialism: 
Anti-illusionism: knowledge/ideology, reality/representation, 
estrangement/identification; 
Surrealism: desire/rationality, imagination/reason, 
unconscious/conscious, automatism/creativity. 
Set out thus, it becomes evident that it is the ways in which 
relationships are posed between the realm of the aesthetic and mass 
popular culture which distinguish the two dominant Modernist 
functions for avant-gardes. 
The first Modernist avant-garde may be termed 'artistic', 
taking its charge from pushing forward the frontiers of knowledge 
of the internal or formal conditions of the film medium, and 
accepts as necessary an ethical division between autonomous art 
practice and 'mass' or commodity film production in order to 
constitute an oasis of pure thought or consciousness. For the 
second type of avant-gardism, though, the demarcation between mass 
culture, viewed speculatively as ideologically repressiveg 
I reified' or monolithically 'kitsch', and mass culture is certainly 
less clea ly defined since emancipatory avant-gardes do not 
entirely forsake the commodified forms of mass culture. Rather, 
emancipatory film avant-gardes reject the elitist and exclusive 
High Cultural assumptions of speculative art and are concerned to 
politicize art, importantly, by incorporating mass cultural or 
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popular consumption patterns within its domain. The emergence of 
film practices such as feminist deconstruction. during the 1970's- 
80's evidently attests to important cultural challenges to the 
dominance of speculative avant-gardes on the grounds of a) an 
adherence to radical aesthetic autonomy, b) the etiolation of 
social content, and particularly c) the effacement of gender and 
sexuality as issues of concern. Howeverg Chapter Four was 
concerned to suggest that a full definition of postmodernism cannot 
rest upon feminism's role in delegitimating the function of avant- 
gardes under the grand recit of speculation because feminist avant- 
gardes are themselves metanarratively embedded. The binaries 
outlined above would suggest that, despite clear evidence that the 
margin between 'aesthetic' and 'popular' domains is drastically 
reduced in terms of engagement with the content of dominant cinema, 
it would be a mistake to suggest that deconstructionism's 
appropriation of popular cultural film forms for art is enough to 
warrant the term 'postmodernist'. 
It was noted above that for some critics, the incorporation of 
mass cultural forms into the realm of pure speculative art 
constitutes a postmodernist activity. It is perhaps more pertinent 
to recognize here that film deconstructionism's enlistment of 
'impure' mass cultural elements for a didactic enterprise 
characterized by spectatorial 'difficulty' and 'displeasure' is 
only a partial de-differentiation, and does not transcend the 
Modernist binaries which secure a critical function for avant-garde 
film as aesthetic knowl eI would suggest instead that such 
practices actually intensify (by reinscribing) the art/mass culture 
distinction: as Upkis has also observed, the tactic 'simply 
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replays the categories of mass culture by 'framing' them within an 
art context without in any way transforming those categories'_. 1 To 
find the term 'postmodernist' used as an appellation for film forms 
which are more properly defined by avant-gardist intentions is 
confusing, and critics such as Owens and Foster add to this 
confusion. To counter the anti-modernist critiques from those 
Habermas labels as 'old conservatives', who typify a 'postmodernism 
of reaction', Foster argues for a 'postmodernism of resistance': 
A postmodernism. of resistance, then, arises as a counter- 
practice not only to the official culture of modernism 
but also to the false normativity' of a reactionary 
modernism. In opposition (but not onl in opposition), a 
resistant postmodernism. is 
n 
th the critical 
deconstruction of tradition, not an instrumental pastiche 
of pop- or pseudo-historical forms, with a critique of 
origins, not a return to them. In short, it seeks to 
question rather than exploit cultural codes, to explor 
rather than conceal social and political affiliations. 
Kaplan is right to suggest that this is a 'good description of some 
modernisms' and especially so with regard to the position occupied 
within the terms of my argument by feminist deconstructionist 
3 
avant-gardism. The idea that 'postmodernism and transgression can 
be seen to be*incanpatible theoretical concepts, 4 is an important 
one: where mass cultural conventions are used to support the notion 
of avant-garde projects as 'interventions', they are being utilized 
from within a Modernist cultural and institutional perspective 
which still maintains a critical space for art 'outside' of 
dominant commodif ied forms of industrial f ilm. The fundamentally 
Modernist assumption of the 'ideological necessity of erer-ting and 
maintaining exclusive standards of the literary and the artistic 
against the constant threat of incursion or contamination I remains 
unquestioned. 5 Thus, while displacing most of the differentations 
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of speculative Modernism, emancipatory Modernism must necessarily 
retain both the differentiation of art as a specific form of 
knowledge and, with it, the political viability of the critical 
function of avant-garde knowledge. A more coherent understanding 
of the epistemological shifts I have subsumed under the label 
'postmodernism' must include consideration of how the field of film 
knowledge is to be conceptualized without recourse to the High 
Art/mass culture binary. This raises possibly the most contentious 
challenge that postmodernism, offers to traditional Left or feminist 
'use' of aesthetics in the service of emancipation: if the 
aesthetic knowledge/mass culture distinction is dissolved, how is 
it possible to retain a concept of the avant-garde which is 
delivered by that differentiation? A full collapse of the binary 
would, -I suggest, leave no means for retrieving a space of critique 
'outside' of mass cultural productions and the question of whether 
postmodernism is inevitably a 'Post-avant-garde' condition must be 
investigated.. If, however, one turns to Lyotard this issue cannot 
be settled easily as incompatible analyses can be made of his 
notion of post-narrative dissensual paralogy. 
.ir itivity, Pmmlogy and the Avmt-Garde 
The course of this work has suggested that film Modernism is 
defined by the unity of two rationality imperatives which are 
manifested in a) the reduction of aesthetic knowledge to medium- 
specific knowledge and, b) the tendency to instrumentalize art for 
totalizing political projects. If Modernism is understood 
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according to the force of the two rationality imperatives, it is 
easier to grasp why some post-structuralist thinking celebrates 
instead an aesthetics of the 'irrational' as a postmodernist 
alternative to the 'terroristic' claims of instrumentality and 
domination. Dum is accurate in pinpointing that the 'use' of 
aesthetics is problematic for postmodern artists who 'understand 
its deployment as a rhetorical subordination of aesthetics to the 
imperialism of rationality, and who see the taming and contaiment 
of aesthetic expressiveness as reflective of the exhaustion of 
6 
modernism'. But, coming after The Postmodern Conditiong one could 
be forgiven a certain bewilderment on reading the addendum 
'Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism' and finding the 
avant-gardist statements: 
The postmodern. would be that which, in the modern, puts 
forward the unpresentable in presentation itself; that 
which denies itself the solace of good forms, the 
consensus of a taste which would make it possible to 
share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; 
that which searches for new presentations, not in order 
to enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger sense of 
the unpresentable. 
(PC, P. 8 1) 
and: 
Modernity, in whatever age it exists, cannot exist 
without a shattering of belief and without the discovery 
of the 'lack of reality' of reality, together with the 
invention of other realities. 
(PC, p. 7 7) 
As statements upon a postmodern 'condition'q which must logically 
formulate the sphere of the aesthetic without the epistemological 
resources of the Modernist metanarratives, these are highly 
problematic. However, the theoretical continuity between Lyotard's 
explanation of the paralogical notion of aesthetic avant-gardism 
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and the condition of post-narrative science is not difficult to 
grasp, and it worth establishing how this continuity is maintained. 
As suggested earlier, post-narrativity subrogates both 
metanarrative models of the social bond and importantly, the forms 
and uses for knowledge that they specify; delegitimation calls for 
'language' pragmatics of a quite different order. It is precisely 
against these that he proproses the idea of postmodernism as the 
condition of knowledge that is now legitimated by performativity, 
but also by paralogy. Performativity prescribes a systems-led 
'informationalization' of knowledge and, to recall Lyotard's 
earlier proposition: 
Knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it 
is and will be consumed in order to be valorized in a new 
production: in both cases, the goal is exchange. 
Knowledge ceases to be end in itself, it loses its use- 
value. 
(K 9 pp. 4-5) 
In post-narrative terms, scientific endeavour loses its speculative 
or emancipatory validation and instead becomes identical with the 
production of technologies. The predominance of a technological 
criterion at the same time imbricates proof, validity and truth 
criteria within the discourse of power (PC, pp. 41-53): 
since freality I is what provides the evidence used as 
proof in scientific argumentation, and also provides 
prescriptions and promises of a juridical, political and 
ethical nature with results one can master all these 
games by mastering 'reality That is precisely what 
technology can do. By reinforcing technology, one 
'reinforces' reality, and one's chances of being just and 
right increase accordingly. 
p. 47) 
Lyotard is careful to maintain that the hypothesis of determinism 
upon which performativity is based, which presupposes 'that the 
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system into which the input is entered is stable... so that an 
accurate prediction of output can be made' (PC, p. 54), does not 
describe the real conditions of the development of scientific 
knowledge: 'science itself does not function according to this 
theory's paradigm of the system... [which] excludes the possibility 
of using such a paradigm to describe society' (PC, p. 61). It is 
evident that immanently-legitimated scientific performativity 
cannot obscure its origination in the modern production of 
autonomous knowledges supervised by the narrative of speculation: 
classical determinism is an 'ideology' which 'continues to work 
within the framework of the unreachable 
- 
but conceivable 
- 
limit 
of the total knowledge of a system' (PC, p. 56): 
Consensus is a horizon which is never reached. Research 
that takes place under the aegis of a paradigm tends to 
stablize; it is the exploitation of a technological, 
economic, or artistic 'idea. It cannot be discounted. 
But what is striking is that someone always comes along 
to disturb the order of 'reason'. It is necessary to 
posit the existence of a power that destabilizes the 
capacity for explanation, manifested in the promulgation 
of new norms for understanding or, if one prefers, in a 
proposal to establish new rules circumscribing a new 
field of research... 
(PC, p. 6 1) 
11ws science should be understood as an 'unstable' system which 
develops (and it surely does develop') by dissensual. challenges to 
the self-definition of systemic performativity. It is this 
I agonistics' of science which keeps performativity from exercizing 
the 'terror' of 'eliminating, or threatening to elimate a player 
from the language game', of repressing or discounting new 'moves' 
which challenge scientific consensus as to what counts as good 
science (that is, science adapted to performativity): 
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The pragmatics of science is centred on denotative 
utterancesq which are the foundations upon which it 
builds institutions of learning (institutes, centers., 
universities, etc. ). But its postmodern development 
brings a decisive 'fact' to the fore: even discussions of 
denotative statements need to have rules. Rules are not denotative but prescriptive, which we are better off 
calling metaprescriptive utterances to avoid confusion (they prescribe what the moves of language games must be 
in order to be admissable). The function of the 
differential or imaginative or paralogical activity of 
the current pragmatics of science is to point out these 
metapresciptives (science's 'presuppositions') and to 
petition the player to accept different ones. The only 
legitimation that can make this kind of request 
admissible is that it will generate ideas, in other 
words, new statements. (PC, p. 65) 
Hence the parallel for construing aesthetic avant-gardist 
I subversion' in terms of paralogical 'moves': the modern (as 
metanarrative) constitution of aesthetic experience must be 
counteracted. It is the role of avant-gardes to question 
consensual game rules to keep the sphere of aesthetics open and 
resistant to both emancipatory and speculative claims on one hand, 
and from performativity on the other. One should not mistake this 
for a plea for artists simply to be imovative because, for 
Lyotard, 'innovation is under the command of system, or at least 
used by it to improve its efficiency' (PC, p. 61). Rather, 
Paralogy is the search for instabilities which effect 
transformations of the game rules (by continually contesting 
consensual definitions of what art 'is'). Thus paralogy escapes 
the game of prescription and prevents the ossification of rules 
which turn denotative utterances into performatives. 
It seems consistent, then, for Lyotard to use the paralogical 
as a metaphor for aesthetic subversion but I find it open to 
criticism on three interrelated accounts: firstly, that the 
'paralogical' is a highly inappropriate concept for understanding 
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shifts into the 'conditions' for a postaudernist legitimation of 
film 'krxmledge'; secondly, that it fails to secure adequate 
. 
theoretical resources for construing the terms of feminist 
engagement in a post-narrative sphere of the 'aesthetic' and, 
thirdly, that an alternative reading of Lyotard would conclude that 
the very metaphor of the avant-garde is itself bankrupted along 
with the postmc)dernist fragmentation of the social bond. The next 
section, then, will examine the relevance of Lyotard's use of the 
metaphor of the 'paralogical' avant-garde for defining the post- 
narrative 'conditions' for postmodern film knowledge. 
Avant-Garde and the Postmodern Cordition 
For Lyotard, postmodernism, as the 'tmpresentable in 
presentation', now becomes not a chronological marker of difference 
from modernism but a condition of possibility within it: 
'Postmodernism thus tmderstood is not modernism at its end but in 
the nascent state, and this state is constant' (PC, p. 79). So 
what kind of modernism is Lyotard affirming if he cannot appeal to 
avant-gardism as specified by the recits of liberty or 
speculation? Lyotard's proposition for an 'agonistic' avant- 
gardism which searches for paralogical 'moves' against the 'rules' 
of art is highly redolent of the anti-art programme of Surrealism. 
In my exposition of Surrealist film above, it was concluded that 
Surrealism, although temporally Modernistq did not sit well with 
the narrative orders of either emancipation (as conventionally 
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construed) or speculation (as autonomous medium-specific 
knowledge). From Lyotard's proposals for a postmodernist-modernist 
avant-garde, it now becomes apparent why that difficulty occured. 
By my reading, because Surrealism does not fall easily under the 
metanarratives, it is possible to redeem it as the saviour of post- 
narrative avant-garde aesthetics. Indeed, Lyotard's view of 
'postmodernist' avant-gardism closely follows the terms of Peter 
Bilrger's analysis of Surrealism. For Biirger, Surrealism is the 
only 'true' avant-garde movement, set apart from mere Modernist or 
'artistic' innovators, by a declared intention to destroy the 
concept 'art', to de-differentiate the social specialization of art 
practices by collapsing the distinction which separates life from 
autonomous art and its social institutionalization. With some 
historical perspective, Surrealist/Dada ready mades, objets 
trouves, automatism and aleatory collage mounted what can now be 
grasped as the 'self-criticism' of art as autonomous institution, 
challenging both the 'work of art' (produced by an original 
individual of genius) and its reception within the framing category 
'art'. Similarly, Surrealist film's anti-art, or better, anti- 
Modernist, critique is manifested, firstly, with the utilization of 
the conventions of 'logical' narrative and 'illusionist' 
representation which refuse speculative claims that for film to be 
art it must concern itself with 'specificity: Surrealism certainly 
does not exhibit the Modernist's anxiety about the putative 
ideological dangers of mass cultural industrial cinema. Secondly, 
the 'instrmental' use made by emancipatory film of art's autonomy 
is refused: exploiting film's 'reality effect' for the liberation 
of irrational forces of unconscious desire/fantasy and the 
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production of the disorientating spectatorial effect of 
'depaysement', Surrealist film resists claims that art should_be 
'at the service' of rational, political programmes. Surrealism, 
then, seems to meet most of the criteria Lyotard sets out for a 
'paralogical' form of avant-gardism. But Bdrger's is, I think, a 
far more sophisticated and realistic investigation of the fate of 
this type of avant-gardism. in contemporary culture; what Lyotard 
fails to consider is that 'the avant-garde is already historical, 7 
and hence not available for appropriation and re-presentation in 
the form of paralogical subversion. In other words, it is manifest 
that historically Surrealism failed in its project, and did not put 
an end to the production of Modernist works of art, nor to the 
social institution of art. This has special consequences for 
succeeding 'avant-gardes' who claim a paralogical function for 
artistic innovation. 
For Bdrger, the most significant effect of Surrealist anti-art 
calls for 'art in everything' (including mass commodities such as 
Duchamp's urinal, bicycle wheel/stool or spiked iron constructions) 
was to 'make art recognizable as an institution, that is, to bring 
into focus how the production, consumption and exchange of 'works 
of art' were effectively isolated from the praxis of life by the 
category of autonomy. 8 It is only by a kind of cultural 
'forgetting' that speculative and emancipatory avant-gardes have 
resisted Surrealism's systems-immanent critique and ignored the 
fact that keeping hold of a category of the aesthetic (as 
specificity or as political tool) is at the same time to remain 
within the parameters of institutional art which inevitably 
delimits art as institutional, and which circumscibes the Modernist 
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differentiation of 'aesthetic experience'. If the historical 
development of avant-garde film after Surrealism is reviewed, it 
can be quickly established how deeply this forgetting is translated 
into the expansion and strengthening of art as institution. My own 
analysis should have exposed this. Structural and structural/ 
materialist film (c. 1960's) emerge well after Surrealism (c. 1920- 
30) while the didactic line of emancipatory film commemes at 
approximately the same time as Surrealism, but feminist 
deconstructionist film is clearly immune to Surrealism's 
paralogical critique. 
It must be said that the institutionalization of Modernist and 
avant-garde film is certainly less obvious or well-known than the 
institutionalization of twentieth-century movements in painting as 
charted by Suzi Gablik (1984), Diana Crane (1987), and Christine 
Lindey (1990). But it is possible to propose a few indicators to 
support Burger's contention that 'art as an institution continues 
to survive as something separate from the praxis of life' and that 
'all art that is more recent than the historical avant-garde 
movements must come to terms with that fact'. 9 For instance: the 
emergence of an avant-garde 'art' film apparatus created through a 
proliferation of critical anthologies, journals, archives, 
theoretical analysis, academic inquiry, journals, catalogues, 
confererices and lectures; specialized financingg distribution and 
exhibition for films contextualized as 'works of art' by screenings 
within the gallery/museum/Fine Art film club circuit; and the 
construction of chronological traditions of influence and 
succession, secured partly through film retrospectives which 
construct the paradoxical concept of a history of 'avant-gardes'. 
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And taking account of the development of this institutitional- 
cultural context places a quite different slant on the potential 
success of an anti-art or 'paralogical' critique as offered by 
Lyotard: 
To the extent that the means by which the avant-gardist 
hoped to bring about the sublation of art have attained 
the status of works of art, the claim that the praxis of 
life is to be renewed can no longer be legitimately 
connected with their employment... the neo-avant-garde 
institutionalizes the avant-garde as art and thus negates 
genuinely avant-gardist intentions. Ihis is true 
independentJ6 of the consciousness artists have of this 
activity... 
The central thrust of Burger's observation, then, would suggest 
that the properly avant-gardist endeavours of Surrealism (to renew 
the 'praxis of life' by de-differentiating Modernism's art/life 
binary, and thus questioning the 'game rules' which hold them 
apart) have themselves becomes part of the institution 'art'. 
Further, the 'anti-art' project of questioning what art 'is' has 
paradoxically become the main category for understanding 
contemporary art practice. This would in part explain how and why 
the concept Savant-garde' is often difficult to separate from that 
of 'Modern art'. The terms have become synonymous, I would 
suggest, because the activity of questioning and challenging the 
'rules' of art no longer threatens but only works to intensify the 
conceptual 'institution' of art. For 'systems-immanent' or anti- 
art avant-gardes more recent than Surrealism, this poses 
considerable difficulties for construing them as 'postmodernist'. 
To elucidate film avant-gardism and its institutionalization a 
little more, it is interesting to note that one of Noel Carroll's 
five 'postmodernist' film formsý punk film, is characterized by an 
explicit rejection of the institutionalization 
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of film avant-gardes. 11 In terms recalling Rosalind Krauss's 
influential essay on the postmodernist 'repetition' of Rodin's- 
sculptures, 12 punk film 
- 
once tellingly billed as 'a 1960's 
underground movie happening today' 
- 
recalls S ealist intentions 
of subverting institutional art. 13 Closely tied to the punk music 
scene in New York of the late 1970's, intentionally amateurish and 
'raw--cut' super-8 footage was screened to new audiences for 
'underground' film, outside of orthodox 'art' film exhibition 
circuits in bars, clubs and popular rock club venues as well as 
briefly at the 'storefront' New Cinema. Hoberman and Carroll's 
analyses suggest that punk film is profoundly 'cannablistic', 
structured around subversive 'repetitions' of both Hollywood 
'pariah genres' ('low-budget crime film and shoe-string sci-fi') 
and the avant-garde 'ghetto' films of structuralism. Of the former 
tactic, Carroll argues that the purpose was to utilize 'their bad 
taste, outrageous logic, and crudity' and exaggerate them in such a 
way that 'the cheapness and mindlessness of these wretcheds of the 
film industry' are 'intensified to the point where they could 
ftmction as synbols of the punk self': 
At the stylistic level, the exaggerated adaptations of 
pulp genres stated themes of transgression of norms, of 
outsideness, of the valorization of the authentic, even 
romatically heroic, significance of bad taste. The punk 
filmmakers exploited the brazenly antireflective address 
of the genres while also expropriating the raw if rather 
crude energy available in their structure. At the same 
time the violence endemic to Hollywood genres could be 
rechanneled in stories that plyýted revolutionary acts 
against the bourgeois culture. 
The point of appropriating Pariah genres of popular culture is thus 
to construct a subversive vision of/for alienated urban-guerillas, 
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not from some 'aesthetic' point apart fr(xn mass culture but from 
within the fragmented detritus of that culture; 'art as the 
practice of referring to shards of a once-vibrant civilization, art 
in the ruins'. 15 As Carroll concedes, the parodic dimension of 
recyclings of genres 'both resembles deconstructionism and does 
not'. The didacticism of anti-Hollywood, emancipatory anti- 
illusionism is certainly refused but, nonetheless, punk film can be 
seen as a 'means of expressing disdain and a superiority for an 
established culture' thus making punk's dominant theme of 
voutsiderness' a 'repetition' of underground film before its 
incorporation into the High Art parameters of Modernism. For its 
ironic/parodic interpretation of previous institutionalized avant- 
gardes, Eric Mitchell's Kidnapped (1979) is especially pertinent. 
Hoberman writes: 
Modeled on Warhol's Vin, I (one of the few early Warhols 
available in New York I K&dna pj4d makes blatant use of 
real time 
- 
splicing together tifteen unedited super-8 
rolls 
- 
and overdetermined camerawork. While Warhol's 
film is static, Mitchell's pans continually around a 
barren Lower East Side apartment, remorselessly chopping 
off torsos at the neck. A few jittery extroverts - 
Mitchell's 'superstars' stimulated by drugs, the 
filmmaker's on-screen direction, and the rock music 
blaring from a plastic phonograph on the floor - jostle 
each other for dominance. Everything in Kidnapped is 
proudly second-hand i even 'Satisfaction' is sung by Devo. Other films 
- 
Nares Rome '78 (1978) and John Lurie's Men 
in Orbit (1978) 
- 
also suggested Warhol pastiches, while 
Mitchell's Red Italy (1978) was a clever parody of 
Fellini and Antonioni. Mitchell was also active as an 
actor and in Harold Vogel's Dear Jimmy -a self-conscious 
chronicle of the new underground - he appears as a super- 
8 director who appropriately I 
afgerts the impossibility of 
doing 'anything new in films 
. 
However, while offering a critique of the high seriousness of both 
speculative and emancipatory Modernism, punk film remains within 
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the terms which define anti-art avant-gardism, in Burger's sense. 
The 'repetitions' of punk film at the level of content are thus 
also symptomatic of a larger historical/cultural repetition 
- 
through an anti-intellectual 'anaesthetic' blankness 'raised to the 
level of style' (rather than through Surrealist strategies of 
critical 'depaysement'), punk film replays dada/Surrealist 
endeavours to break from 'traditional' institutional art and to 
authenticate the concerns of an anti-bourgeois counter-cultural 
enclave. 
What, then, is 'postmodernist' about a postmodernism which can 
encompass a film practice which adheres so closely, in fact returns 
to, the failed anti-art programes of the historical avant-garde? 
Punk film exemplifies another paradox generated by locating 
postmodernism within the context of the avant-garde: the view that 
the impulse for renewal and challenge, of 'doing anything new' (the 
impulse which sustains Modernist avant-gardes) has become 
'impossible' or exhausted, is explicitly denied by a rebellion 
against previous metanarrative avant-gardes (against High Cultural 
I traditions'). This inevitably returns punk film to another 
Itradition': the 'anti-art' or paralogy of Surrealism. As Huyssen 
has observed: 
oos the paradox of the 1970's is not so much... the inherent contradiction of the postmodernist avant-garde 
itself, i. e. the paradox of an art that simulatenously 
wants to be art and anti-art... The paradox of the 1970's 
is rather that the postmodernist search for cultural 
tradition... and continuity, which underlies all the 
rhetoric of radical rupture, discontinuity and 
epistemological breaks, has turned to that tradition 
which fundamentoly and on principle despised and denied 
all traditions. 
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This is an accurate description of Lyotard's postmodernist 
aesthetic in which 'all that has been received, if only 
yesterday... must be suspected' (PC, p. 79). But Carroll's 
analysis, which defines film postmodernism by a plurality of avant- 
garde film forms, would suggest that the linear, future-orientated Cp- 
temporality implied by a 'constant state' of paralogical subversion 
is no longer applicable. The recent proliferation of post- 
speculative film forms (New Talkies, New Psyschodramas, Punk, 
Deconstruction, New Symbolism) would indicate a, splintering or 
spatialization of the temporal dimension informing the concept of 
'avant-garde'. In BOrger's terms: 
Through the avant-garde movements, the historical 
succession of techniques and styles has been transformed 
into a simultaneity of the absolutely disparate. The 
consequence is that no movement today can legitimately 
claim to 1%e more historically advanced as art than any 
other 
... 
19ý 
Thus, Bilrger's observation on the meaning of such late twentieth- 
century avant-garde 'repetitions' is an acute one: in 'a changed 
context, the resumption of avant-gardist intentions with the means 
of avant-gardism can no longer even have the limited effectiveness 
the historical avant-gardes achieved'019 Similarly, with Huyssen, 
it is possible to argue that the 'postmodernist' repetition of 
historical avant-gardism represents instead its 'endgame'. Placed 
within the context of the 'failure' of Surrealism's anti-art 
programme and the incorporation of avant-gardism into institution 
I art', Lyotard's proposal for defining postmodernist critique by a 
resumption of 'paralogical' avant-gardism is not a convincing one 
upon which to pursue an analogous theory for postmodemist film. 
Taking the preceding points into account, 'Answering the 
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Question: What is Postmodernism? ' is a frustratingly orthodox 
account. According to my analysis, I do not see how Lyotard'S 
notion of the paralogical escapes from falling back upon one of the 
most definitive Modernist differentiations which carves out the 
space of art as specific form of knowledge and grants avant-garde 
artists the role of the 'subversion of reality'. As Jobn Tagg has 
wittily observed: 
Like John Wayne, out of the smoke and dust of the 
postmodernist explosion, we begin to see the familiar 
chunky outlines of a rough but redeeming modernism. There 
is the singleness of purpose, the showdown on the 
frontier of the possible, the fearless interrogation, the 
high-noon drama on which hangs the fate of social, 
psychological and epistemological renewal, the restless 
need for change, now stripped of any illusions of 
progress, but with eyes fixed on a horizon which 26s 
endlessly different yet somehow always the same. 
To object to particular theories simply because they are 
'modernist' is a weak criticism, but the 'modernism' of Lyotardian 
postmodernist aesthetics does foreground two issues which I feel 
are effaced by defining postmodernism within the framework of the 
'paralogical': firstly, how film 'knowledge' is to be construed 
and, secondly, where feminism is to be located with the terms of 
his analysis. With these in view, I want to raise two main 
objections 
- 
to Lyotard's preservation of a Modernist 
differentiation which is apparent in his treatment of contemporary 
film and, relatedly, to his adherence to a Modernist avant-gardism. 
nie postmodernist 'paralogical' challenge to both 
performativity and metanarrativity is a 'constant state' of 
rebellion against forces working to supply 'reality' with the 
'fiction' of its transparency. What then, could this formulation 
mean if applied to film? Given that Lyotard's view of cinema does 
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not extend beyond that of a crudely monolithic 'classical realism', 
the short answer is that it cannot be applied: 
Industrial photography and cinema will be superior to 
painting and the novel whenever the objective is to 
stabilize the referent, to arrange it according to a 
point of view which endows it with a recognizable 
meaning, to reproduce the syntax and vocabulary which 
enable the addressee to decipher images and sequences 
quickly, and so to arrive easily at the consciousness of 
his own identity as well as the approval which he thereby 
receives from others 
- 
since structures of images and 
sequences constitute a communication code among all of 
them. This is the way the effects of reality 21 or if one prefers, the fantasies of realism, multiply. 
(PC, p. 74) 
While this does not absolutely exclude the theoretical possibility 
for paralogical film avant-gardism, the terms of Lyotard's anti- 
media stance do suggest a nostalgic 'repetition' of Modernism's 
High art/popular culture dichotomy, in fact of the very conditions 
of Modernist avant-gardes as I have defined them. As he does not 
specify what 'non-industrial' film and photography might be, 
Lyotard leaves himself open to a reading which would suggest that 
film and photography are not available for appropriation in the 
#presentation of the unpresentable'. And this 'story' is an old 
one: a theory of postmodernism which can preserve a Modernist role 
for the unsullied avant-gardes of theory, painting and literature 
while leaving the mass manipulations of the 'fantasies of realism' 
to proliferate undisturbed. Thus, at a stroke, Lyotard obviates 
any further investigation into what critical resources are 
available for the analysis of fibn after the dissolution of the 
metanarratives. Lyotard's critique of metanarrative Modernism thus 
dispenses with the conceptual resources of both speculative and 
emancipatory 'knowledge' in order to secure a 'free' sphere for 
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I sublime' aesthetics, but then appeals to definitively Modernist 
differentiations (autonomous art/popular culture; aesthetic - 
knowlege/pleasure; avant-garde/mass consumption) to define the 
epistemological conditions in which it may furr-tion. 
Does this, then, imply that film is exempt from the critique 
of modernist metanarrative knowledge propounded in The Postmodern 
Condition? Lyotard's schema would suggest that it is exempt, but 
for reasons that offer little comfort for those who would wish to 
retrieve Modernist functions (speculative or emancipatory) for 
avant-garde film. Rather, the High Modernist terms of his analysis 
exclude film from the 'paralogical' because, it would seem, film 
has never been part of modernism. As I hope the course of this 
study has shown, this is a remarkably ill-informed and crude 
proposition, showing little regard for the historical and 
epistemolgical diversity of avant-garde film histories which 
contest the view that film works monolithically to 'stabilize the 
referent'. Evidently, the 'rules' of metanarrative modernism have 
governed the production of avant-garde film as 'knowledge, and a 
consistent analysis must address wbat becomes of the 'conditions' 
for film knowledge after their demise. Perhaps it is unnecessary 
to state that the 'anti-realist' addendum to The Postmodern 
Condition does not attempt this and therefore cannot sustain 
further investigation into what 'postmodernism' might mean for 
film. 
I have argued that if postmodernism is to define a set of 
shifts in the 'game rules' that validate the broader 
epistemological and social constitution of film 'krxwledge, then 
it should de-differentiate the conceptual categories which have 
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permitted film to function under the Modernist metanarratives. And 
so, leaving Lyotard's evasion of the issue to one side, it is 
important to consider wbat full de-differentiation does imply for 
fihn. I would suggest that it is the Modernist or 'mdernist- 
postmodernist' metaphor of the avant-garde as the locus of 
adversarial, critical and transformatory 'knowledge' per se which 
must be reconsidered along with a set of shifts in the constitution 
of the 'condition' of postmodernism, and this inevitably questions 
the validity of any theory of postmodernism which maintains its 
viability. In this respect, I would agree with Lyotard that 
paralogical avant-gardism is not an appropriate tool for defining E- - 
postmodernism in film though, importantly, not for the Modernist 
#anti-realist' reasons presented by him. Rather, I do not see that 
an analogous theory of 'paralogical' avant-gardism is at all 
appropriate for construing film 'knowledge' since post-narrative 
postmodernism is better understood without recourse to a notion of 
the avant- e at all. I would suggest instead that it is not 
because film has never been Modernist that it cannot be subject to 
legitimation by paralogy, but rather because the 'conditions' under 
which film were sanctioned as Modernist have changed. In other 
words, the shift into postmodernism can be more properly traced in 
the loss of the Modernist binary which secured a space for film to 
function as autonomous, avant-garde knowledge. My point is that 
contemporary developments in the cultural production and 
consumption of 'the visual' make it very difficult to accept the 
modernist differentiation (namely, the auton(xny of the sphere of 
art from popular culture) upon which this kind of analysis is based 
and, therefore, to accept avant-gardism as the saviour of 
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postmodernist aesthetics. 
It is clear that a widespread loss of faith in the historical 
role of avant-gardes to make undoubted aesthetic transformations 
consequential for a broader audience (which characterizes much 
thinking on postmodernism) is attributable to the 
'institutionalization' of the transformatory potential of 'Heroic' 
Modernist avant-gardes, and this, clearly, is a crucial factor in 
arguing for a deliberate and conscious rethinking of its viability 
as a postmodernist mode for 'Imowledge'. But also profound changes 
in the wider cultural context of film ran be identified to support 
the view that conceptualizing film 'knowledge' within the Modernist 
mode is 'played out. 
Primarily, I would suggest, it is the developments in the 
tecbnological context of image production and consumption which has 
severely contracted the potential for effective avant-garde 
strategies. Witness the exponential growth in power and 
pervasiveness of image technologies and image-producing media 
- 
satellite and cable television, video, fashion, advertising, 
magazines, commodity packaging, graphic computers and computer 
games, 'real time' simulators, virtual reality, camcorders, 
interactive CD and CD photography, laser disc and multi-media 
'edutainment' packages. In Huyssen's view, a critical factor in 
Surrealism's 'paralogical' anti-art subversion was its 
incorporation of popular cultural media: 
*99 the historical avant-garde's appropriation of technology for high art (e. g. film, photography, montage 
principle) could produce shock since it broke with the 
aestheticism and the doctrine of art's automomy from 
'real' 115e which were dominant in the late 19th 
century. 
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But such shock tactics are hardly available today. More 
importantly, as noted in Chapter Two, in a postmodernist 
I technologized' society, the nature of knowledge cannot survive 
tmchanged: such proliferation of image technologies has radically 
altered both the effectivity of avant-gardist strategies, and the 
ways in which the consumption of film is socially situated. 
Firstly, the evident success of dominant capitalist culture in 
acc. (xnmodating and inc-orporating avant-garde art within a 
canmodified art market in which 'innovation' is functional for its 
maintenance. The form that co-option takes for film avant-gardism 
is slightly different than that, say, for painting or sculpture 
where financial value can be attached to the scarcity value of an 
Artist's 'original' (as Benjamin argued, it makes no sense to think 
in terms of 'originals' with mechanically and now electronically 
reproduced images). I have yet to discover, and doubt, if any 
corporate investment has resulted in collections of Abstract or 
Anti-illusionist film on the scale of the painting collections of, 
say, Saatchi & Saatchi. Rather, the appropriation of avant-garde 
film for daninant culture can be traced in the use of strategies 
which originated as tools of critique in the most conventional and 
banal of contexts. For instance, the use of avant-garde 
(especially Surrealist) juxtapositional tedmiques to invigorate 
commercial commodity aesthetics, pliotographic advertising imagery 
and televisual advertising narratives. More crucially, one only 
has to spend a morning watching children's/youth television or a 
slice of MIV to recognize that what were once considered tactics 
for critical distantiation. are now mainstream: abstract graphics, 
frenetic editing, anti-realist Camera ZOOMS and panS, iMaReS, 
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manipulated by repetition and distortion, cinema verite/documentary 
'sha]W' cameras, 'jump cuts' use of intertitles at odds with visual 
information, sound/image dysjunctions, non-'closure' of narrative, 
and 'laying bare the device' by revealing the 'artifice' of camera- 
people, studio and directors. To recall the core of MacCabe's 
argument for using Brecht as model for Godardian film practice: 
What is important, therefore, is that in the separation 
of the elements the spectator gets separated out of this 
unity and homogeniety 
- 
this passivity 
- 
in order to 
enter into an active appropriation of the scenes 
presented to him. This active appropriation is the of 
epic theatre 
- 
it is the production of knowledge. 
Even allowing for the view that television requires a more 
'distracted' and passive mode of spectatorship than either 
theatrical or cinema viewing, the incorporation of avant-garde film 
techniques suggests that the mainstay of radical emancipatory 
cinema, the Godardian/Brechtian 'separation of elements', can be 
employed without political consequences of any kind. The Modernist 
tenet, that the formal separation of film 'elements' 'will 
automatically produce a disunity disturbing to the audience, and 
ý1- 
- that that disturbance is itself a process of psychological 
I separation' conducive to learning, 24 seems wholly inappropriate 
for audiences habituated to these techniques outside of cinema. 
These issues have kwediate bearing on the strategies available for 
film avant-gardism. Artists using montages of televisual 
sequences, incoporating elements from advertisingg utilizing video, 
rephotography, repetitive loop circuits, etc. for gallery 
'installations' or multi-media 'performances' often, as Tagg also 
notes, result in artworks which are barely distinguishable from the 
products of the 'commodity' aesthetics they intend to 'subvert'. 
25 
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The massive expansion of the domestic consumption of film on 
satellite, Pay-TV or wre particularly on video, also bears 
significantly upon the reception of film in that the conditions of 
its consumption are less and less those of the institution 
'cinema'. Many film theorists have argued that it is as much the 
'illusionist' conditions for spectatorship of industrial cinema as 
the ideological content of individual mainstream film that 
conspire to structure passive spectatorship through the 'relay of 
looks' (which imbricates the Imaginary 'looks' of projection, 
audience, identification and 'the gaze'). But the altered 
circumstances offered by domestic video suggest that film may be 
viewed without such 'metapsychological' investment in the 'wilful 
suspension of disbelief'. One could argue that relatively new 
technologies such as video have increased individual control over 
ý1- 
- the conditions of spectatorship: spectatorship need not be bound to 
the ideological repression of linear, temporal narrative flow when 
'identification' is so often 'broken' by the use of pause, fast 
forward, rewind and, of course, stop. Instead, if cinema's 
'hWinary' conditions are no longer the dominant ones of film 
reception, it is worth asking what status can be granted to avant- 
gardist programmes based on sbuilar 'anti-narrative' tactics of 
spectatorial disruption and fragmentation. 
More broadly, the shift in image-culture that these 
technologies indicate are accanpanied by processes which 
'spectacularize' or aestheticize the everyday, again making it 
difficult to maintain an 'apartness' for film avant-gardes to 
function as loci of critical aesthetic knowledge. Huyssen is again 
to the point in arguing that through the course of the twentieth 
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century, it is mass media popular culture which has transformed and 
revolutionized life experience for Western industrial nations, - and 
not avant-garde film art. For example, the aestheticization of 
commodity consumption, the all-consuming notion of life as 
'lifestyle', the reality of news 'events' articulated by the 
'performance' of electronic communication, popular music video, the 
aestheticization of politics, charity 'spectaculars', or sports 
coverage 
- 
now found lacking without accompanying video replays, 
slow-motion and pop music soundtrack. The undoubted 
laestheticization' of contemporary urban life is an important 
indication that Modernism's art/life dichotomy, which secured the 
autonomous space for legitimating film as 'art', is no longer 
functional in that the differentiation of an 'aesthetic' use of 
film is increasingly also the modus operandi of 'dominant' visual 
culture. Another route to the conclusion that avant-garde film art 
movements have approached their historical endpoint is thereby 
suggested: it can be argued that Surrealism does indeed prefigure 
'the postmodern', though not because of an analogy between its 
anti-art programme and Lyotardian paralogy. Rather, Surrealism 
anticipates the postmodern condition in that its 'mode of 
signification' collapses Modernism's real/representation binary in 
a manner which neatly illustrates how the 'aestheticization' of 
everyday life has been underwritten by a 'loss of the real'. 
To expand on this a little, I argued in Chapter Two that 
Modernist film avant-gardes functioned under the principle of 
autonomy in which art was bracketed from 'reality' either for the 
pursuit of specificity, or for securing a space for critical 
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knowledge. It was also noted that Surrealist film signification is 
not wholly amenable to this categorization because it de- 
differentiates the binary which sets art apart fran life. More 
specifically, Surrealist film does not attempt to invoke a 'real' 
behind its representation but instead aims to persuade the 
spectator of the reality of its fiction. This clearly 
distinguishes Surrealist f ihn fran emancipatory avant-gardism in 
that there is fundamental divergence on the question of what 
function film signification should perform: within the framework of 
emancipatory 'knowledge', film functions as both ideological mis- 
representation of the 'real' but also, in its Modernist form, 
functions as an instrument for 'tearing the veil' of mystification. 
Surrealism, in contrast, makes no such distinctions and offers no 
means for a Brechtian 'return from alienation' as spectatorial 
'depaysement' cannot be enlisted for the purpose of conscious 
critical knowledge. This provides a useful parallel for the de- 
differentiated signification apparent in the 'aestheticization' of 
quotidian life: in this sense, Surrealism has become the cultural 
dominant of the late twentieth century, and hence is not available 
as an individuated, subversive aesthetic option. Scott Lash has 
similarly argued for this reading of contemporary visual culture 
and theorizes postmodernism. as a 'regime of sigmLfication' which 
functions without the 'reality principle' sustaining modernist 
theory (for him, Marx, Freud and Brecht). 26 Postmodernist visual 
culture for Lash is defined, like Surrealist film, by a mode of 
signifying which problernatizes relations between signifier, 
signified and referent so that the 'referent functions as a 
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signifier'. In other words, the 'real' of everyday life is 
'already a representation', experienced as a 'spatio-temporal- 
configuration of signifiers': reality becomes 'spectacular', that 
is, composed of/by images. Againg analysis of this kind makes a 
Modernist separation of art from life a highly problematic one to 
entertain. De-differentiating Modernism's formal, rational 
'discursive' conceptual formation which privileges writing over 
images and textual depth over surface appearance, Lash suggests 
that postmodernism denotes a 'figural' regime in which hermeneutic 
interpretation and 'depth' models of textual meaning are replaced 
by a conceptual configuration dominated by the 'surface' aesthetics 
of the visual image. Thus, quite unlike Modernism, which draws 
attention to the internal conditions of its specificity or to 
cinematic conventions, film postmodernism suggest that the 'real' 
is itself coded and conventional 
- 
there is no 'real' laying 
beneath the surface of signs since the 'outside' of representation 
is similarly constituted by the play of signifiers. In this 
context, in what sense is it possible to hold that there is an 
inalienable 'real' to which avant-garde film can return the 
spectator? Further,, Dana Polan has suggested that film as 
'spectacle' functions in a way that is not amenable to the kind of 
structural narrative analysis which understands narrative to be the 
primary mechanism or 'bearer' of dominant ideology. With both 
anti-narrative avant-gardism, and Marxist analyses of the 
ideological function of narrative in mind, critical theories of 
narrative which explain such genres as Westerns, kung fu, James 
Bond, and the detective in terms of the 'mythological resolution' 
they operate may have to confront the possibility that: 
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There might well be an ideological practice of the 
spectacular, a politics of the kinetic, in which one's 
role as spectator is not to take up myths but to avoid 
all myths, to fall for pure looking that offers no 
critical representation of social relations, that works 
precisely to tradý7analysis of the world for a kinetic 
experience of it. 
Similarly, for Baudillard, without the concept of 'representation' 
(which is predicated on the existence of a 'real'): 
... 
the whole system becomes weightless, it is no longer 
anything but a gigantic simulacrum. 
- 
not unreal, but a 
simulacrum, never exchanging for what is real, but 
exchanging in itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without 
reference or circumference. So it is with simulation, 
insofar as it is opposed to representation. The latter 
starts from the principle that the sign and the real are 
equivalent (even if this equivalence is utopian, it is a 
fundamental axiom). Conversely, simulation starts from 
the utopia of this principle of equivalence, from the 
radical negation of the sign as value, from the sign as 
aversion and death sentence of every reference. Whereas 
representation tries to absorb simulation by interpreting 
it as false representation, simulation envelops týg whole 
edifice of. representation as itself a simulacrum. 
cannot here explore Baudrillard's provocative theories on the 
shift from the 'drama of alienation' to the imploded 'ecstasy of 
communication' but it is evident that the loss of the category of 
'representation' is a profound one, and from this perspective the 
chances of avant-garde film mounting a successful 'subversion of 
reality' in the society of the 'simulacrum' look pretty slim. But 
perhaps it is from this perspective that one should read Burger's 
statement as an epitaph for film avant-gardism, and not from 
Habermas' optimistic programme for the 'appropriation of the 
expert Is culture frorn the standpoint of the lifeworld': 
When art and the praxis of life are one, when the praxis 
is aesthetic and art is practical, art's purpose can no 
longer be discovered, because the existence of two 
distinct spheres (art and the praxis of life) which is 
constituitive of th, 29concept of purpose or intended use 
has come to an end. 
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If the cultural and institutional context of film has been 
redefined by these developments, it is important that a 
reevaluation of the epistemological resources appropriate for their 
analysis be attempted. In short, I would suggest that the 
Modernist context in which Lyotard defines the paralogical, which 
continues to split the sphere of art from life, to differentiate 
knowledge and to propagate the notion that critical knowledge can 
function only by subverting the 'game rules' of art, makes his 
analysis of the 'conditions' for postmodern knowledge a difficult 
one to defend. This is more especially the case as it is founded 
upon a refusal to engage with film per se. 30 For Lyotard, film is 
always on the side of 'realism' which makes him ill-placed to 
consider the possibility that many recent 'industrial' films do. not 
work to 'stabilize the referent'. Once again, this would imply 
that Modernist categories for constructing film as an object of 
'knowledge' must be reconsidered. There are enough instances of 
mainstream films to support this view, for example: Repo Man (Cox, 
1984)q (Verhoeven, 1987), Kiss of the Spider Woman 
(Babenco, 1986), Eraserhead and Blue Velvet (Lynch, 1976 & 1986), 
Stranger Than Paradise (Jarmuschg 1984)9 Stardust Memories, ý21ig, 
and Purple Rose of Cairo (Allen, 1980,1983 and 1984), Brazil 
(Gilliam, 1985), Dead Ringers (Cronenbergg 1988), etc. This is not 
to claim that the use of 'anti-realist' elements 
- 
parody, self- 
relexivity, distantiation, mixing of genres, non-closure of 
narrative, ironic quotations from and intertextual references to 
film history 
- 
autanatically constitutes an unnitigated 
gradicalization' of commodified film. But nor, on the other hand, 
do I want to imply that any film exhibiting such 'postmodemist' 
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tendencies will ultimately be recuperable for dominant ideology. 
Instead, I would hold that these films 'figure' the collapse of the 
Modernist binaries and trouble the assumption that films which do 
not 'stabilize the referent' are thereby engaged in an aesthetic 
'subversion of reality'. Of course, exactly how, for whom and to 
what extent the 'destabilization' of 'realism' is enacted by 
particular texts is not open to generalization, and would require 
detailed textual analysis to determine the broader ideological 
contexts in which anti-realist components are situated. 
Nonetheless, I would venture to say that a more coherent 
postmodernist construction of film 'laiawledge' should accept a 
shrinkage in, if not abandonment of, the avant-gardist space of 
critique (theoretically secured by Modernist legitimation), and 
engage instead with the contradictions and 'undecidabilities' of 
cultural forms. If postmodernist critique camot have recourse to 
the 'guarantee' that avant-gardism has a privileged status in 
regard to 'knowledge' claims, a postmodernist politics of 
representation must ground claims upon a different set of 
'conditions'. 
More specifically, I would hold, a notion of subversion 
structured upon the metaphor of the avant-garde actually runs 
cotmter to the main concerns of Lyotard's thesis, and this is 
important for a consideration of where feminism is to be located in 
the 'presentation of the unpresentable'. In order to demonstrate 
this proposition, the final Chapter will examine the consequences 
for feminism of thinking of postmodernism within the framework of 
paralogical avant-gardism. 
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MAPTER S IX 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF POSTMODERNISM (2)
For feminists who regard engagement with mass media to be an 
important and legitimate site of analysis and critique, the value 
of Lyotard's 'anti-realist' notion of Modernist-postmodernist 
'paralogical' avant-gardism is highly debatable for it rules out 
such engagement from the outset. It is made still more 
questionable by the fact that Lyotard's defintion of 'realism' 
extends beyond the 'fantasies' of transparent communication, 
spawned by mass cultural image tecbnologies, to include the 
'fictions' of organic unity and consensus called forth by demands 
that artists must function in the service of the social 
'community'. Repeating his earlier objections to the metanarrative 
of liberty, Lyotard's idea of the 'paralogical' is clearly 
concerned to counteract the 'terrorism' of the strong state's 
repression of aesthetic 'play' demanded in the name of the People: 
Realism, whose only definition is that it intends to 
avoid the question of reality implicated in that of art, 
always stands somewhere between academicism and kitsch. 
When power assumes the name of a party, realism and its 
neoclassical complement triumph over the experimental 
avant-garde by slandering it and banning it - that is, 
provided the correct' images, the 'correct' narratives, 
the 'correct' forms which the party requests, selects, 
and propagates can find a public to desire them as the 
appropriate remedy for the anxiety and depression that 
public experiences. 
(PC, p. 7 5) 
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SIMMilarly, for Lyotardt even the 'consensual' attempts of artists 
to establish links between art and the politics of the 'community' 
are haunted by a suspicion that behind them lies an illiberal 
homogeneity, the 'terror' of the Politically Correct. If 
'paralogical' subversion can be concerned only with the systems- 
immanent critique of the 'game rules' of aesthetic practice, it is 
thus freed from all rational and instrumental imperatives. And by 
this, feminist relations to the (now) postmodern sphere of the 
aesthetic are made problematic: for how is it possible to conceive 
of feminism without its essentially political claims upon the 
production and reception of 'art'? Further, how can such a notion 
of paralogy answer Lyotard's own guiding question 
- 
'Where, after 
the metanarratives, can legitimac resideV (my emphasis): 
The operativity criterion is technological; it has no 
relevance for judging what is true or just. Is legitimacy 
to be found in consensus obtained through discussion, as 
Jurgen Habermas thinks? Such consensus does violence to 
the heterogeneity of language games. And invention is 
always born of dissension. 
(PC, P. xxv) 
It would seem that 'justice' for Lyotard can only be secured 
negatively, that is, by the dynamic movement of paradoxological 
challenges which perpetually subvert the mechanisms which deny 
heterogeneous 'play' in favour of the 'transparent' instrumentality 
of political 'realism'. This is an initially attractive argument 
but not, f inally 
,a convinc-ing one as it does not identif y the 
conditions upon which feminism may articulate post-narrative 
I petition(s) for justice'. This returns discussion to some of the 
issues raised in Chapter Four relating to the potential dangers for 
feminism in rejecting a Modernist social bond in favour of 
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multiplying 'difference'. Having jettisoned the 'terrorist' or 
even mildly 'consensual' epistemological foundations of the 
metanarrative of emancipation, how can feminists then 'legitimate' 
claims to knowledge? It would appear that avant-gardism, now 
construed without the metanarratives and thus relieved of the 
constraints of political and social responsibility, is open to the 
charge that Lyotard's postmodern 'sphere of the aesthetic' 
conspires to marginalize the hard-won 'right' for feminists to 
challenge the construction of 'reality'. In other words, a 
feminist politics of representation is largely informed by 
'petitions' for 'correct' images and narratives because, crudely, 
images and narratives are understood to contribute significantly to 
ideologically oppressive constructions of female 'reality'. 
Alternatively, the feminist activity of 'subverting' reality might 
indeed be read as a legitimate inflection of paralogical 'moves'. 
But my point is: if aesthetic practice cannot be enlisted to 
propagate political projects, what is the function or purpose of 
such 1 subversion' if it is necessarily limited to the critique of 
the 'rules of art'? When aesthetic subversions of both 
performativity and political Irealismi cannot be 'ravaged' by 
'closing down the heterogeneity of language games', I find it 
difficult to envisage what meaning an 'aesthetics' absolutely freed 
from 'social and institutional practice' could have. Absolute 
freedom is vertiginous - but also meaningless. Ibus, although I 
take seriously his concern to avoid the traps of domination and 
control embedded within metanarrative constructions of aesthetics, 
I do not see that Lyotard's notion of paralogy leaves much upon 
which to re-construct a post-narrative politics of feminist 
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aesthetics, and on this ground I would question whether this does 
not in fact cause Lyotard to eliminate feminist 'players' from the 
agonistics of language games. Seyla, Benhabib has also identified 
the contradictory outcome for feminism of Lyotard's attempt to 
sketch 'the outline of a politics that would respect both the 
desire for justice and the desire for the unknown' (PC, p. 67): 
His defense of the morally uncompromising gesture of the 
asethetic avant-garde, his insistence upon the spirit of 
innovation, experimentation, [and] play... could be 
constituents of a Marxist radical, democratic politics... 
Yet, insisting upon the incommensurability of language 
games, in the name of polytheism, may generate moral and 
political indifference; the call for innovation, 
experimentation and play may be completely dissociated 
from social and institutional practice, and activation of 
differences may not amount to a democratic respect of the 
right of the other to be, but a conservative plea to 
place the other, because of her otherness, outside the 
pale of our common humanity and mutual responsibility. 
Where Modernist metanarrative thinking is construed as a conceptual 
'instrument' for domination and exclusion, postroodernist 
'incredulity' offers a valuable opportunity for reconceptualizing 
both theoretical and political strategies within a 'language 
pragmaticst consonant with a politics which both respects and 
'activates' difference. * But granting that, Lyotard's vision of 
postmodernist avant-garde paralogy offers little upon which to 
reconstruct a replacement for the politics of metanarrative film 
which can at the same time remain identifiably feminist - it is far 
from clear that aesthetic paralogy is an adequate mechanism for 
securing 'justice'. 
This, I think, is symptomatic of much wider divergence between 
the political agendas of some forms of postmodernism and of 
feminism. As Peter Dews notes, the 'radical credentials of post- 
structuralism should not be so readily taken for granted' if it is 
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'driven into an abandonment of systematic cognitive claim 
, 
indeed, 
because of its hostility to the universal, frequently into a quasi- 
2 aesthetic suspension of truth claims as such'. In the light of 
this, one cannot help but feel that Habermas's observation of some 
post-structuralist/deconstructivist thinking is aptly applied to 
Lyotard's 'sublime' aesthetic: 
The 'young conservatives' recapitulate the basic 
experience of aesthetic modernity. They claim as their 
own the revelations of a decentred subjectivity, 
emancipated from the imperatives of work and usefulness 
and with this experience they step outside the modern 
world. On the basis of modernistic attitudes they justify 
an irreconcilable antimodernism. They remove into the 
sphere of the far-away and the archaic the spontaneous 
powers of the imagination, self-experience and emotion. 
To instrumental reason they juxtapose in Manichean 
fashion a principle only accessible through evocation... 
('Modernity', p. 14) 
In short2 I do not think that Lyotardian 'presentation of the 
unpresentable' paralogy is a sufficient concept on which to base a 
a post-narrative politics of feminist film and, if feminism is to 
be persuaded. to, give up legitimation by the metanarrative of 
liberty without regret, then a better set of 'conditions' needs to 
be forged frcxn The Postmodern Condition than are suggested by the 
postmodernist recourse to notions of the 'sublime. In this sense, 
it is not admissable for the loss of legitimation by the Modernist 
metanarratives to be replaced by what is also Modernist. For, only 
once the Modernist remnants of Lyotard's thinking are dispensed 
with, can his most important insight into the 'conditions' for 
post-narrative knowledge be appropriated: 'Postmodern knowledge is 
not simply a tool of the authorities; it refines our sensitivity to 
differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the 
incommensurable' (PC, p. xxv). I would suggest that feminism is in 
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ob 
" stronger position to define postmodern knowledge and demonstrate 
" 
1sensivity to differenceso if it scraps what Tagg calls the 
'fable' of the avant-garde as repository of critical or 
I paralogical' knowledge, and dispenses with a differentiated notion 
of the aesthetic. The epistemological gains for feminism in 
construing postmodernism without recourse to a mass culture/avant- 
garde binary can be shown to far outweigh its epistmological 
'loss'. It should also provide some ground for envisaging a 
politics of film in the light of the previous Chapter which 
indicated that contemporary image culture militates against the 
success of film as 'tool' of avant-gardist 'subversion'. 
In short, I wish to retrieve the valuable core of Lyotard's 
thinking on difference to situate a feminist reading of the 
'postmodern condition' with regard to its consequences for the 
politics of film spectatorship. To anchor this requires further 
consideration of feminism's relationship to the 'social bond' and 
of the meaning of post-narrative 'dispersal'. For the way in which 
feminism construes the 'social bond' is evidently crucial in 
determining whether postmodernist 'fragmentation' is at the same 
the dissolution of feminist emancipatory claims. 
The Conditions for Postrunlernist Knowledge 
My earlier examination of feminist avant-gardism arrived 
somewhat pessimistically at the conclusion that the loss of the 
Modernist metanarrative of liberty might pose a serious threat to 
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feminist emancipatory claims. It was suggested that a 
postmodernist theory of 'the subject' as splintered and fragmented 
would remove the ground upon which Modernist 'totalizing' 
recits are founded. Extending this, it was noted that a post- 
structuralist, radical destabilization of a binary mode of 'gender 
analytics' might similarly be held to invalidate feminism's 
critical project. But the truth of this depends very much upon how 
one understands the concept of 'difference'. 
Taken as an absolute, where differences are wholly 
incommensurable, the concept of 'difference' is led to a 
vertiginous, and I would hold, a-political situation in which 
attempts to ground even a non-totalizing radical politics are 
nullified: without assuming a coherent and identifiable notion of 
female subjectivity, on what basis is it possible to ground a 
politics founded upon the capacity of subversive agency? It is on 
this point that the divergence between feminist and 'mainstream' 
postmodernist deconstructions of 'the subject' becomes explicit. 
There is a huge discrepancy between identifying Lyotardian post- 
narrative fragmentation with postmodernism defined as a 
'destabilized world' of the 'infinitely perspectival' cf. 
Nietszche), and the quite different set of shifts named as 
'postmodernist' within feminism. It is important to be clear about 
this distinction: for the latter, the purpose of dissolving the 
'liberal-humanist self' in favour of decentred subjectivity is 
understood as a feminist one, explicitly concerned with dismantling 
the culturally oppressive synonymity of masculine identity with 
feminine identity as its Other. Contrarily, as Patricia Waugh 
argues, Derridean post-structuralism: 
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... 
situates itself epistemologically at the point where 
the epistemic subject characterized in terms of 
historical exýerience, interiority, and consciousness has 
given way to decentred' subject identified through ffie 
public, 31n? ersonal signifying practices of other 
similarly decentred' subjects. It may even situate itself at a point where there is no 'subject' and no history in the old sense at all. There is only a system 
of linguistic StrTtures, a textual construction, a play 
of differences... 
Several feminist commentators have been provoked by this to ask: 
why is it that, just when feminism enters to challenge patriarchal 
concepts of identity, to threaten the 'neutral' masculine privilege 
in theory and politics, in order to formulate visions of new 
conditions for female subjectivity, is the very idea of a unified 
and coherent 'self' dissolved? It is difficult to give a precise 
answer to this without suggesting that deconstructivist theory is a 
highly sophisticated parallel to the 'backlash' against feminism 
being articulated at less conceptual levels, though several 
commentators have argued that this analysis can be sustained. 4 
Nonetheless, Waugh is absolutely to the point in arguing that early 
feminism was distinguished by calls for new identities and 
subjectivities to counter dominant patriarchally-prescribed 
versions of the female 'self', a feminine 'self' exclude from the 
realm of symbolic signification. As noted in the last Chapter, the 
emergence of Modernist feminist epistemology was necess 
defined by attempts to seek 'a subjective identity, a sense of 
effective agency and history for women which has hitherto been 
5 denied them by the dominant culture'. But, crucially, this should 
not be taken to mean that feminism simply reproduced a notion of 
female subjectivity in terms of an individual, isolated and 
essential ego; rather, analyses of the ideolgically and socially 
-301- 
constructed 'nature' of feminine 'identity' insisted that 
subjectivity is not 'owned' by a self but is historically situated 
and discursively 'placed'. This does not sit easily with theories 
of 'difference' which celebrate the 'loss' of self: 
In the dialectical relationship between traditional 
humanism and the postmodern anti-humanism emerging in the 
1960's, women continue to be displaced. How can they long 
for, reject, or synthesize a new mode of being from a 
thesis which has never contained or expresse what they 
have felt their historical experience to be. 
Within feminism, the concept of subjectivity emerges out of a 
dialectical relationship between an anti-essentialist recognition 
of the profound impersonality of social power structures, of 
discursive and institutional placement, and, importantly, the 
'necessity for assuming a self-concept which recognizes the 
possibility of human agency, the need for personal history... and 
7 the consolidation of human connectedness'. In other words, a 
feminist radicalization of 'the subject' does not simply disperse 
the concept to the point of its absolute dissolution, but grasps 
the fact that 'subjectivity' is, above all, defined relati 
emphasizing instead the 'provisionality and positionality of 
identity'. 8 It is with this non-ontological or non-essentialist 
understanding of 'self' that it is possible to suggest that The 
Postmodern Condition could be utilized theoretically to ground a 
post-narrative politics of film that respects the post- 
structuralist tenet of 'difference' but which does not in the 
process remove the 'right' to articulate feminist claims to 
knowledge. A careful reading of Lyotard's thesis will actually 
demonstrate that he can. offer a way between Modernist homogeneity 
or absolute postmodernist dispersal. 
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Lyotard is mirxiful to retain the idea that the dissolution of 
the social bond does not mean the 'disintegration of social 
- 
aggregates into a mass of individual atoms thrown into the 
absurdity of Brownian motion'. He argues: 
Nothing of the kind is happening: this point of 
view... is haunted by the paradisaic representation of a lost 'organic' society. 
A self does not amount to much, but no self is an island; each exists in a fabric of relations that is now 
more complex and mobile than ever before. Young or old, 
man or woman, rich or poor, a person is always located at 
'nodal points' of specific communication circuits, however tiny these may be. 
(PC, p. 15) 
It is worth recalling Lyotard's statement noted in Chapter One: 
'most people have lost the nostalgia for the lost narrative. It in 
no way follows that they are reduced to barbarity' (PC, p. 41). 
Lyotard is clearly concerned to argue that a post-narrative network 
model of the social bond must recognize the 'situatedness' of its 
nodal points: the bankruptcy of the grand, r&it does not mean that 
individuals are free from all 'banding'. Ignoring the gender of 
the following, he suggests that: 
... 
there is no need to resort to some fiction of social 
origins to establish that language games are the minimum 
relation required for society to exist: even before he is 
born, a human child is already positioned as a referent 
in the story recounted by those around him, in relation 
to which he inevitably charts his course. Or more simply 
still, the question of the social bond, insofar as it is 
a question, is itself a language game, the game of 
inquiry. It immediately positions the person who asks, as 
well as the addressee and the referent asked about: it is 
already the social bond. 
(PC I p. 15) 
In this there is room for construing The Postmodern. Condition more 
positively for feminism than has been suggested so far. I would 
take frcm Lyotard the notion that the play of 'difference' is 
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historically and socially limited and circumscribed: 'selves' are 
always located 'subjects', embedded and situated in the social. 
'fabric of relations' which define and place them in 'specific' 
communication circuits, in 'differences' which are materially 
(socio-economically, racially, politically, culturally) grounded. 
And this is important for reflecting upon the meaning of 
'difference' within a feminist framework: 'difference' is not an 
absolute, but a relational condition which appeals neither to a 
'unified' or 'authentic' feminine 'self', nor to that mirror image 
of the liberal non-gendered subject, the postmodernist subject, 
destabilized and resigned to the perpetual instabilities of 
differential 'play'. 
Lyotard's network model of identity is wholly consonant with 
a feminist politics which understands that gender identity is 
constructed through a network of other power relations: race, 
class, sexual orientation, religion, geography, etc. In itself, 
this is not a profoundly new insight for feminism. However, scme 
postmodernist feminists have taken this further to argue that 
'postmodernist' deconstruction of Modernist feminism's 
I unitotalism' must inevitably call into question the validity of 
the very concept of 'gender'. It is argued that the most effective 
way of clearing space for the expansion of decentred and partial 
claims is to deny the subject 'fixity' inscribed by early feminist 
notions of the 'authentic' female 'self', even if it includes a 
thorough-going 'gender scepticism'. This is not considered to be a 
cause for regret. For Flax, Young and others, the loss of the 
epistemological bond upon which metanarrative feminism depends is 
compensated by the simultaneous loss of related epistemologies 
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viewed as instruments of domination and contol: 
Feminist theories, like 
should encourage us to 
ambivalerr-e, ambiguity, 
expose the roots of our 
structure no Ttter how 
needs may be. 
other forms of postmodernism, 
tolerate and interpret 
and multiplicity as well as 
needs for imposing order and 
arbitrary and oppressive these 
I would agree that it is of paramount importance that often radical 
'differences' between women are represented without being effaced 
'under some larger category labelled femaleness, femininity, 
womanhood, or in the final instance, Woman'. 10 Nonetheless, it is 
important to be clear about what 'gender-scepticism' implies: how 
far can the dissolution of female 'identity' in favour of analysis 
of other power structures determining subjectivity be pushed before 
feminism relinquishes the 'object' of its politics 
- 
gendered 
subjects? In this respect, I share Di Stephano's concern that 
subjecting feminism to the critique of totalization in favour of 
the proliferation of multiple differences runs an extraordinarily 
high risk 
- 
of losing the very principle of difference without 
which the political project of feminism is very difficult to 
sustain: 
To the extent that feminist politics is bound up with a 
specific constituency or subject, namely, women, the 
postmodernist prohibition against subject-centred inquiry 
and theory undermines the legitimacy of a broad based 
movement dedicated to articulffing and implementing the 
goals of such a constituency. 
Readily accepting Sandra Harding's proposal that feminism requires 
a 'principled ambivalence' to both Modernism and postmodernism, I 
would hold back from fully embracing 'gender-septicism' if, in the 
rush to remove the vestiges of domination and exclusion from 
feminist discourses, postmodernism feminists confuse a laudable 
desire to avoid univocal and universalizing theories within 
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feminism with a potentially anti-feminist position that forswears 
analysis built on Modernist insights into the undeniable 'cultural 
fact' of gendered power relations. Put another way, understanding 
that women's oppression does not operate monolithically but is 
constituted through a nodal or relational model of equally (and 
perhaps more oppressive) power relations certainly results in the 
break-up of a 'unitotal' Modernist concept of patriarchy which 
holds that all women are subjected to male domination in the same 
way: sexually oppressive mechanisms clearly Lo specify gender 
difference 'differently' for Black, Third World or lesbian women. 
But to extrapolate from this that the only response to the loss of 
lunitotal' feminism is to 'delegitimate a priori the exploration of 
continuity and structural common ground between womenv12 is not a 
conclusion I would wish to embrace. My admittedly pragmatic and 
'partial' critical perspective would want to keep the fragmentation 
of identity from splintering beyond the point at which it is no 
longer 'useful' for a broader political project of a 
heterogeneously construed feminism thus denying the potential for 
articulating aspirations to common resistance and shared 
responsibility for change. The real strength of a relational model 
of subjectivity such as Waugh's is that it permits a critical 
position which remains 'Modernist' enough to argue that gender 
difference is still a major determinant of social/discursive 
placement for women, but not necessarily the or, in specific 
circumstances, the primary discursive location of female subjects. 
Offered a choice between a) gender and the risk of 'totalization' 
or b) fragmentation and dissolution of the political 'self', I 
would want to question the need for aligning with either side of 
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this too neatly formulated binary, and suggest instead that it is 
precisely because feminism has been defined by a relational and 
non-essential understanding of identity that the delegitimation of 
the lunitotall Modernist metanarrative of emancipation does not 
invalidate post-narrative feminist claims to know 9 By 
retaining a feminist 'social bond' posed as necessarily and 
perpetually provisional, vestigial, perhaps even 'fictive', 13 I 
would suggest that feminism can legitimate its claims without 
resorting either to a notion of the fixity of gender binarism, or 
investment in maintaining 'unitotal' visions of gender difference. 
This position does not preclude a full recognition of the 
splintering of homogenized Woman that postmodernist attention to 
the multiple determinations on the forms of gender differentiation 
demands, and a relational model of identity must accept that 
'unity', like consensus, is a 'horizon' which will never be 
reached. Feminist 'pluralism' (as advocated by Fraser and 
Nicholson) begins from the view that 'gender forms only one axis of 
a complex heterogeneous construction, constantly interpenetrating, 
in historically specific ways, with multiple other axes of 
identity'. 14 Evidently, an important insight but, viewed 
tactically, acknowledging that other structures which 'locate' 
female subjects within 'communication networks' should not thereby 
invalidate analysis of the sites where the exercise of power 
relations is founded upon gender differentation: family, state, 
medical provision, division of labour, gender socialization, 
education, reproduction, sexuality, personal violence, legal 
practice and, of course, the politics of film representation. 
In many ways, this is to accept as inevitable the need for 
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adopting a dual perspective: on one hand, acknowledging that 
holding on to a gendered framework of enquiry and attempting '-to 
occupy a place as a speaking subject within the traditional frame' 
is to become 'complicit in the discourse one wishes to 
deconstruct'. On the other, recognizing that dispensing with the 
notion of gender in favour of the 'troubling and multiple 
permeabilities of boundary and subject positioning' leaves feminism 
bereft of politically agential subjects. 15 Post-structuralist, or, 
better, deconstructivist dissolution of feminism's 'Modernist' 
gender binary is indeed a powerful tool to employ in order to 
escape the 'dualistic logic' which is characteristic of Western 
phallogocentric discourses. Similarly the seductive 'utopia' of ' 
a dream of the innumerable... a desire to escape the combinatory 
to invent incalculable choreographies'16 is a potent weapon for 
keeping the 'dead hand of ordering' at bay. However, to 'adopt a 
political position is of necessity to assume for the moment a 
consistent and answerable identity'17: a post-narrative condition 
of 'difference' clearly should challenge what are undoubtedly 
unitotal perspectives derived from the Modernist feminist 
emancipatory narrative, but it does not necessarily follow that 
critical analysis must dispense with an epistemological frame which 
takes gender as its primary 'axis'. This suggests that what the 
process of deconstructing 'the' feminist subject' ran do': 
... 
is to reveal the inauthenticity of the goal of 
'personal unity', expose the contradictions of the 
liberal definition of subjectivity (particularly as they 
operate to oppress women), and thus act as a starting- 
point for the alternative projection of a society founded 
on a dispersed but rational rather than indivilgalist 
understanding and construction of the subject. 
Thus within a network model of the social bond in which its nodal 
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points are discursively situated and located, it is possible to 
restate my argument that the grand recit, of liberty does collapse 
under pressures for representation, but that: 
... 
the object of attack should not be identity as such 
but its dominant construction as total, non-contradictory 
and unchanging. We need representations that take account 
of identities 
- 
representations which work with a degree 
of fluidity and contradiction 
- 
and we need to forge 
different identities 
- 
ones that hely make productive use 
of the contradictions in our lives. 
Gledhill's proposal indicates that two post-metanarrative avenues 
are open to feminism: firstly, and one which is compatible with the 
political implications of post-structuralist theories of 'self', to 
seek a destabilization of 'total' and 'non-contradictory' 
constructions of female identity and, secondly, and one which seems 
to run counter to it, to reconstruct and represent new identities. 
It is within this framework that my reading of the consequences of 
the delegitimation of emancipatory metanarratives for feminism is 
confined to an assessment of post-narrative challenges to 
perspectives derived from 'unitotal' feminist thinking. The course 
of the next section will address why calls for 'difference' have 
contested a) the Modernist constitution of film as 'knowledge', and 
b) the conceptual resources through which female (which is not 
equivalent to feminist) film spectatorship is theorized. 
Poslumn lernist Difference and Feminist Film Theory 
For my analysis, it is only by dispensing with Modernist 
categories that the field of 'difference' can be opened up, and 
this is a primary requirement for feminism if critique of the 
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metanarratives is to serve as the precondition for a positive 
project of evolving new modes of analysis which aim to accommodate 
this. There is, then, a much wider issue to be considered as a 
result of this proposition which relates to the broader 
constitution of feminist aesthetics under Modernism, and, further, 
to feminism's relation to a concept of 'the aesthetic' itself. 
My examination of the consequences for feminism of the loss of 
the metanarrative social bond concluded that a proliferation of 
'difference' should place a question mark over the potentially 
hanogenizing 'use' of aesthetics by feminist avant-gardism, 
especially in its deconstructionist form. It was suggested that, 
fran a postmodernist position, the 'unitotal' perspective secured 
by the metanarrative of liberty must give way to theories which can 
adequately accommodate 'difference'. In this respect, feminist 
deconstructionist text-determined politics of spectatorship exhibit 
a fundamental complicitity with male-defined canons of traditional 
Modernist definitions of 'the aesthetic', as Claire Johnston notes: 
women s art that poses itself as other', as 
negativity, as essentially feminine -a cultural feminism 
which is unified, non-contradictory and exclusive - could 
be seen as no longer a threat to the institutions of art 
and could bloa way in which male dominance in art can be 
maintained. 
Stern likewise points out that the Modernist model of transgressive 
spectatorship: 
... 
can also institute linguistic strategies which may 
well be subversive within certain contexts (eg. academia) 
but which are nevertheless institutionalised and 
legitimised by a class structure 2Yhich reproduces 
oppression in a different guise. 
Stern's remark is an indication of the undoubted class-cultural and 
educational exclusivity which has informed the notion of 
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'decentred' spectatorship within the Modernist emancipatory avant- 
garde as I have defined it, and the charge of cultural elitism is 
easily laid against the arcane 'difficulty' of theoretically 
informed avant-garde experimentation which seeks spectatorial 
'displeasure'. Feminist deconstructionism's audience: 
participates in the r- 
cog, noscente, positioned 
ideologically correct', 
which is defined by its 
mystifý'ption attribute4 
media. 
comforting identity of critic or 
in the sjýhe of 'the 
and the radical' 
-a position difference from the ideological 
d to the audiences of the mass 
Hence, if the Modernist sea ch for a 'feminist aesthetic' falls too 
easily into the trap of univocality: 
Feminist art, on the other hand, which asserts a woman's discourse about her position and the inter-subjective 
relationships which constitute her as a female subject in 
history, is far more problematic and far less easily 
assimilated into the conception of women a 23 irrevocable 
'other' by which patriarchy is maintained. 
It is interesting to note that de Lauretis's reading of Jeanne 
Dielman... and Born in Flames is similarly informed by a larger 
concern to question femirdsm's relationship to film Modernism. She 
argues that these films operate in terms of a 'de-aesthetic' since 
they resist entrapment'in the snare of positing a 'feminist 
aesthetic' within Modernist parameters: 
To ask of these women's films: what formal, stylistic or 
thematic markers point to a female presence behind the 
camera?, and hence to generalize and universalize, to 
say: this is the look of and sound of feminist cinema, 
that is its language 
- 
finally only means complying, 
accepting a certain definition of art, cinema and 
culture, and obligingly showing how women can and do 
'contribute', pay their tribute, to 'society'. Put 
another way, to ask whether there is a feminine or female 
aesthetict or a specific language of women's cinema, is 
to remain caught in the master's house and there, as 
Audre Lorde's suggestive metaphor warns us, to legitimate 
the ýýdqr agendas of a culture we badly need to 
change. 
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It might be possible to argue that challenging the inscribed 
tradition' of film Modernism (that isq redefining the 'rules'_ 
which constitute film as art) is a neat formulation of a 
postmodernist paralogical 'move' in the 'game' of art. However, 
this is clearly untenable if attempts to escape from the totalizing 
vision of a 'specifically feminist aesthetic' are replaced by a 
'de-aesthetic' which is itself tied to 'realist' political claims 
which 'ravage' the radical heterogeneity that Lyotard reserves for 
paralogical 'sublimity'. The most pertinent aspect of both 
Johnston and de Lauretis's analyses, though, is that it brings 
sharply into focus that a fragmentation of the feminist social bond 
must entail a revaluation of the categories used to conceive of the 
relations between film, politics and 'knowledge'. De Lauretis's 
view suggests that it is the search for an 'aesthetic' which needs 
to be reconsidered along with the shift into postmodernism because 
a feminist aesthetic will necessarily unitotalize a plurality of 
female spectators: the real question at issue, then, is not how 
feminism can construe the terms of its intervention in the 'sphere 
of the asethetic, but whether feminism even needs this conceptual 
category. If the 'master's tools will never dismantle the master's 
house', 25 are a postmodernist politics of film better conceived for 
non-monolithic feminist aims without the ideological weight of 
Modernist differentiations which, I suggest, have necessarily 
constricted the potential effectivity of feminist film-making? 
This question, I think, indicates most clearly the existence of 
contradictory readings of The Postmodern Condition which are 
highlighted by reading from a feminist perspective: there is an 
irreconcilable tension arising from Lyotard's attempt to hold on to 
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a Modernist metaphor of the avant-garde with a model of the social 
bond which cannot sustain it. 
If Lyotard's analysis is pushed to its logical conclusion, 
both speculative and emancipatory modes of Modernist avant-gardism 
are dependent on perspectives derived from unitotal thinking: both 
define a 'space' for art outside of dominant commodified forms of 
industrial film produced and consumed by a social mass. It is only 
possible to retain a concept of the 'avant-garde' if it is defined 
against the idea of a homogeneous mass, and this mass must be 
addressed without reference to the heterogeniety of its 
constituents. The relationship between paralogical 
'destabilization' and 'realist' mass cultural film is similarly 
structured. But this is surely quite contrary to his thesis that 
the post-narrative social bond is multiple and fragmented, and a 
strong reading of Lyotard's thesis would stress the point that 
without a unitotal epistemology, there is quite simply no way of 
defining a 'garde' or body from which to be structurally or 
temporally favant'. How, then, from Lyotard's proposition that the 
post-narrative model for thinking the postmodern social bond is as 
a nodal network or fractured multiplicity of language games (which 
defy overarching command by metaphors of unitotality), is it 
possible to arrive at a notion of 'the mass' against which the 
enclave of avant-garde knowledge is structurally defined? Further, 
what can a concept of avant-gardism. mean within a fractured and 
heteromorphous nodal model for which the unitotal differentiation 
of so large and amorphous category of 'mass' is theoretically 
impossible? Again, the politics of fragmentation demands a radical 
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rethinking of the epistemological assumptions carried by the 
Modernist concept of the avant-garde. If the pressures which 
delegitimate the 'use' of feminist film under the metanarrative of 
emancipation derive from a homogenous conception of its social 
bond, it is only consistent to extend this critique to the concept 
of an undifferentiated 'mass. Once the notion of 'the mass' is 
similarly fractured and spatialized, it makes little sense to 
continue to assume a bifurcated structural relationship between 
different orders of knowledge which is implicitly inscribed by the 
metaphors of 'avant-garde' and 'mass'. The splintering of the 
Modernist social bond must entail the end of the conceptual network 
which supports Modernist differentiations that a) secure an 
epistemological function for the notion of an advance party of 
intellectual/aesthetic innovators capable of challenging tradition, 
'realism' and order; and b) protect the distinction between mass 
culture and high art required to define the space of its operation. 
In sum, it is not conceptually consistent to maintain the 
categories for understanding 'art' if the model of the social bond 
which furnishes them is no longer epistemologically legitimate. 
This has two important implications for the way any film text 
- 
documentary, mainstream, experimental, 'cult' etc. 
- 
is constructed 
and positioned as 'knowledge'. Firstly, without the Modernist 
notion that emancipatory critical knowledge is located in the 
'institutionalized' margins of the enclave, the 'field' of film is 
opened to a much greater diversity of forms that 'knowledge' may 
take. Secondly, the fragmentation of the 'mass' suggests that 
spectatorial positions must also be multiplied. 
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The main advantage gained by dispensing with the concepts of 
the avant-garde and the 'aesthetic' is that this clears a space 
which permits a heterogeneous approach to cultural practices which 
does not predetermine their status as, or potential for, critical 
knowledge. John Tagg has succinctly defined the value of such an 
approach: 
Cultural products and practices have significance 
precisely because of their place in that non-unitary 
complex of social practices and systems of representation 
which construct, evoke, maintain, or subvert the 
relations of domination and subordination in which social 
position and identity are produced. Such practices and 
representations must therefore affect and be in turn 
affected by political and economic conditions and 
conflicts, though they cannot be seen as their 
expression. Nor can they be evaluated by reference back 
to their origins or sources. Their only measure is the 
calculation of their specific social consequences 
- 
which is not to say they determine their condition or 
that these don't have effects. Cultural practices always 
involve mobilization of determinate means and relations 
of representation within an institutional framework whose 
organization takes particular historical forms 
- 
marked 
in the west, no doubt, by what Stuart Davis called 
'cultural monopoly'. There is no meaning outside this 
framework but it is not monolithic. The institutions 
which compose it offer multiple points of entry and 
spaces for contestation - and not just on the margins. 
The natur 26of the resistance will depend on the nature of 
the site. 
In view of the observations made earlier upon contemporary image- 
culture and the fate of film avant-gardism, this is an acute 
analysis of the 'space' left for political critique after the loss 
of the Modernist metanarratives. 
Firstly, this formulation confronts the issue that Modernist 
film avant-gardism has signally failed in its historical mission to 
effect radical revolutionary change. If 'marginality guarantees 
nothing', the terms of engagement with cultural practices cannot be 
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construed with the view that speculative or emancipatory avant- 
gardes function to produce 'real' knowledge outside of the 
- 
'institutional framework. Evidently, this is to accept that the 
teleological or politically utopian dimension of metanarrative 
avant-gardism must also be given up, but as I do not think that 
feminism (defined diversely) has been served well by 
'transgressive' Modernist aesthetics, it is easy to resist 
temptation of 'nostalgia' for the lost narrative which sustained 
Modernist feminist avant-gardism. 
Secondly, in view of my concern for 'difference', Tagg's 
formulation is useful because it cannot be implicated in the trap 
of 'totalizing' either the 'meaning' of f ihn texts, or of 
predefining the reception of cultural products by spectators: it is 
postmodernist in that its space for critique is limited but 
conditional upon locality and context, refusing Modernism's broad 
demarcations of knowledges in favour of a, negotiated production of 
of knowledge through the mechanisms of reception and appropriation. 
Taken together, these have important implications for the 
development of a politics of multiplicity which might be formulated 
against the Modernist 'traps' of unitotal thinking. The politics 
of Modernist film avant-gardism may now be severely limited, but 
that does thereby entail an end to feminist film politics L)P=r. ýe. 
And it is with spectatorship that theories of multiplicity must 
begin. A 'negotiated' model avoids eliding 'conceptually distinct 
notions: the "f eminine spectator" , constructed by the text , and the 
female audience, constructed by the social-historical categories of 
27 gender, class, race, and so on This, as E. Am Kaplan notes , 
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suggests that: 
... 
any reading is a result of a delicate, perhaps 
unconscious, negotiation between the historical 
positions/ideologies the text is seeking to present, and 
the frameworks/codes/local ideologies and individual 
psychoanfiytic constructs that spectators bring to 
texts... 
Acknowledging that 'meaning' is produced at the point of audience 
reception, and that readings are informed by a network of 
determinants conditioning the reception of film, clearly shifts the 
politics of spectatorship from 'instrumental' notions of 
'appointed' spectatorship to a complex notion which cannot 
conceptually prioritize 'textual' positioning. If the experience 
of spectatorship cannot be determined a priori, the 'culinary 
fallacy', the 'economistic' assumption underlying the view that 
spectators of mainstream film are passive 'consumers', must also 
be reviewed where the 'consumer' is taken to be 'one who, meeting 
with the media product as a discrete object, swallows it whole, an 
already processed textual package of the same order as a television 
dinner'. 29 Rather, Gledhill advances the view that a more mobile 
and complexly construed theory of the experience of spectatorship, 
a theory which permits audience interchange with textual process, 
suggests that spectatorial negotiation is characterized by 'fluxq 
discontinuities, digressions, rather than fixed positions' across 
or through a film text: 
It suggests that a range of positions of identification 
may exist within any text; and that, within the social 
situation of their viewing, audiences may s%ft subject 
positioning as they interact with the text. 
And this cuts across the unitotal assumptions that underpin 
Modernist theoretical positions in two ways: on the one hand, a 
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negotiated model which includes a heterogeneity of receptions 
offers potential for critical and resistant readings of mainstream 
film and, on the other, it throws into the doubt the validity of 
avant-garde practices for which critical knowledge is produced to 
counter the putative 'unifying' operations of mainstream film 
narrative. However, as Gledhill's exegesis of Coma would suggest, 
it would be foolish to conclude from this that film spectatorship 
is simply a matter of Lyotardian polymorphic 'playl, in which all 
spectators are free to adopt subjectivities at will. As Tagg is 
concerried to note, it is evident that social position and identity 
are constrained by 'relations of domination and subordination'; 
this again suggests caution in underestimating the extent to which 
cultural practices are implicated in the institutionalization of 
gender in-difference. Gledhill does not lose sight of the fact 
that while audiences may shift subject positioning, the 
intersection between 'social' and 'textual' subjects is 
overdetermined. by the ways in which gender is culturally and 
filmically constructed, which necessarily sets limits upon 
spectatorial mobility. 'But if 'gender' is not singular or 
monolithic, a notion of the heterogeniety of 'negotiations' 
available within this seems to be a necessary theoretical 'tool' 
for feminist film theory to employ if class, race, and sexual 
'differences' between women are to be opened up. 
For feminism, when film is understood as a cultural space in 
which diverse subjectivities can contest from a plurality of 
perspectives the 'meaning' of representations of the 'figure of 
wxxnan' 
, 
it becanes evident that: 
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... 
the look of the camera, the gestures and signs of 
human interaction, are not given over once and for all to 
a particular ideology 
- 
unconscious or otherwise. They 
are cultural signs and therefore sites of struggle; 
struggle between male and female ýyices, between class 
voices, ethnic voices, and so on. 
It is not surpising, then, that one of the main targets of 
critiques aimed at 'totalizing' theories of female spectatorship 
has been the monolithic binarisrn of the Mulveyian model of visual 
pleasure. 32 
The chief weakness of the exclusive definition of sexual 
desire in terms of masculine heterosexual desire is not only that 
it assumes a deterministic equivalence between male/female 
spectatorsq masculine/feminine identities and sadistic/masochistic 
positions, but that the spectator is 'presumed to be an already 
fully constituted subject and is fixed by the text to a 
predetermined gender identificationo. 33 Thus to avoid the 
lessentializing' problems noted above, and to respect the notion 
that subjectivity is not fixed but relational, a processual 
understanding of visual pleasure is needed. Here, the primary 
requirement is the separation of gender identification 
(masculine/feminine) from sexual subjectivities and, in her 
analysis of Blue Velvet, Barbara Creed has demonstrated that film 
texts can and do offer multiple 'pleasures' which cut across the 
gender binary. She argues that feminist film theory has paid 
attention to only one of Freud's 'primal fantasies' which describe 
the orgination of identity and sexual difference, that of 
castration, but when the scenarios of copulation and seduction are 
also incorporated, multiple points of identification are offered 
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(masochist/sadist, autoerotic, seducer/sedured, voyeur/object of 
desire). She is also careful to maintain that the 
interchangeability of subject positions is not entirely free from 
constraint. For instance, in the section of Blue Velvet in which 
the investigative male protagonist (Jeffrey) is caught sneaking 
into Dorothy's flat: 
The representation of the seduction fantasy is 
overdetermined by the theme of castration: Jeffrey 
voyeuristically views Dorothy as woman, signifier of 
castration; Dorothy strips Jeffrey naked and threatens him with a knife. Because castration (having and not 
having a penis) means such different things for women and 
men, the freedom of the female and male spectator to 
enter into the scenario via the pr! jýesses of 
identification cannot be unbiased. 
The next sequence in which Jeffrey is hidden in a cupboard and 
witnesses the disturbing sexual encounter between Dorothy and 
Frank, the fluctuation of positions, Creed suggests, enacts the 
primal scene 'from various perspectives: the primal scene as 
parental coupling and the primal scene as birth', which 'merges 
into a scenario marked by Oedipal desire and castration'. 35 
Creed's use of psychoanalysis for theorizing the 'gendering' 
of filmic space does suggest a much more complex notion of 
spectatorial identification which should prove useful for future 
detailed textual analyses of filmic economies of pleasure. 
However, arguing for a mobility of subjectivities within a revised 
Freudian paradigm does not wholly escape from the 'reification of 
modern sexual categories' in that the issue of how female 
homosexual desire is textually 'figured' is not addressed. Jackie 
Stacey's essay is a particularly useful survey of theorists who 
have indicated that Mulvey's theory 
- 
that the female spectacle is 
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'subject' to the dominance of the male gaze 
- 
can only address the 
'pleasures' of a woman spectator in terms of a masochistic 
identification with 'the' female image as seen by the 'bearer of 
the look'. 36 Within this theory, active female desire can only be 
'masculinized'. Stacey draws upon Mary Arm Doane to suggest that 
such psychoanalytical binarism is extremely limited if it is forced 
to explain female homosexual desire in the following terms: 
The woman's sexuality, as spectator, must undergo a 
constant transformation. She must look as if she were a 
man with the phallic power of the gaze, at a woman who 
would attract that gaze, in order to be that woman. The 
convolutions involved here are analogous to those 
described by Julia Kristeva as the 'double or triple 
twists of what we commonly call female homosexualit T ': 
am looking, as a man would, for a woman'; or else, I 
submit myself, as if I were a man who thought he was a 
woman, to a woman who thinks she is a man. 737 
For Valerie Traub, an analysis of a 'mainstream' text such as Black 
Widow would conclude that, despite the accommodation of a 
variability of positioning, psychoanalytic theories of filmic 
subjectivity are ultimately framed by a heterosexual conceptual 
system which necessarily closes down the heterogeneity of gay 
receptions: 
By employing multiple transpositions of identity to 
produce homoerotic tension between two female leads, 
Black Widow solicits a 'lesbian' gaze at the same time 
that it invites male heterosexual enjoyment. 'Lesbian' 
viewing pleasure, however, like male and female 
heterosexual pleasure is constructed around a set of 
overdetermined relations between gender and identity; it 
does not exist outside of, but in complex relation to, 
__? 
orary the 'deployment of sexuality' dominating contem 
discourse. 'Lesbian' appropriation of the 'gaze comes 
only at the price of acquiescence to a system of sexual (gender and erotic) regularization that reproduces 
minant taignomies of sexual (gender and erotic) 
difference. 
And this is an important consideration for acknowledging that calls 
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for a heterogeneous model of spectatorial difference must be 
tempered by an awareness that both filmically and culturally some 
subjectivities are currently precluded from representation. Traub 
argues that the film, like psychoanalysis and ideologies of gender- 
binarism, assigns 'lesbian' viewing pleasure to a position of 
ambiguity, ambiguous, that is, from the point of view of 
'heterosexual hegemony'; within a 'binary telology that upholds a 
structural heterosexuality', 'lesbian' desire cannot be represented 
except by its 'unrepresentability' (the paralogical 'sublime' 
revisited? )39 Thus, a 'lesbian' viewer's negotiation of textual 
pleasure is determined by the conditions in which: 
... 
as much as 'lesbians' independently walk into the 
theater, they are also constructed within the space the 
film affords them. That this space is precisely a locus 
of ambiguity 
- 
both potential and constraint, affordance 
and limitation, a space open for representation and a 
space denied 
- 
suggests that the contradictions within 
Black Widow bear some relation to the status of 'le; bian' 
representation more generally. Ambiguity not only informs 
this film but constitutes the very possibility of 
'lesbian' desire within 48 predominantly heterosexual 
(and 
heterosexist) ideology. 
Traub's use of quotation marks around the term 'lesbian' is 
significant for signalling the heterogeneous relations of 
homoerotic looking and for forestalling the imputation of a fixed 
identity which the following passage confirms: 
Race and class stratification within the 'lesbian' 
spectator are further complicated by differences in 
gender identification and erotic practice. The 'lesbian' 
who identifies as 'butch' may respond differently to Alex 
or Reni than would a 'femme' or 'rough-fluff', and not 
all 'butches', 'rough-fluffs', or 'femmes' would respond 
alike. The bisexual who has chosen a monogamous gay 
relationship may respond to other erotic cues than would 
the woman who has multiple partners. The 'feminist' who 
has adopted a 'lesbian' identity as a political necessity 
may feel differently abouther desires than would the 
woman who feels she has been 'gay' from birth. Needless 
to say, those involved in S/M have different erotic 
tastes from those preferring what has come to be called 
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(reductively, I think) 'vanilla' sex. And, finally, it 
must be said that, dominant ideology to the contrary, 
'lesbian' desire is extant within many putative 
heterosexuals. Indeed, despite the linguistic iimperative 
underlying the division between 'homo' and 'hetero'q 
'lesbian' desire is not oppositional to female 
heterosexual desire 
- 
though what its relation might be (continguous, tangential, interstitial, disterminate) is 
yet to be theorized beyond the psychoanalytic narrative 
that poses 4 
'lesbian' desire as that which must be 
repressed. 1 
Within this narrative, however, the space for the representation of 
lesbian 'difference' is paralleled by the larger 'logic' of closure 
in Black Widow which first articulates 'lesbian' desire, rendering 
it visible, then reencode(s) it as invisible, inarticulate': 
Black Widow is constructed around two mirroring I inconsistencies 
- 
Reni's desire for Alex and Alex s 
desire for Reni 
- 
and it is only within these gaps that 
the representation of anything 'lesbian' can emerge. 
Moments of textual excess 
- 
moments not required by the 
logic of plot, but instead functioning to 
I upset 
the 
coherence of,. ýhe narrative 
- 
instantiate lesbian' desire 
in the film. ', '- 
'Lesbian' viewing pleasures, her argument suggests, must be 
negotiated in the absence of full subjectivity or coherent lesbian 
identity. It is interesting to compare this with Dana Polan's 
observation that an Althusserian definition of ideology, founded 
upon the assumption that the reproduction of dominant ideology 
rests on the 'unifying' function of subject-interpellation, needs 
to be reconsidered in the light of spectators who are actually 'de- 
positioned, cut off from transcendental control, given no sense of 
power, no logic': that is, offered 'no interpellative space'. 
43 
Once again, this reflects a critical light upon transgressive 
avant-garde strategies aimed at the dissolution of the 'unified' 
self: for 'many women there can be no prior subject or self whose 
fragemenation becomes a political necessity, source of nostalgic 
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regret, or hedonistic jouissancet. 44 
But even granting that the proliferation of potential filmic 
subjer-t-positions within a psychoanalytic framework circumvents the 
worst excesses of 'unitotal' theories of female subjectivity (which 
for lesbian viewers it evidently does not), it nonetheless elides 
the issue that female spectators are also 'placed' by discourses of 
'self' which relate very specifically to race and class 
'difference'. Alile Sharon Larkin argues that white feminism must 
grasp the consequences if it fails adequately to recognize the 
'totality of oppression' (econanic, racial and sexual) that black 
women and women of colour are 'subjected' to/by: 
Feminism succumbs to racism when it segregates Black 
women from Black men and dismisses our history. The 
assumption that Black women and white women share 
identical or similar histories and experiences presents 
an important problem. Historically, white women have also 
been our oppressors. Historically, Black men have abused 
us, but they have never held the kind of power that white 
women hold in this culture. Both historically and 
currently, white women participate in and reap the 
benefits of white supremacy. Feminism must address these 
issues, otherwise its ahistorical approach toward45 Black 
women can and does maintain institutional racism. 
This perspective certainly throws into relief the extent to which 
feminist film theories of spectatorship have proceeded under 
lunitotal' 'white' assumptions which disregard 'the position white 
women occupy over black men as well as black women'. 
46 Black women 
and women of colour 'live in a culture in which the dominant gaze 
47 is not only male, but white', and Jane Gaines has considered how 
filndcally 'racial difference structures a hierarchy of access to 
the female image'. In an analysis of Mahogany, Gaines argues that 
the positioning of a less privileged black male gaze overrides 'the 
patriarchal scenario feminists have theorized as formally 
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determiningo. 48 She draws upon the historical formation of white 
discourses on black sexuality during the period of post-slavery 
Reconstruction to identify the structures of 'looking' that the 
film enacts. Gaines argues that the lynching of black men on 
imagined or trumped-up charges of raping white women while white 
men habitually violated black women offers: 
... 
a sexual scenario to rival the Oedipus myth: the black women sexually violated by the white man, but the fact of her rape repressed and displaced on to the 
virginal white woman, and thus used symbolically as the justj&ication for the actual castration of the black 
man. 
Thus the monopolization by the film's white photographer of 
Tracy/Diana Ross's sexualized image (the 'classic patriarchal look 
controlling the view of the female bodyl repudiates 
- 
symbolically 
castrates 
- 
the black protagonist's look. 
At a broader level, Manthia Diawara has argued for the 
heuristic device of an 'interchangeablity of the terms "black 
spectator" and "resisting spectator"' where 'black spectators may 
circumvent identification and resist the persuasive elements of 
Hollywood narrative and spectatcle, 50 because they are often 
. 
already, to recall Polan, 'depositioned, cut of f frcxn 
transcendental control'. Diawara's analysis, like Gaines's, 
proposes that even where Hollywood utilizes black actors as 
protagonists (for instance Eddie Murphy), their 'textual 
deracination or isolation' and narrative/visual 'punishment' 
tliwarts the possibility of postively coded identification. These 
analyses relating to identification exceed the confines of 
traditional psychoanalytic film theory which rests on the 
lconstituitive moment' of Lacanian 'difference' with the entry into 
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language: 
The position of the spectator in the cinematic apparatus 
has been described by recourse to the mirror phase, 
suggesting that the metapsychology of identification (with the camera or point of enunciation) entails a 
narcissistic form of regression which leads to the 
infant's illusion of a unified ego. But since spectators 
are socially and historically as well as psychically 
constituted, it is not clear whether the experiTices of black spectators are included in this analysis. 
As Gaines notes: 'How can the formative moment of one's entry into 
language be the one condition overriding all other determining 
conditions of social existenceV52 This sets up a complex series of 
questions about identification and spectatorship. For instance: 
what does the notion of a subordinate black male gaze imply for the 
pleasures of white female spectatorship? Can white male (or even 
female) spectators take pleasure in looking at a white female 
character via the gaze of a black male character? How do some 
black spectators identify with white representations of blacks in 
dominant cinema? Does experiencing oppression in terms of race 
before gender cut cross the assumption that women are invariably 
forced to adopt the positionality of the obiectification and 
fetishization of their like when their 'like' is white? Or, how do 
black female spectators identify with the structures of looking and 
desire that promise the image of a white woman as its obiect? 
Again, a homogeneously construed notion of black spectators should 
not obscure the potential multiplicity of responses to these 
questions. 
As with 'lesbian' challenges to psychoanalytical binary- 
defined models of patterns of spectatorial pleasure, film theories 
of black spectatorship begin from a position of absence: 
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How is the black subject sutured into a place that 
includes it only as a term of negation? What does the 
black spectator identify with when his/hWr-mirror image is structurally absent or present only as Other? In the 
past, it was assumed that all social subjects acceded to 
to the narcissistic pleasure of the 'mirror phase' in 
their misrecognition of themselves as the subject of 
enunciation, returned thus normalised and passified I subjects' of ideological subjection (this was the basis 
of Barthes' distinction between 'pleasure' and 'bliss'). But what if certain social categories of spectator do not have access, is it were, to the initial moment of 
recognition? 5 
It is partly for this specialized reason that I have argued that 
the metanarrative of emancipation must break-up under the pressures 
for a representation of 'difference' in both mainstream cinema and 
the dominant theories used to analyse them. 
These theoretical perspectives suggest that the multiplicity 
of ways of 'being f emale' must be matched by theories which respect 
the different determinations acting upon a feminist consciousness. 
However, within the context of this study, I cannot hope to do 
iustice to the sheer complexity of issues resulting from challenges 
to what are undoubtedly unitotal perspectives derived f rom the 
Modernist feminist emancipatory narrative. What can be said, 
though, is that a post-narrative politics of f ilm cannot sustain 
the privileged position of a 'unitotal' conception of the feminist 
' social bond', and, from the position of 'multiplicity', theories 
of spectatorship produced fr(xn the discursive emplacement of white, 
heterosexual feminism must accept a more 'partial' status than has 
hitherto been evident from feminist film theory. But, again, this 
is not to suggest that accepting 'partial' status is equivalent to 
invalidation. By way of a Conclusion, I want to reflect upon this 
study to situate some remarks on the meaning of a postmodernist 
'incredulity towards metanarratives'. 
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CONCLJJSION 
My application of the thesis of The Postmodern Condition to 
the politics of film began with an attempt to formulate some means 
by which a concept of Modernism might be grourxied. Having 
identified thatq retrospectively, the epistemological resources of 
Modernism could be bifurcated along the axes of Lyotard's grands 
recits, my interest in locating feminism somewhere against these 
poles suggested that the radical claims of speculative film were 
undermined by the fact that its model of spectatorship was a 
properly 'unitotal' one. The pursuit of anti-representational 
medium specificity, theorized as a mode of cinema to counter 
dominant narrative realist forms 
, 
could take no account of the view 
that the ideological forms of 'Hollywood' oppression are gender 
specific. Hence feminism's need for emancipatory film practices 
which could address, and potentially break with, dominant cinematic 
mechanisms of ýpasochistic. identification: 'suture', narrative, 
frame canposition, visual signification of the female body, etc. 
From my reading of Lyotard and other theorists of postmodernism, it 
became evident to me that these film practices were themselves 
subscribing to metadiscursive homogeneity. This recognition has 
encouraged recent feminist theorists to rest a Lyotardian critique 
of 'totalization' on the basis that Modernist feminism has not been 
free from its own forms of 'unitotal' power politics. Shelagh 
Young, in her contribution to The Female Gaze (1988) takes a tough 
line on the assumptions which determined that the liberational 
strategies of early feminism were prima ily defined by a privileged 
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(white, middle-class, intellectual) cx)hort. 1 Young uses Foucault 
to argue that early feminism constructed a 'unitotal' feminist 
I subject' through the production of a feminist 'discourse' of 
resistance (taking 'discourse' to be the imbrication of power, 
knowledge and domination). Henceg for Young, the emergence of 
dissenting Others (Blackg Third World, Irish, working-classi) have 
shaken the 'power' base of white feminist politics and thrown into 
relief the extent to which feminist resistance to patriarchy 
quickly hardened into a feminist orthodoxy: 
The irony of this feminist resistance is that in opposing 
the privilege 
,s of knowledge and the construction of women 
as 'feminine' subiects, a form of feminist knowledge, a feminist discourse which actually excludes and oppresses 
some women has I volved with its own regime of governing 
the individual. 
Further: 
In clinging on to the idea that a relatively privileged 
minority of women could concoct a plan for liberation for 
all women, Western feminism deludes itself. Founded on a 
startling ignorance of questions of age, race, sexuality 
and class, the shared assumptions of a relatively small 
number of politically active women on the Left came to 
form the basis of a feminist discourse that defined the 
parameters of Jeminist politics, practices and 
subjectivity. 
I would, however, question the recent retrospective tendency of 
some to regard feminism of the 1960's/70's as a wholly monolithic 
and oppressive theoretical/political movement, and hazard the view 
that feminism has exhibited a sensitivity to its constituents which 
can be found in no other politically orientated social 
theory/practice. But more importantly, I have not found a coherent 
body of 'Modernist' feminist 'orthodoxy' which claims to be in a 
position to enforce homogeneity and forbid the right of Others to 
speak. A more historically grounded sense of Second Wave 
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feminism's emergence would suggest that gender theorists: 
... 
cleared a spacev described a new territory, which 
radically altered the male-normative terms of discussion 
about reality and experience; they forced recognition of 
the difference gender makes. Academic traditions were 
challenged, sometimes in their most basic self- 
conceptions 
- 
as in philosophy, which has made an icon of 
the ideal of an abstract, universal reason, a reason 
without race, class, gender, or history (the 'view from 
nowhere'... ). There is no view from nowhere, feminists 
insisted; the 'view -From nowhere' may itself be 4 male 
construction of the possibilities for EiowTe-dge. 
In other words, feminism was defined by its demands for recognition 
of the locatedness and partiality of critical perspectives 
formulated from the margins of cultural power: feminism emerges out 
of the experience of exclusion and thus, in principle, has little 
invested in universalizing theories which reproduce invisibility 
and repression at other levels. As a marginal discourse within 
society as a whole, it has never equalled the taken-for-granted- 
ness of the institutional and theoretical dominance of the 'view 
from nowhere'. While Young's position lucidly highlights the 
(necessarily) 'unitotal' pitfall of early feminist epistemlogies, 
turning Lyotard's critique of 'totalization' upon feminism conceals 
one vital fact - that not all totalizing narratives are ; for 
'feminist theory 
- 
even the work of white, upper-class women - is 
5 
not located at the centre of cultural power'. The form or degree 
of feminist 'domination' that Young's analysis is concerned with is 
of quite a different order than the real historical 'terrorisms' 
perpetrated in the Name of 'master' discourses. My own analysis 
bas recognized the validity of claims that the work of 'white, 
upper/middle class, intellectual' feminists can be criticized for 
not taking adequate account of the heterogeneity of its 
constituents. Fr(xn this perspective, the 'High Iheory' assumptions 
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of theories of both mainstream and Modernist avant-garde practices 
need to be challenged for offering as transcendental assumptions 
and emancipatory strategies which are clearly historically and 
culturally limited. But this is not enough to ground a full-scale 
delegitmation of feminist claims per se. Feminism, however 
construed, has not achieved anything like 'compulsory' status. I 
think it is very important to recognize that this points to a 
larger problem with Lyotard's critique of 'totalization, and with 
a post-narrative theory of language 'pragmatics', if it cannot: 
... 
distinguish between raising a validity claim and forcin someone to believe in something, between the 
coordination of action between participants on the basis 
of conviction generated through agreement and the 6 
manipulative influencing of the behaviour of others. 
In linguistic terms, a demand is of a different order than a 
petitioner's request, and a theory which 'regards language as an 
evocative medium, in which validity and force, reasoned belief and 
manipulated opinion can no longer be distinguished' will inevitably 
lead to the view that 'claims to validity are at best pious wishes, 
7 
at worst illusions fabricated to dec-eive'. It is crucial to 
distinguish between metanarratives which are coercively and 
compulsorily maintained, and those that cannot claim (and do not 
s 'M. MIr eek) this authority. As I have already indicated, feminism does 
not have to be premissed on a monolithic notion of patriarchy, nor 
confine gender analysis to the 'object' of oppression in terms of 
bi-polar male/female, white, heterosexual economies of 'self'. I 
would hope that the force of an epistemological frame in which 
identity (set against 'fixed' and 'unitotal' notions of a female or 
a feminist 'self') is construed relationally can be employed to 
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deny the conceptual grourxis upon which hierarchical positions of 
privilege, dominance and exclusion are constructed. Again, I would 
be wary if this formulation is taken surreptitiously to invest 
feminism with the status of primary interpretative discourse. Jane 
Gaines has addressed the issue that a sensitivity to the diversity 
of ways in which women of different racial, sexual and class groups 
experience oppression should encourage the analyst 'not to do what 
middle-class feminists have historically done: to assume 
responsibility for everyone. Drawing upon Marilyn Frye, she 
states: 
To take it upon oneself to rewrite feminist theory so 
that it encompasses our differences is another exercise 
of racial privilege... and therefore all one can do with 
conscience, is to undergake the study of our own 
'determined ignorance'. 
I wonder, then, if my observations on a politics of multiplicity 
that might be formulated against the Modernist 'traps' of unitotal 
thinking (which suggest that there are a plurality of possibilities 
for being positioned as a female spectator), remain embedded within 
the discourse of 'privilege? In one sense, as a white, 
heterosexual, middle-class wornan, the terms of my analysis of the 
meaning of Modernism and postmodernism which situated them has 
inevitably been a 'partial' one. Perhaps this is to do no more and 
no less than to recognize that critical positions are limited, and 
that theorists need to signal clearly the 'partiality' of their 
perspectives within feminism. Nonetheless, this also brings into 
focus that there is a negative register to a politics of 
heterogeneity: postInDdernist 'ine-redulity' towards metanarratives 
of emancipation can be allied to a form of discursive repression in 
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which to 'speak to' or 'on behalf of' is tantamount to 'terrorism'. 
This aside, it is indisputable that cultural domination is 
exercised on the assumption that female identities (white, black, 
women of colour, lesbian) are limited and 'fixed' by gender 
determinations: it is for this reason that I cannot see that 
dispensing with a gendered framework of enquiry which provides 
conceptual resources for analysing and contesting highly specific 
modes of the polymorphous deployment of power is the precondition 
for empowering 'Others'. Pursuing the delegitimation of all 
emancipatory metanarratives in the belief that this will lead to a 
comfortable scenario of the happy co-existence of equal 'partial' 
differences is naive. The geo-political break-up of totalitarian 
States in Eastern Europe serves as a reminder that the 
fragmentation of 'metanarrative' bonding does not automatically 
bring with it freedom from repression and the right to self- 
determination but also nationalistic separatism, ethnic intolerance 
and a refusal of the 'Other's' right to speak. 
Lyotard's critique of emancipatory metanarratives such as 
Marxism was based on the view that without a Modernist 'unitotal' 
model of the social bond, its liberational claims were 'reduced to 
the status of a 'hope' or 'utopia' (PC, p. 13). 1 would suggest 
that Lyotard's notion of the consequences of a fragmented bond is 
similarly underwritten by utopian thinking. In this, I find myself 
anticipated by Seyla Benhabib who has argued cogently for a more 
salutary understanding of Lyotard's vision of a 'iust' society, 
founded upon a post-metanarrative polytheism. His position 'either 
assumes that culture and society are harmonious wholes or that the 
struggles within them are plays only': 
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The assumption that language games would be games of 
perfect information suggests that language games do not 
compete, struggle with, and contradict one another, 
-not in the sense of jousting in a tournament but in the 
actual sense of struggling to delegitlimize, 9 overpower, and silence the language game of the other. 
I share wholeheartedly Benhabib's conclusion that 'in the absence 
of radical, democratic measures redressing economic, social, and 
cultural inequalities and forms of subordination, the pluralistic 
vision of groups Lyotard proposes remains naive'. 10 Consequently, 
the idea that simply petitioning for representation in film 
practice and theory is enough to have that petition met is cynical. 
To suggest this is to ignore the very real financial, 
institutional, cultural and ideological inequalities which exclude 
from the means of representing 'Other' cultural identities 
(including feminist) in non-oppressive forms. Perhaps, then, 
disaffection with the 'radical' capacities of art and the recent 
shift in attention to notions of the heterogeneity of spectators, 
to instabilities and to moments of contradiction within 
contemporary film, is a pragmatic acknowledgement of unequal 
access, making a virtue out of the necessity that it is only in the 
reception of texts that inequalities ran be represented. 
The call for heterogeneity does suggest other implications for 
the fate of Modernist avant-garde practices: the political need for 
representation proposes a different agenda than the anti-narrative, 
anti-illusionist, anti-representational and formalist avant-garde 
practices sanctioned either by Modernist speculative practices or 
feminist deconstructionism. Larkin's article suggests that a 
primary concern of independent black women film makers emerging in 
the late 1970's was for 'self-definling' representations of black 
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female identities to counter institutionalized cinematic and 
televisual racist stereotypes (e. g. Contented Slave, Local Colour 
Negro, Exotic Primitive, Tragic Mulatto) 
- 
the formularized 
denotations of an absence of identity. Andrea Stuart's reading of 
Spielberg's film of Alice Walker's The Color Purple (1985) suggests 
that the politics of black film spectatorship cannot be theorized 
within a model of postmodernism which does not acknowledge the need 
for identity, and for representation. Stuart concludes: 
Because it is only when we have more varied, indeed just 
more, images in the mainstream that negative reductive 
stereotypes can begin to be effectively challenged. And 
it is only when we participate in the creation of these 
images of ourselves that we can expect to seelff 
reflections in the mirror of popular culture. ' 
Similarly, the collective authors of 'Lesbians and Film' emphasize 
the need for films which are concerned with 'the affirmation of 
identity', which 'reclaim history, offer self-definition and create 
9 12 alternative visions 
- 
This would lend support to my earlier 
conclusion that the Modernist aesthetic of displeasure and 
deconstruction of the 'self' are only options for a few: instead, 
the postmodernist 'condition' of excluded and culturally oppressed 
identities (black, gay, lesbian and, I would still insist, most 
white, heterosexual women) can be theorized in terms of 'requests' 
for theories and film practices which produce narratives, images 
and textual languages which answer the need for identification, for 
desire, for pleasure - for difference. But this opens up another 
set of issues which returns discussion to the debates which also 
characterized 'unitotal' feminist film making during the 1960's and 
1970's: what filmic discourses, methods or strategies are most 
appropriate for articulating politicalq emancipatory cinema? 
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Realism? Documentary? Narrative? Textually trangressive? 
Parallel debates have been held in the context of lesbian, gay, 
women of colour and black film politics: for instance, the 'social 
and political imperatives' that have motivated black independent 
film makers to utilize documentary cinema verite 'do not dissolve 
their dependency on ideologically problematic forms': 
Realist methods... operate within aesthetic values 
central to dominant film and media culture.. 
- 
While such 
film can offer an immediate source of alternative 
information, 'such communicative efficacy in providing 
counter-information exhausts itself once the political 
terrain changes'. In addition, the tenet of authenticity 
is virtually incompatible with the strictures of 
narrative drama, since 'typical' experiences are presumed 
to stand, ýor every black person's perception of 
reality. ' 
Or, the notion that positive lesbian images can be articulated 
within basically tmchanged narrative realism is limited by the 
'fact that positive imagesq like negative images, suppress 
contradiction and are thus static'. 
14 On the other hand, as 
outlined in Chapter Three with regard to feminist debates on the 
possibilities for political film, black, gay or lesbian film makers 
and critics have argued that formal inventiveness and textual 
strategies of disruption need to be employed to avoid complicity 
with the daninant cinematic structures which consistently function 
to oppress and silence them: hence the 'objective alliance' with 
Modernist avant-gardism. But, several critics have indicated that 
the adoption of avant-garde strategies for those groups and 
cultures I have ambivalently labelled 'Others' cannot be a question 
of an easy assimilation into the Modernist avant-garde/mass media 
position of 'oppositionality'- I argued in the last Chapter that 
cultural and technological shifts in the image culture of Western 
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socities should radically challenge the strategies of avant-gardism 
defined a2ainst 'mass' culture. In this context, it is important 
to recognize that the institutionalization of the 'avant-garde' has 
other implications for those 'Others' who can legimately claim 
that, historicallyq Modernist avant-gardes have also operated as a 
site of domination, control and exclusion. Coco Fusco's review of 
a proliferation of conferences, exhibitions and screeings of black 
and Latin American film within the institutionalized avant-garde 
locations of Boston and New York is particularly poignant: 
The 'avant-garde' and 'socially conscious' institutional 
engagement in the 'discovery' of the 'other' is also, 
however, collective amnesia of past entanglements and, in 
more recent memory, of dismissive rejection. Although the 
promotional mechanisms would have it otherwise, there is 
nothing new about the so-called 'other' or its discovery. 
Western cultural institutions such as the avant-garde 
have a history of rejuvenating themselves through Jýe 
exploitation of disempowered peoples and cultures. 
SlAilarly, in 'Two Kinds of Otherness: Black Film and the Avant- 
Garde', Judith Williamson echoes de Lauretis's observations on 
feminism's relationship to the instituionalized avant-garde by 
questioning what I have argued are Modernist metanarrative 
differentiations: 'to be productively oppositional, the place 
occupied by the avant-garde as the structured-in opposite of the 
mainstream is something we have to be aware of,. 
16 Several critics 
have observed the process by which the 'Otherness' of gay, black 
and Third World cinema is recuperated for its 'avant-gardeness' 
rather than for its political or critical import (a fate I would 
argue characterized feminist avant-garde film making). The 
politics of fragmentation suggest that a vision of 
'objective 
alliances' within the institutionalized avant-garde is itself 
caught within Western Modernist discourses which are erq)owered with 
-341- 
the ability to position the production of films by culturally ex- 
centric 'Others': 
The attention to the 'others' stresses 'otherness'l 
reaffirming the role of the intellectual who interprets 
those experiences. Not only does the institutional 
preference for ethnic testimony confirm the dependency of Third World artists on intellectual intermediaries, it 
also functions to create an illusion of authenticity 
- that 'real' others are called to speak for the category 
they represent, producing a spectacle of identity, 
atomised, stereotyped, and fetishised by the setting and 
structure of the event*17- 
From a wider perspective, one important element to be considered in 
the dissolution of the 'narrative' of Western avant-gardes is the 
'potential break-up or deconstruction of structures which determine 
what is regarded as culturally central and what is regarded as 
culturally marginal': 
Ethnicity has emerged as a key issue as various 
'marginal' practices (black British film, for instance) 
are becoming de-marginalised at a time when 'centred 
discourses' of cultural authority and le0timation (such 
as notions of trans-historical artistic canon') are 
being increasingly de-centV@d and destabilised, called 
into question from within. " 
It is at this point that a delegitmation of 'instrumental' 
perspectives must be taken to mean that debates upon which film 
practices are radical, and which are not, is beyond the 
recuperation of metadiscursive prescription. The logic of my 
observations on spectatorial heterogeneity suggests that, unlike in 
Modernist avant-gardist philosophies, it is simply not possible (or 
desirable) to make any A priori claim about the political capacity 
or effectivity of film, mainstream or experimental, to establish 
theoretically how a single film language or 'aesthetic' practice 
can determine its reception. Put another way, in the absence of 
'unitotal' guarantees, a postmodernist politics of representation 
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L- 
neuxis to take into ac=xnt that criteria for the 'validity' of 
knowledges are provisional, contextual and local: specific film 
practices are not political, but they can be and are politicized by 
'communities' of cultural readers. Admittedly, this is an 
inconclusive and unresolved position but a principled one: I 
believe that it is only in this way that a space for heterogeneous 
'petitions for iustice' can be secA ed. 
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